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Abstract 
The Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Request (TASAR) concept applies onboard automation for 
the purpose of advising the pilot of route modifications that would be beneficial to the flight. 
Leveraging onboard computing platforms with connectivity to avionics and diverse data sources 
on and off the aircraft, TASAR introduces a new, powerful capability for in-flight trajectory 
management to the cockpit and its flight crew that is anticipated to induce a significant culture 
change in airspace operations. Flight crews empowered by TASAR and its derivative technologies 
could transform from today’s flight plan followers to proactive trajectory managers, taking an 
initial critical step towards increasing autonomy in the airspace system. TASAR was developed as 
a catalyst for operational autonomy, a future vision where the responsibilities and authorities of 
trajectory management reside with the aircraft operator and are distributed among participating 
aircraft, thus fulfilling a vision dating back decades and enabling a fully scalable airspace system. 
This NASA Technical Paper maps TASAR to its foundational vision and traces its research and 
development from initial concept generation to an operational evaluation by a U.S. airline in 
revenue service, the final stage before technology transfer and commercialization. 
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1. Introduction 
On July 24, 2018, Alaska Airlines conducted the first commercial-airline revenue flight with 
NASA's Traffic Aware Planner (TAP) prototype software installed onboard. Alaska Airlines pilots 
used TAP to optimize the flight path, saving substantial fuel and flight time, thereby saving 
operating cost and carbon emissions. This first flight and the dozens of evaluation flights that 
followed prepared Alaska Airlines to potentially lead the world in implementing “Traffic Aware 
Strategic Aircrew Requests” (TASAR), a novel and patented NASA concept for en route flight-
path optimization and a transformational advancement toward future operational autonomy in the 
national airspace. It is a rare achievement to transition NASA research software from the 
laboratory to a commercial airline operational environment, and the achievement is a testament to 
the diverse, multi-organizational team that collaborated over a seven-year period to execute an 
aggressive strategy of research, development, testing, deployment, and operational evaluation. 
Augmenting the non-reimbursable partnership between NASA Langley Research Center and 
Alaska Airlines were self-funded industry leaders Collins Aerospace, Gogo Commercial Aviation, 
and Aviation Communications & Surveillance Systems, each making valuable contributions 
critical to the success of the operational evaluation and therefore to the future potential of the 
technology in airspace operations. The fact that these companies would invest their own funds 
over multiple years in the TASAR evaluation illuminates the degree of interest and traction this 
new technology has quickly achieved in the commercial sector and previews the potential long-
term success of the technology and its strategic goals. 
The Alaska Airlines operational evaluation of TASAR was the culminating activity of a research 
and development strategy that attempted to motivate the first stages of a new transformation to a 
long-held vision of aircraft operational autonomy in the airspace system [1]–[5]. This vision holds 
that aircraft operators, when supported by advanced cockpit-based trajectory-management 
automation infused with real-time information about the dynamically evolving airspace 
environment, are able to independently oversee and safely manage the aircraft’s route throughout 
the majority of their flight even in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), as many aircraft 
do today in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) operating under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). 
An expansion of the vision also holds that such “autonomous operations” can safely and equitably 
share the airspace on a non-interfering basis with aircraft operating under Instrument Flight Rules 
(IFR) within the dominion and active oversight of Air Traffic Control (ATC) [6]. Introducing 
aircraft operational autonomy in this manner, through a concept of “Autonomous Flight Rules” 
(AFR), offers tremendous potential for airspace capacity to grow substantially to meet future 
demand while posing no threat to the complex IFR and ATC system of today and the aircraft 
operators choosing to continue operating under IFR. 
Achieving this vision of aircraft operational autonomy in IMC will require infusion of new 
cockpit technology and a culture shift in the role of the pilot. The technology will perform the 
functions needed to maintain a safe and efficient plan for the aircraft as it proceeds through the 
challenges of the airspace ahead (e.g., dense traffic, wind changes, dynamic weather). The culture 
shift may be more difficult to achieve than the technology in that it requires pilots to be active 
trajectory managers throughout the flight. Pilots operating under IFR today perform this role at 
times but typically only for limited periods when maneuvering tactically around weather. The 
culture in IFR otherwise dictates that pilots will generally follow the plan devised for their flight 
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and filed with ATC before departure, and they will follow instructions from ATC while en route 
for purposes of traffic separation and flow management. Aircraft operational autonomy will need 
an evolved pilot culture that is more “proactive trajectory manager” than “reactive plan follower” 
(similar to IFR flight near weather, and VFR flight nearly always) where pilots are less constrained 
by an initial plan and are both empowered and encouraged to make changes as desired throughout 
the flight.  
TASAR was developed as an innovative strategy to promote both of these elements essential to 
achieving future operational autonomy: new cockpit technology enabling airborne trajectory 
management and a culture shift for pilots toward being proactive airborne trajectory managers. 
The innovation of TASAR is to introduce the technology of future operational autonomy into 
current day operations, inducing a gradual shift in technology and culture towards airborne 
trajectory management and generating initial momentum in the airspace community toward future 
operational autonomy [7]. By focusing on the non-safety-critical aspect of airborne trajectory 
management, i.e., flight efficiency optimization, TASAR will enable the technology to safely 
mature at a measured pace through actual operational use and refinement toward its eventual future 
safety-critical function, while generating benefits for its operators through improvements in flight 
efficiency. At the same time, TASAR will begin to encourage that culture shift by acclimating 
pilots (and eventually all flight operations stakeholders) to the use of advanced cockpit-based 
trajectory management tools in their normal piloting routine.  
NASA’s TASAR project was instituted in order to build a prototype of the cockpit technology 
and prepare it for technology transfer to the commercial aviation industry. The intent was for the 
technology to be commercialized and adopted by the airline community and eventually other 
aircraft operator communities. A series of activities were defined to facilitate successful and rapid 
technology transfer and to minimize risks of adoption by airlines. Such activities included 
preliminary assessments of expected benefits, safety, and approval requirements; development of 
airline pilot training materials; simulation evaluations of human factors; NASA flight trials using 
flight-test aircraft; and finally an operational evaluation by a partner airline in commercial revenue 
service. 
This report summarizes the TASAR project from conception to its current state of completion: 
the Alaska Airlines operational evaluation and initial commercialization. Although many 
publications document the individual TASAR activities in greater detail, this report presents the 
full arc of the project. The project is somewhat unique given the span of technology readiness 
levels (TRL) achieved within a relatively short period for a NASA cockpit technology. This report 
is intended to aid and inspire future projects with similar goals, enhancing NASA’s ability to make 
further significant contributions to its Aeronautics mission and the airspace operations community. 
It also informs that community on the motivation and pedigree of TASAR. 
The report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 further explores the motivation for TASAR. 
Chapter 3 summarizes the TASAR concept. Chapter 4 describes the objectives and approach for 
the project. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 review the various analytical assessments (benefits, safety, and 
approval) performed early in the project. Chapter 8 describes market research and community 
engagement in TASAR. Chapter 9 describes TAP, NASA’s prototype automation technology for 
TASAR. Chapters 10 and 11 review the human factors simulations and NASA flight trials. Chapter 
12 summarizes the airline operational evaluation. Chapter 13 looks beyond the TASAR project to 
commercialization and potential derivative technologies on the roadmap to operational autonomy. 
Chapter 14 presents conclusions.  
 3 
 
2. Motivation 
The motivation for the TASAR project is rooted in an area of preceding NASA research: 
operational autonomy for airspace users. TASAR was conceived as a catalyst for achieving this 
future vision, wherein airspace users have the option to self-manage their aircraft trajectories while 
assuming the full responsibilities of safety. To provide the proper context, this report first reviews 
the motivation for operational autonomy. Discussion of the motivation for TASAR then follows 
in two parts: enabling this future vision of operational autonomy, and in the process, enhancing 
current-day flight efficiency. 
2.1.  Motivation for Future Operational Autonomy  
At the highest level, all research in the NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate is 
motivated by the vision set forth in the Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) [8]. As the SIP states, 
the vision “encompasses a broad range of technologies to meet future needs of the aviation 
community, the nation, and the world for safe, efficient, flexible, and environmentally sustainable 
air transportation.” Among the six Strategic Thrusts listed in the SIP, three support the need for 
research into operational autonomy in aviation operations: Safe, Efficient Growth in Global 
Operations; Real-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance; and Assured Autonomy for Aviation 
Transformation. Even though these Strategic Thrusts were formulated long after NASA’s 
operational autonomy research began in the late 1990s, they underscore the continuing relevance 
of the research today. The key strategic goal for NASA Aeronautics in the 1990s and early 2000s 
focused on the need to significantly increase airspace system capacity with no compromise in 
safety. Specifically the stated goal was to triple airspace capacity (3X), no small order considering 
the National Airspace System (NAS) is fundamentally limited in capacity due, in part, to the 
reliance on human air traffic controllers to ensure traffic separation. 
A relevant historical review of the origins of navigation and separation in IMC is provided in 
reference [6]. The review shows that the fundamental limitation in IMC operations that led to the 
current system of IFR under ATC control was lack of visibility in the clouds. Pilots could not see 
the ground to navigate, and so electronic navigation aids emerged which solved this problem but 
created another: a concentration of aircraft on prescribed “airways” and the associated collision 
hazard particularly at their intersections. Since aircraft could also not see each other in the clouds, 
ATC expanded its role from runway adjudication for arriving and departing traffic to also assist in 
separating en route aircraft. Initial use of so-called “procedural” separation methods were 
eventually replaced by radar, but over decades the role of ATC in managing en route traffic was 
institutionalized and largely has not changed. Today, with the advent of satellite precision 
navigation and air-to-air traffic surveillance via Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast 
(ADS-B), the original cause for operational limitations no longer exists. It would not be a 
significant issue, except for the limitations still imposed on aircraft operators to accommodate the 
structure and needs of the ATC system that serves them. By and large, IFR aircraft are still 
concentrated onto airways and all still use ATC services for traffic separation. Emerging 
technologies do not appear poised to make a significant difference. Position broadcasts via ADS-
B will soon be required of nearly all aircraft, but only to supplement and eventually replace the 
radar data source used for providing ATC services that will remain largely the same. Data 
communications will soon supplement and may eventually supplant the bulk of voice 
Motivation 
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communications, but the capacity of the airspace system will still be restricted by the cognitive 
capacity of human controllers to track and communicate with each aircraft in their sector.  
The primary motivators for the vision of airspace-user operational autonomy, defined here as 
self-governance, are these long standing inefficiencies imposed on IFR aircraft operators and the 
capacity limits of the ATC system [1]-[6]. Among its contributions, NASA produced a concept for 
introducing user operational autonomy into the airspace system that through its very name, 
“Autonomous Flight Rules,” invokes the proposed solution: create an additional formalized set of 
operating rules to complement VFR and IFR that is tailored to enable operational autonomy in 
IMC (similar to how VFR enables operational autonomy in VMC). In this concept, AFR flights 
will be non-segregated, sharing the airspace with IFR and VFR flights in “mixed operations.” 
Reference [9] details the AFR concept and how mixed operations would be enabled. References 
[6] and [9] discuss anticipated AFR benefits and their bases: improving safety, improving 
efficiency, reducing delay, increasing flexibility, lowering costs, and reducing implementation 
risk. Scalable capacity is achieved in AFR by removing the aircraft from the IFR system and the 
attendant ATC responsibilities for monitoring and separation. NASA’s research activities on “self-
separation” and AFR, encompassing many studies, simulations, and human-in-the-loop 
experiments over a 12-year period, have answered many research questions including the scalable-
capacity characteristic of AFR by demonstrating safe separation at traffic densities of 5x recent 
levels and above [10]. Mixed AFR-IFR operations studied from both the pilot and controller 
perspectives demonstrated operationally acceptable integration in shared airspace [11]. The overall 
finding from 12 years of research on AFR was a feasible concept of operations capable of meeting 
the significant challenge of achieving the growing capacity needs of the airspace system and the 
flexible operation needs of the aircraft operator community. 
2.2. TASAR Motivation #1: Enable Future Operational Autonomy  
As affirmative research findings of AFR accumulated, a critical question emerged: how do we 
get there from here? Certainly a significant rule-making effort would be required to codify the 
AFR rule set and establish performance standards for the enabling technologies. But what will 
motivate the industry to overcome inertia and initiate such efforts? An answer emerged in a 
realization that the technologies that enable AFR to benefit future airspace operators can also 
provide benefit to operators today. Non-safety-critical elements of the future technology could 
potentially be fielded to meet a current need, thereby getting the basic infrastructure in place. Over 
time, the technology would mature through operational use and likely expand to new applications, 
some of which may potentially track in the direction toward future operational autonomy. 
Reference [7] lays out such a potential roadmap to autonomy. A guiding principle of this roadmap 
is that each step along the way would be a beneficial and suitable end state, should the target goal 
of operational autonomy (i.e., AFR) or any preceding steps not be achievable. TASAR, envisioned 
as the first step in this roadmap, must hold to this principle as well. To be successful in initiating 
a transformation toward AFR, TASAR would need to be adopted by the community on its own 
merits. Its purpose, however, is to provide a real-world, current-day implementation of the 
technology and infrastructure needed for the future, thereby overcoming static inertia and nudging 
the industry forward. To understand this better, we go back to the technology of AFR to determine 
what exactly needs to be put in place. 
With three operational rule sets available (VFR, IFR, and AFR), future aircraft operators will 
choose the rule set appropriate to their mission. The pilots must have the appropriate training and 
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currency, and the aircraft must have the appropriate certified equipment and technology. For AFR, 
the technologies will be those that are key to enabling operational autonomy: traffic surveillance, 
information connectivity, and trajectory-management automation. The first two technologies are 
already emerging. Air-to-air traffic surveillance is available in the commercial market through an 
optional receiver upgrade to the mandated “ADS-B Out” transmitter system called “ADS-B In.” 
Such systems provide surveillance of nearby aircraft out to distances well over 100 nm (the size 
of a typical ATC sector). What is lacking are applications that sufficiently motivate aircraft 
operators to equip with ADS-B In. (As will be discussed, TASAR is intended as one potential 
motivation.) The second technology, information connectivity, is already a rapid-growth industry 
enabled by terrestrial and satellite airborne internet technology. This latest revolution in the 
industry is referred to as “connected aviation” and provides onboard automation access to virtually 
any online data content including key information relevant to airborne trajectory management 
(e.g., wind models, weather forecasts, restricted airspace schedules) [12]. 
The third technology enabling operational autonomy is airborne trajectory management 
automation, which does not currently exist in a form suitable for AFR. To enable AFR, this 
technology needs to perform three functions that would no longer be supplied by ATC: monitor 
the aircraft’s trajectory through the airspace, detect any need to change the trajectory such as a 
conflict, and resolve by computing one or more route modifications to meet the identified need. In 
operations where airspeeds are high, visibility is limited, and airspace constraints (e.g., weather 
hazards) may be evolving, these functions enabling operational autonomy in ever-increasing traffic 
density must be automated and not rely on a human to perform them. The requirement applies to 
all three functions (monitor, detect, and resolve). The monitoring function must be automated to 
ensure sufficient accuracy and notification time in predicting future events (e.g., a traffic conflict). 
The detection function must be automated to ensure vigilance that critical events are not missed. 
The resolution function must be automated to ensure a course of action is always available that 
best addresses the need. While these functions will all need to be automated to enable AFR, 
significant challenges remain in achieving the requisite functionality and safety criticality for use 
in dynamic, uncertain operational environments. The state of the art of such automation is a 
limiting function and will have to progress significantly before they will truly enable operational 
autonomy. TASAR can facilitate these advancements by providing early operational data and 
experience with an initial set of relevant automation functions in a non-safety critical application. 
Through everyday use in the dynamic airspace, TASAR offers the opportunity to mature the 
algorithms, refine requirements, and develop additional automation functions necessary to enable 
operational autonomy as envisioned by the AFR concept. 
To enable research on AFR feasibility and performance, NASA developed a high fidelity 
prototype of this airborne trajectory management automation, the Autonomous Operations Planner 
(AOP) [13]. The functionality of AOP spanned from route optimization to separation assurance, 
the latter being the safety-critical function of self-separation required for AFR. NASA’s simulation 
research on AFR extensively exercised AOP, resulting in significant maturation and robustness of 
the software algorithms and infrastructure. Furthermore, thanks to an early design decision to 
pursue a high fidelity implementation, AOP was designed to integrate with onboard avionics using 
an industry-standard interface (i.e., ARINC 429). This key decision proved fortuitous for 
TASAR’s prospects for near-term technology transfer. 
In summary, the first motivation for proposing TASAR (to induce a fundamental shift toward 
airborne trajectory management and future autonomy) centers primarily on the approach of 
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fielding a viable current-day application of airborne trajectory management technology, one that 
leverages the conflict-free route optimization capabilities of AOP in a repackaged application 
called TAP. The strategy is one of technology insertion: use NASA technology transfer of TAP 
(an AOP derivative) as a catalyst to get pilots to acclimate to a new role as proactive trajectory 
managers with the modest, non-safety-critical goal of flight path optimization.  
2.3. TASAR Motivation #2: Enhance Flight Efficiency  
The second motivation for TASAR is simply to improve flight efficiency for today’s airspace 
users while not impacting and potentially benefiting the air traffic controller. Tied in with this is 
the desire to incentivize ADS-B equipage. The following description excerpted from the original 
TASAR concept publication summarizes the motivation [14]. 
“Aircraft operating in the National Airspace System under IFR generally must fly trajectories 
approved by ATC. The approved trajectory is the trajectory originally specified in the flight plan 
or subsequent ATC clearance received prior to takeoff, modified by changes issued or negotiated 
and approved by ATC after takeoff and throughout the flight. The approved trajectory often does 
not coincide with the aircraft operator’s most efficient or preferred trajectory. Less-desired 
trajectories can be the result of non-optimal routes, altitude restrictions, and/or speed restrictions 
issued by ATC before or during the flight, or of changing conditions or priorities during the 
flight. Some causes of in-flight priority changes are unanticipated weather convection or 
turbulence development, the need to make up time as a result of an earlier reroute to avoid traffic 
or weather, the need to delay arrival due to fleet operator constraints or traffic congestion at the 
destination, and the need to increase altitude as fuel is burned to improve efficiency. As a result, 
pilots occasionally have a need or desire to change their trajectory while in flight. The desired 
change may be a revised lateral route, a climb or descent to a different altitude, a change in 
airspeed, or a combination. It may be of a temporary nature, such as a heading change to avoid 
weather, or a long-term nature, such as a diversion to an alternate airport. 
“Because ATC has responsibility to separate IFR aircraft, it maintains authority over the 
trajectories of all IFR aircraft in controlled airspace, and IFR pilots are not permitted to make 
changes to their approved trajectory without first receiving permission from ATC. The 
operational procedure to request a trajectory change is for the pilot to prepare the request and, 
when appropriate, communicate it to the air traffic controller. The controller will assess the 
request with respect to nearby traffic and other factors and issue an approval, an amendment, a 
deferral, or a denial. The pilot then proceeds as instructed. 
“Referred to as ‘user requests,’ trajectory change requests from aircrews may not be living up 
to their full potential to provide user benefits. Traffic information is currently not available to 
most flight crews, and consequently, a trajectory change request has a reasonable chance of not 
being approvable by the controller because of resulting conflicts. Disapproved user requests are 
an operational detriment to everyone involved. They cost workload for the pilot and controller, 
contribute to radio frequency congestion, and do not produce a more desirable trajectory. In 
addition, conflict-free opportunities for improving the trajectory can remain undiscovered by 
pilots because of the lack of onboard traffic information and automation to compute trajectory 
changes that are more optimal. 
“ADS-B has been established as a surveillance infrastructure that will provide substantial 
benefits to both airspace users and air navigation service providers in the future. The FAA 
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(Federal Aviation Administration) has mandated that all aircraft operating in current Mode-C 
airspace be equipped with ADS-B transmit capability by 2020. System benefits increase with 
the number of aircraft equipped, so there is interest in increasing ADS-B equipage levels as 
quickly as possible, preferably long before the mandate takes effect. Therefore, near-term 
applications are sought that provide user benefits large enough to justify the cost of equipping 
aircraft with ADS-B capability. ADS-B provides an opportunity for airspace users to gain more 
utility from their trajectory change requests. Aircraft that equip with ADS-B receivers gain 
access to the key information – timely and accurate traffic surveillance – needed to formulate 
trajectory change requests that avoid other aircraft and therefore are more likely approvable by 
ATC.” 
In summary, opportunities for increasing operational efficiency for today’s aircraft exist, and 
TASAR offers a means to act on those opportunities. Even if the goal of operational autonomy is 
never reached, these improvements in operational efficiency alone justify the pursuit of TASAR.
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3. Concept Description 
First conceived in 2005, published in 2012 [14] and 2013 [15], and patented in 2015 [16], the 
concept of TASAR (as described in the first publication)  
“combines ADS-B and flight deck automation for in-flight decision-aiding and re-planning to 
increase the likelihood of ATC approval of pilots’ trajectory change requests, improving the 
efficiency or other user-desired attribute of the flight, while not impacting and potentially 
benefiting the air traffic controller. In addition to ADS-B surveillance, TASAR can leverage 
ground-based information services via data link or internet access, as well as on-board weather 
radar, to identify weather hazards to be avoided and other conditions affecting flight optimization 
and ATC approval” [14].  
Embedded in this long-winded description are several key attributes of TASAR: ADS-B 
surveillance, on-board data sources, ground-based information services, flight deck automation, 
optimization, trajectory-change requests, and ATC approval. As illustrated in Figure 1, TASAR 
integrates these attributes into a progression: data flows into automation that optimizes trajectories 
which are requested and usually approved.  
The TASAR concept is embedded in the three parts of its name: “Traffic Aware,” “Strategic,” 
and “Aircrew Requests.” Starting from the end, “Aircrew Requests,” the concept centers on the 
mechanism IFR pilots use today to modify their route: making requests to ATC. It is common 
practice for some pilots to make occasional route modification requests to sector controllers as 
they proceed en route to their destination. Apart from weather and turbulence avoidance, these 
requests are typically geared towards improving flight efficiency and are often based on rules of 
thumb. Pilots may ask for a “direct” i.e., a short cut directly to a downstream waypoint on their 
Figure 1. The TASAR concept. 
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filed route to achieve a shorter ground track and therefore presumably save time and fuel. Pilots 
of larger aircraft (e.g., airlines) may also ask for a change in altitude to a presumably more efficient 
(typically higher) altitude as the aircraft burns off fuel and becomes lighter. ATC generally grants 
these requests where local procedures allow, after checking first for conflicting traffic and other 
constraints. Using this request-check-approve mechanism, pilots can ask for pretty much any 
change to their route they want, within the practical limits of voice requests and pilot/controller 
workload. TASAR’s aim is to leverage this existing mechanism and its flexibility but will augment 
it with trajectory management automation to more reliably enhance flight efficiency relative to 
rules of thumb that may not consider all of the information available through TASAR, for example, 
wind data at different altitudes on and off the current path. 
The middle term, “Strategic,” introduces the notions of a more informed view of the situation 
and a more purposeful aircrew request. Sometimes a tactical decision may seem counterintuitive 
until considered in the context of a strategic goal, for instance, a requested change from a direct 
route to a non-direct route, or a requested change to a lower cruise altitude instead of a higher 
cruise altitude. TASAR aims to empower an operator with a strategic goal (a re-optimized route) 
and the means to achieve it (technology designed to advise more optimal routing). A key element 
of TASAR is the retrieval, integration, and processing of large quantities of diverse, near-real-time 
data about the aircraft and its operating environment. This information processing is central to the 
strategic characteristic of TASAR in that it aids the pilot in finding the most optimal balance 
between objectives and constraints. The pilot’s desire might be to know whether their aircraft is 
still on the best route that minimizes the operating cost for this flight, as was planned before 
departure hours earlier. Given that wind field models and weather forecasts are always being 
updated, even during the flight, the previously optimal flight plan may need to be re-optimized 
based on these updates and on conditions experienced in flight. TASAR opens up the opportunity 
to ensure the route modification request made to ATC achieves the operator’s particular strategic 
goal for that flight (which may even change during the flight), even if it means making an 
occasional non-obvious and potentially counter-intuitive request. To this end, the advent of the 
“connected aviation” revolution currently unfolding in the industry is perfectly timed for enabling 
the Strategic (i.e., informed view) aspect of TASAR [12]. 
Finally, taking on the moniker of “Traffic Aware,” TASAR is identifying with the needs of the 
“strategic aircrew request” approver – ATC. After all, finding the most optimal route modification 
possible means nothing if the sector controller cannot approve the change. Though many factors 
play into ATC approving a pilot’s request, traffic separation is generally the most important factor. 
It is therefore in the pilot’s best interest if nearby traffic can be considered when formulating the 
request. If left to chance, the request may be disapproved due to traffic, thereby delaying or 
potentially eliminating the opportunity for flight efficiency improvement. To that end, TASAR 
invokes the Traffic Aware characteristic as the principal example (but not the only example) of 
elements addressing ATC’s requirements for approvability. A second example is active Special 
Use Airspace (SUA), through which ATC will generally not approve aircraft passage. As stated, 
many other such factors exist. The goal of TASAR is not to incorporate all such ATC approvability 
factors (many of which are not accessible or even codified). Indeed, the flight efficiency goal of 
TASAR seeks as much optimization as possible, which means not over-constraining the set of 
possible route options with ATC restrictions that may not always be applicable. Traffic separation 
is certainly mandatory, and thus it is given prominence in TASAR. It also meets the objective of 
providing aircraft operators a tangible benefit for ADS-B In equipage. 
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TASAR, therefore, is the concept of pilots using cockpit-based trajectory management 
technology, connected to an array of relevant data sources, to identify route optimization 
opportunities that may exceed the benefits achieved by pilots without this technology and that have 
improved likelihood of ATC approval thereby providing direct cost-benefit to the operator. The 
concept is formally defined in reference [15]. By “turning data into dollars,” TASAR’s direct 
product is operational savings, a useful feature in motivating industry to consider adopting the 
technology. Another such factor is that TASAR is designed as an advisory capability with no 
safety-critical function. This enables operators to install the TASAR automation on an Electronic 
Flight Bag (EFB), a burgeoning technology that is growing in popularity particularly when paired 
with “connected aviation” and the real-time access to onboard and off-board data it provides. The 
platform seems custom made for TASAR, though the reverse is more the case. Suppliers are 
rapidly producing “connected” EFBs and are looking for applications like TASAR to help make 
the business case. 
The procedure for pilots to use TASAR is straightforward. They simply monitor the application 
during the flight for any displayed opportunity to optimize the flight. TASAR is expected to be 
used outside of terminal airspace during the climb (above 10,000 feet (ft) for jet aircraft operators) 
and cruise portions of the flight. For some installations, some set-up of the application is likely 
required with respect to the current flight plan, but this can be done on the ground before departure. 
Once the aircraft is airborne and the application is active, it will display route optimization 
opportunities when available. The pilot consults the application as desired and reviews the options 
presented. As is always the case, even without TASAR, any serious consideration of a route 
modification must include crew coordination, cross-checking with the onboard certified systems 
(e.g., Flight Management System (FMS), weather radar), and depending on company policy, 
coordination with a dispatcher. The request to ATC is made using normal procedures and 
phraseology without reference to “TASAR.” From ATC’s perspective, it is simply a user request. 
They are not trained on TASAR, and no operational credit is given that would result in special 
treatment.  
Another TASAR procedure is to use the application to assess the merits of a route modification 
proposed by an external source, which could be the pilot, the dispatcher, or the air traffic controller. 
For instance, if ATC offers a “direct” clearance to a downstream waypoint, the pilot could quickly 
enter it into the application and assess whether the maneuver is indeed cost effective. Depending 
on the wind field, the answer may be no, and the pilot may wish to decline the offer. 
The concept of TASAR as described here is a starting point, but future enhancements are 
envisioned as elements of the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) become 
operational. Such enhancements include incorporating four-dimensional (4D) constraints and 
degrees of freedom into the automation, integrating TASAR with Data Communications (Data 
Comm), augmenting TASAR with new data available through the System Wide Information 
Management (SWIM), and expanding the types of optimization beyond just time and fuel costs 
(e.g., turbulence minimization). These elements will be discussed further in Chapter 13, 
“Technology Transfer and Beyond.”  
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4. Project Approach 
The TASAR project was initiated in February 2012 and concluded in July 2019. Sponsored 
primarily by the NASA Airspace Operations and Safety Program (AOSP), TASAR began under 
the auspices of the Concepts and Technology Development (CTD) Project through funding of two 
NASA Research Announcement (NRA) contracts, and it continued beyond these contracts under 
the Airspace Technology Demonstrations (ATD) Project. The TASAR project completed under 
the sponsorship of the Langley Technology Transfer Office. 
Impelled by the motivations described in Chapter 2, the TASAR project was initiated with the 
principal objective of positioning NASA’s state-of-the-art airborne trajectory management 
technology for transfer to industry such that it would “stick.” In other words, for the technology 
transfer to achieve its near-term goal of enhancing flight efficiency for today’s airspace users, it 
would need to generate sufficient “pull” from the end users, be commercialized by industry 
suppliers, enter service in operational use, and be self-sustaining without NASA involvement. 
Furthermore, to achieve its long-term goal of enabling operational autonomy for future airspace 
users, it would need to inspire additional industry investment in creating derivative products that 
foster an evolution toward future operational autonomy. To increase the likelihood of success in 
such ambitious undertakings, a project approach was formulated around a five-point strategy, 
described in the following paragraphs.  
1. Fill a current need  
The emergence of the “connected aircraft” revolution and the expansion of EFBs beyond their 
original purpose of hosting static information (e.g., charts, manuals) created a need in the 
industry to demonstrate the profound possibilities inherent in this new platform, now 
connectable to the aircraft and the world. Any application that could create a business case for 
onboard computing and connectivity was in high demand, and not just by single industries. 
Driving this need were vendors from multiple industries: EFB hardware, avionics connectivity, 
terrestrial and satellite internet connectivity, navigation avionics, surveillance avionics, flight 
efficiency services, weather data services, and even airframe manufacturers.  
Approach: The TASAR project would help establish a business case for the emerging 
“connected EFB” by developing a compelling software application for this revolutionary new 
platform. The software application would introduce a state-of-the-art airborne trajectory 
management function and a proactive role for pilots using it. 
2. Demonstrate a clear business case  
To enhance its commercialization potential, the software application should target a direct 
connection between the investment and its return. By enabling cockpit-based route 
optimization through TASAR, the investments in hardware, connectivity, and associated 
certification present a compelling business case centered on achieving direct operational cost 
savings for each flight. Such arguments are easier to make than building a business case on 
technologies that improve safety, which can often require a more circuitous argument to 
demonstrate a return on investment.  
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Approach: The TASAR project would focus the technology on achieving direct-operating-cost 
savings. The project would estimate the cost-savings benefit and make these preliminary 
estimates available to industry early in the project to promote interest and engagement. 
3. Reduce risk of technology transfer  
Introducing any new technology into an aircraft environment carries some additional inherent 
business risk as compared to ground-based technologies, given the extra burdens imposed by 
policy and regulation to ensure the safety of flight. Ultimately these burdens must be 
shouldered by companies that commercialize and market the products to their customers, not 
by NASA, who (in the case of TASAR) prototyped the technology and would license it to these 
commercial companies. However, NASA can take steps to lower the barriers to 
commercialization by studying key issues in advance and publishing the results, thereby 
reducing some of industry’s investment risk.  
Approach: The TASAR project would conduct preliminary analyses of safety, human factors, 
and FAA authorization requirements. The project would conduct flight trials to validate the 
technology’s viability and robustness in real aircraft operating in the airspace system. 
4. Bridge the valley  
NASA typically works on the lower end of the TRL scale (Table 1) by inventing, prototyping, 
and demonstrating technologies to industry. The expectation is that industry will recognize the 
technology’s value and take it the rest of the way through the higher TRLs to eventually market 
the technology for operational use. However, many valuable NASA technologies with great 
potential have been lost in the “valley” between NASA’s low TRL investments and industry’s 
high TRL expectations, having never successfully negotiated a full handoff from one to the 
other. The TASAR solution is for NASA to reach a little higher on the TRL scale and to invite 
industry to reach a little lower, meeting in the middle to conduct a joint technology evaluation 
in a mutually relevant environment.  
 
 
Table 1. NASA Technology Readiness Level scale. 
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Approach: The TASAR project would seek partner airlines to conduct operational evaluations 
of the technology in revenue service. Operational data from the evaluations would be used to 
validate the preliminary benefit estimates and provide justification for industry to carry it 
forward. 
5. Promote industry investment in basic and derivative products  
For the technology to be self-sustaining and grow in relevance, it must inspire further 
investment by industry or else risk being a static “spin off” technology with no future beyond 
its initial implementation. Ideally, a wide variety of companies would identify connections 
between their own product innovations and TASAR and pursue both together as a synergistic 
endeavor. This approach is more likely to be sustainable than one that attempts to build a new 
industry centered just on TASAR automation, at least at the outset. As TASAR was envisioned 
as a foundation upon which future capabilities could build, it is well positioned to attract such 
industry innovators.  
Approach: The TASAR project would encourage companies to follow or participate in 
NASA’s activities, increasing awareness of TASAR as a foundation for technology innovation 
while creating an initial cadre of TASAR industry experts. 
These five supporting objectives and their associated approaches drove the structure and content 
of the TASAR project. At the outset, it was unknown how far down this path the NASA effort 
would be able to reach. In fact, the initial project scope envisioned proceeding only as far as the 
first human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulation experiment and flight trial (FT). However, market 
research was simultaneously pursued to determine the level of interest in the industry for TASAR, 
and the immediate strong response confirmed that the larger objectives were achievable provided 
that no showstoppers emerged as a result of the earlier activities. Thus the following activities for 
the TASAR project were defined: 
• Preliminary assessments (benefits, safety, FAA approval, market analysis) 
• Technology prototype development 
• Human factors simulations 
• NASA flight trials 
• Airline operational evaluation 
Figure 2 shows the TASAR project timeline approximately as executed. The figure shows the 
rapid progression from concept development and analyses to prototype development, HITL 
simulations, and NASA FTs, to airline evaluation and commercial industry license applications. 
Also note the early and continuous engagement with various elements of the aviation community, 
initially to assess interest and later to communicate progress. Summary descriptions of most of 
these activities are provided throughout this report. Most activities are described in greater detail 
in previously published reports as will be indicated in each chapter. The summary descriptions in 
this report include unattributed text excerpts from these references. 
The TASAR project team and resource expenditure varied significantly over the life of the 
project. While retroactively calculating the total cost of the TASAR project was not feasible given 
multiple complications (i.e., variable civil servant and contractor staffing levels, contract 
transitions, changes in sponsoring NASA project, blended work on TASAR and follow-on 
development, and heavy leveraging of industry company resources), a summary of personnel 
involvement is provided to give an indication of the scope of the TASAR project resources. 
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The TASAR project relied heavily on contractors throughout its duration but especially for the 
first four years, from project initiation through the second NASA flight trial in 2015. The bulk of 
the TASAR workforce through 2015 was provided through two NRA contracts, described below. 
Only two civil servants (CS) were dedicated to TASAR – a principal investigator/project lead and 
a human factors scientist – with one to two others assisting on a limited basis. Once the airline 
partnerships were formalized in 2015, the CS team and contractor staff started to grow. 
Concurrently, the project switched sponsors from CTD to ATD, and the scope of work expanded 
beyond the airline operational evaluations to also include developing and testing the integration of 
NASA’s air and ground route optimization technologies. TASAR personnel supported both 
activities (TASAR and integration) in parallel until the integration work was suspended in late 
2018. The peak year for the CS team working on TASAR (and integration) was 2017, with nine 
persons (not including management and other support personnel). Supporting the CS team 
throughout the project was an aviation-operations subject matter expert (SME) contracted through 
the National Institute of Aerospace (NIA) who facilitated extensive engagement between the 
NASA TASAR team and industry. Additional NIA SMEs supported the project at various stages. 
Two NRA contracts were issued at the outset of the project, one to Engility Corporation and one 
to Rockwell Collins. The Engility contract focused primarily on TAP development and conducting 
NASA flight trials. The TAP software development team consisted of six persons, with two to 
three others on an in-house contract assisting as needed in configuration management and code 
delivery. Augmenting that team, a TASAR analyst produced the benefits assessment and supported 
data analysis for the flight trials. The first and second NASA flight trials were subcontracted to 
Advanced Aerospace Solutions, consisting of a four-person principal team with additional 
personnel supporting as needed. The subcontract included aircraft modifications and flight hours, 
and the Engility team augmented their staff by two persons to support data collection and analysis.  
Figure 2. Approximate calendar-year timeline of the TASAR project. 
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The second NRA contract to Rockwell Collins focused primarily on analyses of market interest, 
safety, and regulatory issues, as well as the design and execution of the two HITL simulation 
experiments. An avionics systems SME performed the several analyses, while the human factors 
simulations were subcontracted to the University of Iowa Operator Performance Lab (OPL). The 
simulation team consisted primarily of about four persons with four to six others supporting as 
needed.  
By 2016, the NRA contracts had concluded, and all contracted efforts switched to in-house 
teams. The period leading up to the airline operational evaluation (2016-2018) had the largest 
TASAR team size, with up to 30 contractors providing some level of support (most of which was 
not full time). The CS team included seven to nine persons, though also mostly not full time on 
TASAR (e.g., some also supported air/ground integration). While not charging to the project, many 
additional NASA personnel also supported various TASAR activities (e.g. legal, contracting, 
software release, safety reviews). Significantly reducing NASA’s cost burden, the industry 
participants brought their own resources to the project. The Alaska Airlines team included up to 
15 persons at various stages and provided access to the aircraft and support personnel for testing 
and for the operational evaluation flights. Similarly, industry collaborators Collins Aerospace, 
Gogo Commercial Aviation, and Aviation Communications & Surveillance Systems each had 
about eight persons working at some level on TASAR and provided their own testing facilities and 
support personnel. 
Other expenses for the project included hardware, data subscriptions, software products, in-
house flight testing, and travel. NASA procured several pieces of avionics equipment to support 
bench testing and flight testing of the TAP software, as well as multiple computer systems, tablets, 
and network equipment dedicated to systems integration testing. A weather data subscription was 
procured for software prototyping and use in the operational evaluation. Additional software tools 
were procured to support training material development. A third NASA flight trial was procured 
using in-house personnel and aircraft. Travel included trips to industry forums, partner airline 
facilities, and conferences. All expenses were geared towards accomplishing the ambitious 
objectives of the TASAR project. 
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5. Benefits Assessment 
Among the first priorities of the TASAR project, after defining the concept, was to generate a 
preliminary assessment of operational benefits. Not only would the assessment inform the NASA 
team on the various benefit mechanisms and the expected magnitude of savings, it would be a 
crucial element of NASA’s outreach to industry. In fact, every airline and industry company with 
whom NASA discussed TASAR requested estimates of savings potential. Immediate credibility 
for both NASA and TASAR was gained by having these estimates in hand, as they showed that 
NASA was addressing an industry need and had the forethought to provide the estimates up front. 
Furthermore, the benefits assessment was instrumental in airline partnership development. Two 
airlines, Virgin America and Alaska Airlines, later used the NASA preliminary estimate as 
justification to enter into self-funded partnerships with NASA to conduct operational evaluations 
on their aircraft.  
The TASAR benefits assessment was performed in two stages. A preliminary assessment was 
performed at the outset of the project exploring the benefits potential for a range of generic airspace 
user classes (network air carriers, low cost airlines, regional airlines, and business aviation 
operators) and providing an estimate of benefits per flight in terms of fuel burn and flight time 
metrics, as well as some additional ancillary metrics. Later, the methodology was extended to 
estimate the annualized benefits for the two prospective partner airlines. These estimates 
incorporated information about the airlines’ fleet size, route structure, and flight frequencies, and 
it calculated estimates of benefits for the fleets assuming a specified number of aircraft were 
equipped and conducting TASAR operations for a year. The sections below summarize the 
objective, method, results, and conclusions of the benefits assessments. Full details can be found 
in references [17], [18], and [19].  
5.1. Objective 
The objective of the preliminary benefits assessment conducted at the project’s outset was to 
quantify and characterize the potential benefits of TASAR for a range of aircraft operators. The 
questions at hand were, “who might benefit from TASAR, by how much, and under what 
circumstances?” Aircraft operations in the conterminous United States (CONUS) are highly 
diverse, and TASAR benefits are expected to vary accordingly. Flights can range from under one 
hour to more than five hours. Origins and destinations are major hubs for some flights and not for 
others, and airspace structure plays a greater or lesser role in the flexibility for rerouting, depending 
on location. Flights also vary by aircraft type, and weather and wind impacts vary geographically 
as well. The assessment would seek to characterize benefits across some of these factors. Also to 
be assessed were the effects of TASAR on ATC in terms of traffic conflicts and the effects of 
ADS-B equipage level on TASAR benefits. 
Upon identification of prospective partner airlines, an additional objective was to estimate the 
annual cost savings for these airlines assuming a substantial portion of their fleets were equipped 
with TASAR. 
5.2. Method 
The assessment began with an analysis of TASAR opportunities and benefit mechanisms. 
Opportunities for aircrew requests were selected from requests that are relatively common in 
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current operations as suggested by pilot and ATC SMEs. One constraint on requests is the practical 
use of voice communications, which limits route change requests to one or two named waypoints 
(i.e., navigational aids, fixes, and airway intersections) before rejoining the original trajectory 
downstream, since the voice communication frequency must remain available to ATC for time-
critical clearances.  
A preliminary quantitative analysis and a literature search were used to select three “use cases” 
of aircrew requests that are expected to have the highest potential for benefits. The analysis focused 
on quantifying the benefits of these three use cases of aircrew requests, recognizing that there are 
other use cases of aircrew requests that have opportunities for benefits. This analysis therefore 
represented only part of the expected full benefit of TASAR. The benefits of the following three 
use cases of aircrew requests were quantified: 
1. An aircraft is part of an FAA reroute initiative to avoid convective weather or mitigate 
congestion. Aircraft in these initiatives are sometimes not shifted back to user-preferred 
routes after the initiative has ended. The aircrew requests a lateral trajectory change direct to 
a downstream waypoint or changing one or two named waypoints along the trajectory before 
reconnecting to the route upstream of the arrival fix.  
2. An aircraft is impacted by convective weather, and there is sufficient lead time to the 
convective weather to allow a strategic route change rather than a tactical heading change. 
The aircrew requests a lateral trajectory change consisting of changing one or two named 
waypoints along the trajectory before reconnecting to the route upstream of the arrival fix. 
3. The aircrew requests a trajectory change (lateral, altitude, or combination lateral and altitude) 
to switch to a more wind-optimal trajectory. This request for a more wind-optimal trajectory 
is intended to occur when the aircraft is not impacted by a reroute initiative or convective 
weather.  
Historical days that contained reroute initiatives, severe convective weather, or were clear of 
reroute initiatives and convective weather allowing pure wind optimization were selected for the 
analysis. 
A benefit mechanism is a causal link that converts a function into a benefit by applying the 
function to mitigate an inefficiency. Two TASAR functions were assessed, shown in Figure 3, 
generating user-preferred trajectories and pre-probing trajectories for traffic conflicts. The former 
mitigates the issue that the aircraft may not be following their preferred trajectory due to a previous 
inefficient trajectory assignment, a change in flight priorities, or a change in the environment (e.g., 
winds or weather). The latter is expected to mitigate the issue that aircrew requests are not always 
conflict free and are therefore sometimes denied by ATC. 
The benefit mechanisms shown between the first and second vertical dashed lines are enabled 
by these two functions and result in the four benefits shown between the second and third vertical 
lines in Figure 3. The four benefits shown are: (1) the aircrew is better able to meet their objectives, 
(2) improved NAS performance, (3) reduced nuisance requests, and (4) reduced conflicts. In order 
to quantify these benefits, four metrics respective to the four benefits are (1) flight time per aircraft 
and fuel burned per aircraft, (2) NAS-wide effects such as delays, (3) aircrew requests rejected by 
controller, and (4) conflicts resolved by controller. The analysis quantified the first, third, and 
fourth metrics. While quantifying the second metric was beyond the scope and capability of the 
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analysis, NAS performance may have both positive and negative effects depending on the extent 
and nature of the technology’s use. 
A fast-time simulation platform described in reference [17] was used to conduct the benefit 
assessments. An existing simulation platform connected through an Application Programming 
Interface (API) to two instances of the Future ATM Concept Evaluation Tool (FACET) [20]: one 
to model the current state of aircraft trajectories, and the other to model future states of aircraft 
trajectories to test TASAR aircrew requests for conflicts with surrounding aircraft, conflicts with 
airspace hazards, and to calculate the impacts of TASAR aircrew trajectory change requests on 
user time and fuel objectives. The platform applied a series of nine models shown in Figure 4 and 
described in further detail in reference [17]. Models 1-6 represent the airborne side: model 
historical aircraft flight plans, synthesize aircraft trajectories, apply an ADS-B range limit, perform 
conflict detection on traffic and airspace hazards, generate alternate optimized routing, and 
formulate TASAR requests. The TASAR Request Model applied a series of seven filters to prevent 
making requests that would be 
considered unacceptable to the 
controller. Examples include cases in 
which the request conflicts with 
traffic or airspace hazards (SUA or 
weather), a previous request was 
made to the current sector controller, 
and the aircraft had passed an arrival 
fix within 200 nautical miles (nmi) of 
a large hub destination airport.  
The ground side in the simulation 
is represented by Models 7 to 9: 
provide full surveillance range and 
flight plan to the controller, probe for 
traffic conflicts, and evaluate 
TASAR requests for acceptability. In 
Figure 3. TASAR benefit mechanisms. From ref. [17]. 
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this final model, three primary filters were applied: the request would cause a traffic conflict, the 
request occurs in a sector that was experiencing traffic exceeding its monitor alert parameter value 
(i.e., a red sector), and the aircrew request was projected to enter an adjacent red sector. These last 
two filters intend to reflect the reduced flexibility available for granting rerouting requests in high-
traffic sectors. 
First, a preliminary analysis was conducted to estimate benefits per operation for several generic 
classes of operators. The preliminary results are based on analysis of approximately one week of 
traffic in July 2012. Method details are provided in reference [17]. 
Then, once prospective partner airlines were identified, additional assessments tailored the 
simulation to the specific airlines and extended the analysis to produce estimates of annual cost 
savings due to TASAR for majority fleet equipage. The annualized results are based on an 
extrapolated analysis of approximately three months of traffic in July through September 2012 and 
published airline-specific data detailing the annual frequency of operations between airport pairs 
by aircraft type [21]. Benefits are a function of both the benefit per operation and number of 
operations. Annual operations were divided by the number of aircraft of each type to obtain the 
number of operations per aircraft. Simulations of each airline’s flights between their primary city 
pairs produced the benefit per operation for each of the three use cases of requests (reroute 
initiative recovery, reroute for convective weather, or reroute for optimal winds). Benefits were 
scaled based on the observed frequency of each request use case and summed to produce an annual 
estimate of fuel and time savings. Annualized cost savings were then estimated by applying the 
published fuel, maintenance, and depreciation costs for each airline to the fuel and time savings. 
Though additional savings in crew costs are expected, these costs were not included in the 
analyses. Method details are provided in references [18] and [19]. 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Preliminary Benefits Analysis 
Scenarios were selected for simulation based on classifications of airport hub size and stage 
length to represent typical operations for different classes of NAS users. Published data from four 
classes of airspace users were analyzed to determine the percentage of traffic by type of operation 
(e.g., origin and destination hub types, stage length). The four classes were network carriers, low-
cost carriers, regional carriers, and business aircraft. For reference, Virgin America is classified as 
a low-cost carrier, and Alaska Airlines is classified as a network carrier. For the simulation, airport 
pairs were selected that were representative of the airport hub size and stage lengths of the four 
classes of operators. The preliminary results are based on analysis of approximately one week of 
traffic in July 2012. Three aircrew objectives are considered in this analysis: (1) minimize time, 
(2) minimize fuel, and (3) weighted combination of minimizing time (50 percent) and minimizing 
fuel (50 percent). This analysis also attempted to determine whether stage length, airport size, or 
use case of request (reroute initiative recovery, reroute for convective weather, or reroute for 
optimal winds) determines which aircraft would receive the highest benefits from TASAR. 
Figure 5 shows the average time savings for an aircrew minimizing time per aircraft (y-axis) 
relative to a baseline without TASAR plotted against stage length (x-axis) for different airport sizes 
(separate curves). Aircraft traveling between large hub airports (shown as a solid black line) saved 
approximately 1.5 minutes of time at a 600 nmi stage length and these savings increased to 
approximately eight minutes at 2000+ nmi stage lengths. This trend of increasing time savings as 
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stage length increases also held for the 
other airport sizes, but the slope is not 
as steep as the solid black line for 
aircraft traveling between large hub 
airports. Plots of average time savings 
when minimizing fuel and weighted 
combination of time and fuel objectives 
showed similar trends, as did plots of 
average fuel savings for the three types 
of objectives considered in this 
analysis. An additional analysis of two 
city pairs (shown in boxes in Figure 5) 
determined that the cause of the 
difference between time savings 
between large hubs (ORD-LAX) and between a medium and a large hub (PDX-ORD) related to a 
greater spread of historical trajectories for the former, which allowed more opportunities for 
savings. 
Simulation results described in reference [17] showed that there were higher time savings during 
convective weather conditions as compared to a condition where aircraft are requesting wind-
optimal trajectories in the absence of convective weather and reroute initiatives. An insufficient 
number of flights were involved in cancelled or expired initiatives on the selected historical flight 
days to obtain an estimate of time savings for TASAR requests after a reroute initiative is cancelled 
or expired. 
Some aircraft in the simulation experienced benefits much higher than the average. Figure 6 
shows the distribution of time savings for aircraft that traveled between DFW and LGA (either 
direction) to meet the objective to minimize time. Each bar represents the count of aircraft (y-axis) 
with the time savings (x-axis). Even 
though several aircraft did not benefit (0 
time savings), there were aircraft that 
experienced as much as 13 minutes of 
time savings. The aircraft with larger 
improvements had less efficient 
historically flown trajectories as 
compared to aircraft that did not benefit. 
The distribution in Figure 6 shows three 
characteristic regions: no benefit (0 time 
savings), moderate benefit (~3 minutes 
savings), and large benefits (7+ minutes 
savings). These characteristic regions 
were also seen in the Alaska Airlines 
operational evaluation as will be 
discussed in Chapter 12.  
An initial calculation of the expected per-operation benefits (i.e., savings per flight) of equipping 
with TASAR is shown in Table 2. The calculations were achieved by mapping the benefits 
measured for each of 12 representative city pairs (representing different combinations of origin-
Figure 5. Average TASAR time savings by stage length and 
airport size. From ref. [17]. 
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destination airport types and 
stage lengths) to the percentage 
of operations by the four classes 
of airspace user (network 
carriers, low cost carriers, 
regional carriers, and business 
aircraft) to these city pair types. 
The methodology and 
intermediate data are presented in 
more detail in reference [17].  
Operators typically use a 
weighted time-fuel objective in 
flight planning (known as Cost 
Index), and so the 50TF columns 
may be the most representative of 
average TASAR savings per operation. The analysis results in Table 2 indicate that network 
carriers would save an average of approximately 3.6 minutes of time per operation and 543 pounds 
(lbs) of fuel per operation when minimizing a weighted time and fuel objective. This benefit was 
higher than the other airspace user classes due to network carriers operating at longer stage lengths 
between large hub airports than the other airspace user classes. Other airspace user classes 
benefited by about one to three minutes per operation and 50 to 340 lbs of fuel per operation. These 
estimates include flights that did not receive a TASAR benefit. 
The preliminary benefits assessment also investigated additional metrics. An analysis (detailed 
in reference [17]) considered the impact of TASAR on traffic conflicts requiring ATC resolution. 
There is no expectation that TASAR would increase or decrease conflicts to be resolved by the 
controller, since TASAR (in this simulation) only checks for conflicts on potential trajectory 
changes to an eight minute look-ahead time horizon, and TASAR does not probe for conflicts 
beyond that time horizon. However, there is a concern that TASAR requests may inadvertently 
result in more conflicts for controllers to resolve beyond the eight minute look-ahead time horizon. 
An analysis indicated that average conflicts per aircraft for aircraft equipped with TASAR were 
lower than the baseline without TASAR for all three types of aircrew objectives (time, fuel, and 
50/50 weighted). The TASAR requests in the simulation reduced conflicts to be resolved by the 
controller beyond the eight minute look-ahead time by shifting aircraft to altitudes with a lower 
traffic density. Depending on actual traffic density distribution by altitude, the opposite effect 
could also be possible. Though certain effects like favorable winds may cause local density to 
increase as aircraft seek out the same efficient routes and altitudes, TASAR also can serve to 
diffuse local density by providing pilots a means to adjust their requests based on nearby traffic. 
Determining the net effect with high levels of TASAR equipage was not possible with this 
simulation platform. 
Three additional analyses can be found in reference [17], including the effect of ADS-B Out 
equipage levels on TASAR performance, the percentage by request type (lateral, vertical, 
combination) of approved requests, and request disposition (requests preempted by TASAR, 
approved requests, and rejected requests) as a function of stage length. The ADS-B Out equipage 
analysis indicated that TASAR benefits are immediately achievable under low levels of ADS-B 
Out equipage, but the finding is no longer relevant given the mandate date of 2020 has effectively 
Table 2. Model-based estimate of TASAR savings per operation. 
From ref. [17]. 
 
Class of 
Airspace 
User 
Time Savings (min) Fuel Savings (lbs) 
TO FO 50TF TO FO 50TF 
Network 4.2 3.4 3.6 –122 575 543 
Low Cost 2.9 2.5 2.6 –123 406 344 
Regional 1.0 0.8 1.0 –88 137 66 
Business 1.2 1.6 1.5 – 2 64 53 
 
TO = time objective, FO = fuel objective,  
50TF = weighted 50% time 50% fuel objective. 
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arrived. The simulation results indicated that combined lateral/altitude requests were an important 
source of TASAR benefits. The request disposition analysis showed a relatively low percentage of 
TASAR requests were rejected at all stage lengths and, when a beneficial trajectory change was 
found by TASAR, approximately half of these beneficial requests were not made due to TASAR 
determination of operational unacceptability and the other half of the beneficial requests were 
approved. In other words, TASAR was effective in making user requests productive for both the 
aircrew and ATC. This result does not reflect the other reasons ATC rejects requests not 
represented in the simulation, such as requests that would violate letters of agreement between 
ATC facilities. 
5.3.2. Partner Airline Annual Benefits Estimate 
The Virgin America analysis focused on operations of the Airbus A320 and A319, as both are 
candidates to be equipped with TASAR. Similarly, the Alaska Airlines analysis focused on the 
Boeing models 737-900ER, 737-900, 737-800, and 737-700. A total of 1,554 historical Virgin 
America flights and 1,606 Alaska Airlines flights in July, August, and September 2012 were 
analyzed using the fast-time simulation platform to estimate TASAR benefits. Published data on 
annual operations per aircraft for prominent city pairs (23 city pairs for Virgin America, 14 city 
pairs for Alaska Airlines) [21] were then applied to estimate the benefit for all flights between each 
city pair derived from the three TASAR request use cases (reroute initiative recovery, reroute for 
convective weather, or reroute for optimal winds). Benefits were then summed to produce the 
estimated total annual fuel and time benefits for each aircraft type, shown in Table 3 and Table 4.  
To estimate annual cost savings, published values for fuel, maintenance (Maint.), and 
depreciation (Depr.) costs [21] were applied to the annual fuel and time benefits (rounded down) 
Table 3. Virgin America estimated annual TASAR benefits by aircraft type. From ref. [18]. 
 
Aircraft 
Type 
Annual Benefit  
Cancelled Initiative 
Use Case (1) 
Annual Benefit  
Weather  
Use Case (2) 
Annual Benefit  
Wind  
Use Case (3) 
Annual Benefit  
Total 
(1)+(2)+(3) 
Fuel  
(Gal) 
Time  
(Min) 
Fuel  
(Gal) 
Time  
(Min) 
Fuel  
(Gal) 
Time  
(Min) 
Fuel  
(Gal) 
Time  
(Min) 
A320 1273.9 123.0 1635.5 131.2 24700.3 2290.2 27,609.7 2544.4 
A319 195.5 62.2 2628.6 164.3 22789.5 2458.0 25,613.6 2684.5 
 
Table 4. Alaska Airlines estimated annual TASAR benefits by aircraft type. From ref. [19]. 
 
Aircraft 
Type 
(737) 
Annual Benefit  
Cancelled Initiative 
Use Case (1) 
Annual Benefit  
Weather  
Use Case (2) 
Annual Benefit  
Wind  
Use Case (3) 
Annual Benefit  
Total 
(1)+(2)+(3) 
Fuel  
(Gal) 
Time  
(Min) 
Fuel  
(Gal) 
Time  
(Min) 
Fuel  
(Gal) 
Time  
(Min) 
Fuel  
(Gal) 
Time  
(Min) 
-900ER 568.4 53.7 271.4 15.3 11202.7 1312.2 12042.5 1381.2 
-900 30.2 2.9 72.5 2.7 10464.5 1163.6 10567.2 1169.2 
-800 528.3 50.6 149.0 21.3 8286.0 905.2 8963.3 977.1 
-700 207.9 7.6 459.0 32.7 11612.0 1002.1 12278.9 1042.4 
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of each aircraft by type, multiplied by the number of aircraft in each fleet, and summed. The 
calculations shown in Table 5 and Table 6 indicate that both airlines would save approximately $5 
million per year, based on aircraft counts, operations, and prices indicated for the year of the 
analysis.  
Two additional analyses were performed to estimate the impact on ATC workload regarding 
request approvability based on traffic conflicts and peak number of requests per sector per hour. 
Method details are described in references [18] and [19]. The simulation results indicated that 
without TASAR, ~23 percent of requests would reasonably be expected to be rejected, whereas 
with TASAR, ~6 to 8 percent of requests would reasonably be expected to be rejected. The 
reduction is attributed to TASAR filtering out or adjusting requests to avoid creating traffic 
conflicts. The rejection rate does not reach zero because ATC has access to intent information, 
whereas TASAR had access only to traffic state information from ADS-B In.  
Requests per hour by sector were approximated by binning the TASAR request times into hours 
and scaling by requests per day. Virgin America hourly results for the three sectors with the most 
requests indicated that 2 to 4 requests per sector occurred during the peak hours between about 9 
AM and 2 PM. Alaska Airlines hourly results for the four sectors with the most requests indicated 
that 4 to 8 requests per sector occur during the peak hours of about 8 AM, 2 PM, and 9 PM. Given 
the simulation’s limitations, these estimates indicate that even with fleet-level TASAR equipage, 
Table 5. Virgin America estimated annual cost savings from TASAR. From ref. [18]. 
 
Aircraft 
Type 
Number 
of 
Aircraft 
of Type 
Annual 
Fuel 
Savings 
per 
Aircraft 
(Gal) 
Fuel 
Cost 
Fuel Cost 
Savings for 
All Aircraft 
of Type 
Time 
Saving
s per 
Aircraft 
(Min) 
Maint. 
Cost 
per 
Min. 
Maint. 
Cost 
Savings 
for All 
Aircraft of 
Type 
Depr. 
Cost 
per 
Min. 
Depr. 
Cost 
Savings 
for All 
Aircraft of 
Type 
A320 43 27,000 $3.03 $3,517,830 2,500 $5.51 $592,325 $0.54 $58,050 
A319 10 25,000 $3.03 $757,500 2,600 $5.68 $147,680 $0.54 $14,040 
Sum $4,275,330 Sum $740,005 Sum $72,090 
Total estimated annual cost savings $5,087,425 
 
Table 6. Alaska Airlines estimated annual cost savings from TASAR. From ref. [19]. 
 
Aircraft 
Type 
(737) 
Number 
of 
Aircraft 
of Type 
Annual 
Fuel 
Savings 
per 
Aircraft 
(Gal) 
Fuel 
Cost 
Fuel Cost 
Savings for 
All Aircraft 
of Type 
Time 
Savings 
per 
Aircraft 
(Min) 
Maint. 
Cost 
per 
Min. 
Maint. 
Cost 
Savings 
for All 
Aircraft 
of Type 
Depr. 
Cost 
per 
Min. 
Depr. 
Cost 
Savings 
for All 
Aircraft of 
Type 
-900ER 22 12,000 $3.26 $860,640 1,300 $8.44 $241,384 $8.72 $249,392 
-900 12 10,000 $3.26 $391,200 1,100 $8.44 $111,408 $8.72 $115,104 
-800 61 8,000 $3.26 $1,590,880 900 $4.96 $272,304 $6.75 $370,575 
-700 14 12,000 $3.26 $547,680 1,000 $21.40 $299,600 $7.18 $100,520 
Sum $3,390,400 Sum $924,696 Sum $835,591 
Total estimated annual cost savings $5,150,687 
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the impact on ATC workload may be relatively minor provided that TASAR requests do not 
require substantially more effort for ATC to manage than non-TASAR requests.  
5.4. Conclusions 
The preliminary benefits assessment conducted at the project’s outset showed that all classes of 
airspace users gained benefit from TASAR. On average, aircraft equipped with TASAR, relative 
to aircraft not equipped with TASAR, saved about one to four minutes of flight time per operation 
and about 50 to 550 lbs of fuel per operation depending on the objective of the aircrew (time, fuel, 
or weighted combination of time and fuel), class of airspace user (network, regional, low cost, or 
business), and aircraft type (e.g., 737-800). These initial results were based on aircrews requesting 
lateral only, altitude only, and combination lateral and altitude trajectory changes. The use of 
combined lateral and altitude trajectory changes provided significant time and fuel benefits since 
approximately 30–50 percent of approved requests in the simulation were combination requests. 
The analysis indicated that, in general, TASAR benefits increased with longer stage lengths since 
beneficial trajectory changes can be applied over a longer distance. Also, larger benefits were 
experienced between large hub airports as compared to other airport sizes. This was largely due to 
less efficient (from an airspace user point of view) historically flown trajectories between large 
hub airports, and not all flights operating to or from medium hub or smaller airports have 
significant room for improvement.  
The two prospective partner airlines, Virgin America and Alaska Airlines, were each estimated 
to save approximately $5 million per year if a significant portion of their fleets were equipped with 
TASAR. 
The assessment also indicated no significant adverse impacts on ATC and some possible benefit. 
TASAR requests were found to reduce conflicts that controllers need to resolve beyond the look-
ahead time horizon that TASAR was probing for conflicts. This reduction in conflicts was the 
result of aircrews in the simulation requesting altitudes with lower traffic densities. Results also 
indicate that TASAR improved productivity of user requests, with a significant number of un-
approvable requests filtered out by TASAR’s conflict probing and the great majority of requests 
made being approved. Peak hourly requests per sector for fleet-level TASAR equipage were 
estimated to be 8 or fewer requests for highest impacted sectors. 
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6. Safety Assessment 
According to FAA policy on EFBs, “in order to qualify as an EFB application, the failure effect 
must be considered a minor hazard or have no safety effect” [22]. In anticipation that operational 
approval of TASAR may be predicated on a safety effect determination by the FAA, a preliminary 
Operational Safety Assessment (OSA) was performed with the intent to generate artifacts that may 
be useful for such a determination. Reference [23] details the preliminary OSA for TASAR. A 
summary is provided in this chapter. The OSA results support a likely Failure Effects 
Classification (FEC) of “No Effect” and no higher than a “Minor” effect. Any official 
determination of safety effect, if needed, would be made by cognizant FAA organizations 
responsible for authorization of EFB applications.  
In the case of the two prospective partner airlines, a separate determination of safety effect was 
not required by the Principal Operations Inspector (POI) of either airline. The POIs authorized 
TASAR as an EFB application and documented the authorization in both airlines’ Operations 
Specification A061, “Use of Electronic Flight Bag,” listing the NASA TAP software application 
by name. 
6.1. Intended Function 
An OSA begins with a description of the “intended function” of the system. As presented in 
reference [23], the TASAR system is “an optional, advisory-only decision support tool that 
recommends trajectory change improvement opportunities to the pilot for operational efficiency 
improvements to flight operations. As such, TASAR is supplemental equipment, does not replace 
any required avionics function, and should not be on or alter the Minimum Equipment List for 
flight operations. Use of TASAR is at the discretion of the pilot, i.e., the pilot may choose to ignore 
TASAR or can manually inhibit its operation at any time for any reason.” In addition, TASAR 
provides no “operational credit” (i.e., authorization to operate beyond the operations authorized 
without the technology) and does not alter pilot or ATC procedures or requirements for making 
trajectory changes under IFR. 
6.2. Methodology 
The TASAR preliminary OSA methodology was based on two industry standard safety 
assessment methodologies to make a preliminary determination of the FEC for TASAR.  
Method 1: Failure Effects Classification  
References:  
• Aviation Recommended Practice 4761 “Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety 
Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment” [24]  
• Advisory Circular (AC) 25-1309 “System Design and Analysis” [25] 
• AC 23-1309 “System Safety Analysis and Assessment for Part 23 Airplanes” [26] 
Summary Description of Method: 
1. Evaluate the intended function per phase of flight 
2. Identify failure events 
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3. Examine the effect of these failures on aircraft, pilot / flight crew, and ATC 
4. Determine the Hazard Classification, e.g., Major, Minor, No Effect 
5. Determine frequency of occurrence, e.g., per flight hour, per operation 
6. Provide rationale for hazard assessment 
 
Method 2: Operational Safety Analysis  
Reference:  
• RTCA DO-264 / EUROCAE Document 78A “Guidelines for Approval of the Provision 
and Use of Air Traffic Services supported by Data Communications” [27] 
Summary Description of Method: 
1. Perform an Operational Hazard Assessment  
1.1. Identify Operational Hazards 
1.2. Determine the Operational Effect, the worst credible outcome of the Operational 
Hazard, e.g., collision, loss of separation, workload 
1.3. Determine the Severity Classes for each Operational Effect (Catastrophic, Major, 
Minor, etc.) and identify the maximum allowable probability of occurrence of the 
Operational Effect 
1.4. Determine the Effects Probabilities, which represent the probabilities of available 
mitigations to the system to help reduce the probability of occurrence of the 
Operational Effect due to the Operational Hazard 
1.5. Assign Safety Objectives, which represent the probability of occurrence of each 
Operational Hazard that is allowable for ensuring the safety of the application 
1.6. Identify External Mitigation Means, i.e., barriers external to the application that reduce 
the adverse effects and impact to safety when Operational Hazards occur 
2. Allocate Safety Objectives and Safety Requirements 
2.1. Identify Abnormal Events and Basic Causes internal to the applications that could lead 
to the occurrence of each Operational Hazard 
2.2. Identify Internal Mitigation Means, i.e., barriers internal to the application that reduce 
the probability of the Operational Hazard from occurring in order to achieve the 
required Safety Objective 
2.3. Allocate Safety Requirements to the sub-functions comprising the application 
Method 1 represents the traditional safety process for airborne systems and equipment. The key 
outcome of this safety assessment process is the determination of the FEC of the intended 
application (e.g., TASAR). The FEC then drives the development and validation requirements and 
processes to be followed in integrating the application into the flight deck to gain certification and 
operational approval. 
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Method 2 represents a system-of-systems analysis approach and is well-suited for allocating 
safety requirements across a high-criticality, multiple-system function. This allows a more 
balanced allocation of safety requirements across systems and sub-systems, which is particularly 
beneficial for higher criticality systems. While an excellent approach for systems analysis, it is not 
as well suited for lower criticality systems such as TASAR. This is particularly true in the realm 
of “Minor” criticality systems, where this approach puts excessive emphasis on formal analysis 
related to operational effects such as workload. 
Given the likelihood of a low safety concern for TASAR based on SME input, the preliminary 
OSA for TASAR was essentially a qualitative decomposition of the concept and identification of 
potential hazards and mitigating factors. The analysis was performed by a systems analyst / safety 
and certification SME at Rockwell Collins, Inc. under contract to NASA, with input from 
additional SMEs in airspace and aircraft operations. No quantitative analysis was performed for 
the preliminary OSA. Reference [23] details the preliminary OSA performed for TASAR.  
6.3. Analysis and Conclusions 
The following sections highlight some of the identified hazards and mitigating factors relevant 
to TASAR. 
Identified Hazards 
• Pilot error entering TASAR configuration inputs, leading to non-functional TASAR 
software or erroneous TASAR system outputs  
• Excessive pilot workload in entering or updating TASAR configuration inputs 
• TASAR processing errors resulting in undetected misleading information displayed to 
pilot, e.g., fuel and time savings when the opposite would actually occur 
• Ownship and/or traffic information (e.g., state, intent information) are incorrect or 
incomplete, leading to route modification candidates that have a conflict, but are 
presented as conflict free 
• Wind data are of poor quality or are incorrect, leading to route modification requests that 
are conflicted or lead towards hazardous airspace 
• Convective weather information is of poor quality or is incorrect, leading to route 
modification requests toward hazardous airspace 
• Airspace status information is incorrect, leading to route modification requests toward 
hazardous airspace 
• Detected errors, failures, or poor quality TASAR recommendations, leading to pilot 
troubleshooting and therefore additional workload 
• Undetected errors or failures of TASAR computations, leading to poor or multiple route 
change requests and additional pilot or ATC workload 
• Undetected errors or failures of TASAR computations, leading to hazardous encounters 
with traffic, weather, terrain, SUA, etc. 
• TASAR application preoccupies the pilot from observing non-TASAR flight-deck hazard 
alerts 
• Pilot misinterprets TASAR recommendation and unknowingly requests a trajectory 
clearance that is not conflict free or leads toward hazardous airspace 
• TASAR misleads or confuses pilot who misrepresents TASAR recommendation to ATC  
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• Pilot follows the wrong trajectory clearance following receipt of amended clearance from 
ATC 
 
Mitigating Factors 
• TASAR is a supplemental system not relied on by critical functions supporting aircraft 
operations 
• TASAR is optional and can be ignored or disabled without adversely affecting operations 
• TASAR can be manually inhibited or ignored by the pilot at any time for any reason 
(e.g., detected failures, spurious or inconsistent system performance, distracting effects) 
• Discontinued use of TASAR involves no recovery time since the aircraft remains on an 
ATC-cleared trajectory at all times. In the event of a TASAR system fault, the pilot need 
only remain on the current clearance while disregarding the TASAR display. 
• TASAR is intended for use in non-critical phases of flight (i.e., above 10,000 ft for jet 
aircraft operators) 
• The pilot has a responsibility to evaluate TASAR-provided route modification candidates 
before making a request to ATC, providing cross-check opportunities to detect erroneous 
candidates being offered by TASAR 
• Certified aircraft systems (e.g., FMS, weather radar) serve as available, higher integrity 
information allowing quick check on acceptability and performance impacts of TASAR 
recommended route modifications 
• Undetected, misleading information associated with TASAR outputs are mitigated by 
pilot inspection of the recommended route modification using standard procedures and 
certified systems and by mitigations associated with the existing route modification 
request process 
• Route modification request procedures are unchanged; pilot must direct all route 
modification requests to ATC using conventional means and phraseology 
• ATC is responsible for reviewing request for acceptability, including separation from 
traffic 
 
The preliminary OSA for TASAR supported a likely FEC of “No Effect” and no higher than 
“Minor Effect,” the latter being identified in terms of a potential effect on pilot workload. The 
safety assessments performed for TASAR were preliminary and not exhaustive or authoritative as 
they were intended only to be investigative in nature and potentially serve as supplemental material 
for an official determination of the FEC, should one be required by FAA officials. Such 
determinations are typically only performed for an actual application by an operator to the FAA 
for operational approval, and only at the discretion of the approving official (e.g., an airline’s FAA 
POI). However, to assess the likelihood of TASAR being approvable as an EFB application, the 
NASA team met with the FAA authors of EFB policy in the offices of Aircraft Certification (AIR), 
Flight Standards (AFS), and Surveillance & Broadcast Services (SBS). Their feedback was fully 
consistent with the conclusions above, stating that TASAR should be viewed as a “Minor Effect” 
application because of potential pilot workload associated with TASAR due to misleading/bad 
data. From a loss-of-function standpoint, they viewed TASAR as having “No Effect” on safety. 
Formal determination, if needed, would again be left to the appropriate approving official. 
The preliminary OSA was performed based on the TASAR concept represented by an early 
prototype of the TAP software which contained a sparse display of graphical information only 
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featuring the current route and the advised route modification. Early TAP evaluation pilots 
indicated that interpretation of TAP route modification recommendations absent of associated 
contextual information, in particular the weather polygons and SUA polygons accounted for in the 
route modification recommendation, was potentially problematic. Therefore a subsequent 
generation of the TAP Display incorporated the display of polygons to aid the pilot’s 
understanding of the advisories. This raises the question of whether hazardously misleading 
weather information could be presented via the TAP Display, which in turn has implications on 
the Design Assurance Level (DAL) of the software. Further discussion of these issues is included 
in the next chapter. 
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7. Authorization Assessment 
As with any new system installed on an aircraft, adherence to appropriate FAA standards will 
be required for TASAR. To determine which standards are applicable to an EFB application with 
TASAR’s intended function, a requirements analysis for FAA authorization was performed. At 
the outset of the analysis, it was unclear how involved the requirements would be, and so the scope 
of the activity included drafting a project-specific certification plan, collecting representative 
artifacts, and conducting a “dry run” with Designated Engineering Representative (DER) 
certification officials. Ultimately these were not required by either Virgin America or Alaska 
Airlines to receive formal operational approval for TASAR from their POIs. A likely contributing 
reason a formal certification process for TASAR was not needed was the separation at both airlines 
of the EFB system approval from the TAP EFB application approval. Virgin America’s EFB 
hardware system (Class 3, fully integrated with the aircraft) was already installed and approved 
when their association with the TASAR project began, and that installation was already approved 
for higher-criticality applications than TASAR (i.e., Major Effect). Alaska Airlines was already 
using the iPad as a standalone Portable Electronic Device (PED) EFB (i.e., Class 1, not 
electronically integrated with the aircraft) and had plans to upgrade to a “connected” PED EFB 
(i.e., Class 2, with “read-only” access to aircraft data) via certified installation of an aircraft 
interface device (AID). By first completing the EFB hardware certifications, the TASAR approval 
process was greatly simplified, requiring only POI review and approval. 
As increasingly more capable EFB applications such as TASAR are considered for the flight 
deck, these applications will transition from low-certification (e.g., Minor Effect) applications 
hosted on a standalone PED EFB to applications that interface with higher-criticality avionics 
systems (read-only, transmit-only, or both), while also connecting to external networks. 
Consequently, the FAA and industry must require sufficient protections to prevent interference by 
the EFB to avionics systems (e.g., Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI) protection), provide cyber 
security, and require an AID to serve as a trusted interface between more critical avionics and 
airborne internet systems and the lower criticality PED EFB. A comprehensive review of policy 
requirements was conducted for authorization of a TASAR EFB system. Detailed results are 
reported in reference [28]. A summary is provided in the following sections. 
7.1. Key FAA Regulatory Documents 
Presented below are some of the cornerstone regulatory documents that provide guidance 
information and requirements that must be met in order to gain authorization for EFB-based flight 
deck applications. These documents were reviewed and assessed in detail in order to identify 
expected EFB standards adherence requirements for TASAR. These documents point to numerous 
secondary documents not listed here that contain additional authorization requirements an 
applicant must address as part of a certification project with FAA. The document versions listed 
were current at the time of the analysis. 
• Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Parts 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 43, 91F, 
91K, 121, 125, and 135 [29]   
• Flight Standards Information System 8900.1 Change 47, Vol. 4, Chapter 15 – EFB 
Operational Authorization Process [30] 
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o This document provides the FAA approval perspective including POI checklists 
followed for approving EFBs and associated applications (e.g., TASAR). 
• AC 120-76B, Guidelines for the Certification, Airworthiness, and Operational Approval 
of Electronic Flight Bag Computing Devices [31] 
o This document is intended for operators conducting flight operations under 14 
CFR Parts 121, 125, 135, or 91 Subpart F (Part 91F) and Part 91K. It is a key 
guidance document for EFB use with applicability to TASAR. 
• AC 20-173, Installation of Electronic Flight Bag Components [32] 
• FAA Order 8110.4C, Type Certification [33] 
• RTCA/DO-160G, “Environmental Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne 
Equipment” [34] 
o Pertains to EMI and High Intensity Radio Frequency (HIRF) requirements for 
read-only and transmit data interfaces to avionics, respectively. TASAR requires 
read-only access to avionics and thus will need to meet EMI requirements (or 
delegate this requirement to an AID). In addition, wireless connectivity likely 
requires additional isolation testing (i.e., if TASAR is installed on a Transmit-
PED) to ensure non-interference to avionics. 
• AC 20-115, RTCA DO-178B, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and 
Equipment Certification [35] 
7.2. EFB Hardware 
At the initiation of the TASAR project, the guiding FAA document for the certification, 
airworthiness, and operational approval of EFB computing devices was AC 120-76B, issued June 
2012 [31] Two revisions followed (-76C in May 2014, -76D in October 2017) with AC 120-76D 
current at the completion of the TASAR project [22]. The two earlier revisions defined EFB 
hardware in terms of Classes (1, 2, or 3), but the 2017 revision dropped this distinction in favor of 
only two hardware distinctions: portable and installed equipment. Nevertheless, the Class 
distinction remains relevant for this discussion since the regulatory requirements analysis for this 
project was completed in 2015 and the Alaska Airlines EFB upgrade was completed in 2017 before 
the most recent revision was issued.  
TASAR was envisioned to be implemented as a Class 2 EFB application. It requires a read-only 
interface to avionics systems, connection to aircraft power, and data link or internet connectivity 
for access to ground information sources. In most implementations, TASAR is expected to be 
implemented via a mounted PED, the most common type of Class 2 EFBs. The mounted PED 
requires interface to aircraft data through an AID. The hardware combination PED EFB and AID 
represent the entire Class 2 EFB system. The PED EFB must be capable of being easily removed 
from and attached to its cockpit mount by flight crew personnel. The EFB (with associated AID) 
must be installed in accordance with AC 20-173 [32]. As indicated in this AC, cockpit mount 
(versus a yoke mount) may reduce approval requirements. The portable Class 2 EFB components 
(e.g., PED) are not considered to be part of aircraft type design, i.e., not in the aircraft Type 
Certificate (TC) or Supplemental Type Certificate (STC). The installed components with aircraft 
connectivity (e.g., AID) require an STC. An STC is a recertification of the aircraft with the new 
component included. 
The following high-level steps are needed for the installation and operational approval of a Class 
2 EFB, such as for TASAR: 
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1. Applicant must obtain approval via TC or STC for initial alterations related to mounting 
fixture installation and installation of power and/or data connectivity. 
2. Manufacturer, provider, or installer must assure via testing that the Class 2 EFB provides 
interference-free operation. If a data transmitter is used to transmit data to the Class 2 EFB, 
it must be tested to RTCA DO-160G, section 21, paragraph M, ensuring conduction and 
radiation of emissions do not result in interference [34] 
3. Applicant must obtain TC, STC, or DER approval for installation of antennas that provide 
data to the EFB, e.g., navigation, weather data. TASAR falls into this category, as it seeks 
to access information from network-enabled information services. However, since TASAR 
is of “No Effect” or “Minor Effect,” the data integrity required is expected to be relatively 
minor. TC, STC, or DER approval of installed antennas are generally not an issue if 
connecting the EFB to an aircraft’s existing In-Flight Connectivity (IFC, i.e., airborne 
internet) system, though connecting the AID to the IFC system will require an STC, a 
process which must also include addressing cybersecurity issues. 
4. Applicant must obtain operational approval by Operational Specification (OpSpec) or by 
Management Specification (MSpec) and Letter of Authorization, A061, from the POI. 
7.3. EFB Software  
AC 120-76B provides detailed definitions and descriptions of EFB software related factors (e.g., 
Type A, B, C; hosted versus approved software). The revision AC 120-76D maintained the Type 
A and B application definitions (while updating the list of applications included in each) but 
dropped the Type C definition and the term “approved” software as no longer applicable to EFBs. 
Type A applications (listed in Appendix 1 of AC 120-76B and Appendix A of AC 120-76D) 
generally perform paper-replacement functions or present static data (e.g., manuals, logs, chart 
supplements). Type B applications (listed in Appendix 2 in AC 120-76B and Appendix B of AC 
120-76D) generally produce dynamic data with algorithms that must be tested for accuracy and 
reliability by the applicant (e.g., weight and balance calculations, power settings, runway 
performance). 
Though the definitions of Type A and B applications have migrated somewhat between 
document revisions, TASAR reflects the characteristics of Type B applications in both the earliest 
and latest revisions: (1) FEC of no more than “Minor,” and (2) includes variables in the information 
presented based on data-oriented software algorithms (in case of TASAR, using a variety of 
information sources for subsequent processing to determine route modification candidates). 
Whereas TASAR’s intended function was implied in the AC 120-76B list of Type B applications 
(i.e., en route performance calculations), it is explicitly listed in AC 120-76D (i.e., flight 
optimization planning software) possibly prompted by a NASA briefing on TASAR to FAA policy 
writers as part of this project. In this meeting, the policy writers explicitly removed any ambiguity 
of TASAR’s appropriate classification as Type B. 
A question that remains open is the level of software certification required for TASAR. The FEC 
for TASAR was assessed to be within the range of “No Effect” to “Minor Effect.” AC 120-76B 
(applicable in the TASAR project’s formative years) and its replacement AC 120-76C both 
explicitly stated that Type B applications do not require compliance with RTCA/DO-178B (current 
version is -178C [35]), the primary document by which certification authorities approve all 
commercial software-based aerospace systems. However the current revision AC 120-76D is silent 
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on RTCA/DO-178C conformance requirements, saying only that specific authorization for use by 
the FAA for each Type B EFB application must be documented in the OpSpecs or MSpecs.  
As stated earlier, the TAP Display was updated during the project to include display of weather 
polygons and SUA polygons to aid pilots in interpreting the route modification advisories. This 
change could potentially solidify the FEC as “Minor Effect” based on the possibility of presenting 
hazardously misleading information (even predicated on there being a separate primary display of 
weather in the cockpit) [37]. According to RTCA/DO-178C, software with a Minor failure 
condition should meet the standards for Design Assurance Level D. It should be noted that Virgin 
America and Alaska Airlines both obtained operational approval with AC 120-76C in effect, which 
explicitly stated that RTCA/DO-178 compliance was not required for Type B applications. Future 
software implementations of TASAR may need to revisit whether DAL-D compliance is required 
based on AC 120-76D or any further revisions. 
Given its heritage as “research code,” the NASA TAP software did not meet DAL-D compliance 
criteria during its use in the NASA TASAR project. To assess the potential for future DAL-D 
compliance, a software certification upgrade analysis was performed. The analysis concluded that 
while certifying the TAP source code directly in its present form would likely not be cost effective, 
the addition of several insulating layers of certified “validator” software could mitigate the hazards 
associated with most software failure modes [38][39].  
Alternatively, a more detailed OSA may be in order to clarify the FEC (“Minor” vs. “No Effect”) 
given the display of airspace polygons and further evidence of whether or not TASAR increases 
pilot workload. 
The following responsibilities were identified for the approvers and operators in the 
authorization process of the EFB applications such as TASAR: 
FAA POI: 
1. Verifies that: 
a. application criteria and operator requirements are met 
b. data updates follow maintenance manual and inspection program procedures 
c. applicable job aids, including human factors evaluation are completed 
d. training, checking, and currency programs are approved 
e. operational evaluation report from operator is appropriately reviewed 
f. OpSpec or MSpec A061 is issued upon completion of authorization process 
2. Ensures that the level of information integrity is commensurate with the FEC 
Operator: 
1. Determines usage, architectural features, people, procedures, and equipment to eliminate, 
reduce, or control risks associated with an identified failure in a system 
2. Performs 6-month operational validation per authority granted in OpSpec or MSpec A061 
3. Uses both EFB device / system and conventional paper copies during evaluation (not 
applicable for TASAR) 
4. Submits final evaluation report to the POI, as appropriate after evaluation 
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5. Ensures operating system and hosted application software meet criteria for appropriate 
intended functions and do not provide false or hazardously misleading information 
6. Ensures software revision loading will not corrupt data integrity of original software 
7.4. FAA Feedback on TASAR 
The NASA TASAR team met with FAA certification (i.e., AIR), operational approval (i.e., 
AFS), and ADS-B (i.e., SBS) representatives to present the safety, certification, and operational 
approval analyses results and to gain FAA feedback early in the project (July 2013). The outcome 
of the meeting, at which NASA’s briefing materials and results from analyses were reviewed, 
indicated TASAR should have minimal authorization requirements. The following is a summary 
of FAA feedback: 
1. TASAR meets the definition of a Type-B application and does not need to be added 
explicitly to the list of Type B applications in AC 120-76B (though it later was added to 
AC 120-76D). Type-B applications running on non-certified hardware (e.g., Class 2 EFB) 
do not require DO-178B compliance. 
2. TASAR is not considered a formal “ADS-B In application” but rather a 
performance/planning application that leverages ADS-B In data, if available. 
3. No need was identified to establish a “TASAR standard.” 
4. TASAR should be viewed as a “Minor Effect” application because of potential pilot 
workload associated with TASAR due to misleading/bad data. From a loss of function 
standpoint, TASAR is viewed as “No Effect.” 
5. Existing policies already cover the proposed TASAR application. 
6. If an end user already has a certified and approved EFB installation, then the operational 
approval process is for the user to go directly to the POI for review and approval of the 
EFB application. 
 
The last two points of FAA feedback represented the major conclusion of this authorization 
assessment, that existing policies already cover the proposed application and that, from their 
standpoint, an applicant (e.g., an airline) should have no difficulty getting approval to implement 
TASAR. This finding supports NASA’s objectives of developing a near-term, low-cost application 
for in-flight optimization of trajectories using ADS-B In traffic data to increase the likelihood of 
approval. The application enables airspace users to gain early benefits of onboard route 
optimization and ADS-B In at minimal investment risk, while also paving the way for the 
emergence of more advanced airborne trajectory management applications with even greater 
operational benefits. 
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8. Market Assessment 
Market research through various forms of outreach to the commercial aviation community was 
conducted throughout the TASAR project and played an instrumental role in achieving its positive 
outcomes. Not only did it lead to two airlines signing partnership agreements to conduct 
operational evaluations, it generated a sustained interest in the aviation community, with numerous 
industry requests for information on licensing and multiple airlines expressing interest in adopting 
TASAR. 
The objective of early market research was to determine the level of community interest in an 
airborne route optimization capability such as TASAR and their prospective readiness to adopt it. 
As project activities continued, community engagement was sustained in order to gauge the degree 
of alignment with evolving trends in industry technologies, including not only TASAR’s 
foundational infrastructure (e.g., “connected” EFB, ADS-B In) but also future opportunities for 
integrating TASAR with emerging technologies (e.g., onboard multi-scan weather radar, data 
communications). Outreach also established important relationships in identifying a potential 
partner airline (or two) to conduct an operational evaluation of TASAR and in communicating the 
commercialization opportunities to potential TASAR vendors in the aviation industry. 
One of the first TASAR market research activities was a community survey issued to commercial 
aircraft operators. Complementing this research effort were direct meetings and presentations to 
airlines, industry vendors, government organizations, and relevant aviation community groups at 
various established venues. Rounding out the outreach strategy were the publication and 
presentation of technical papers at mainstream aviation conferences as well as a variety of media 
activities. The following sections summarize these various TASAR project outreach strategies, 
activities, and outcomes. 
8.1. Aircraft Operator Community Survey  
The first significant outreach activity was an assessment of the community need for the route 
optimization capabilities of TASAR. The target community was the airspace users (i.e., aircraft 
operators) based on the assumption that if the demand exists (or will exist), the suppliers will come. 
This market research activity would assess the current state and planned investments in 
infrastructure needed to support TASAR technology, and it would gauge the prospective value 
TASAR could bring to existing tools and procedures already employed by aircraft operators for 
route optimization. Results of the community survey are documented in reference [28]. 
Three operators were surveyed: a global Network Carrier, a domestic Low-Cost Airline, and a 
Fractional Operator of business aircraft. Given the small sample size of survey respondents, the 
responses could not be used for generalizable conclusions for all aircraft operators. However, the 
multiple responses received from each stakeholder community within these organizations who are 
involved in flight planning and execution (i.e., responses from multiple pilots, dispatchers, and 
flight operations managers) did allow reasonable observations to be made regarding market 
readiness for TASAR.  
As can be illustrated in four ways, the three operators responding to the survey represented an 
appropriate spectrum of the potential TASAR user community and the diversity of operations 
among aircraft operators in the U.S.  
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1. Fleet Makeup. The two airlines surveyed are air transport operators and operate fleets 
strictly comprised of Boeing and Airbus transport category aircraft. The Fractional 
Operator on the other hand operates a wide range of business aircraft types as part of their 
aircraft fleet. Having more aircraft types within an airline is a cost disadvantage, 
particularly if multiple “first of type” certifications are required to integrate the required 
equipment for TASAR.  
2. Flight Duration. Two-thirds of Fractional Operator flights were reported in the survey as 
short haul (<2 hours), whereas two-thirds of the two airlines’ operations were reported as 
medium to long haul (>2 hours), with 40 percent being long haul (>4 hours). The 
preliminary benefits analysis in Chapter 5 indicated that TASAR will likely provide the 
most benefits for medium to long haul flights [17]. While all three operators can benefit 
from TASAR, the longer haul flights of the Network Carrier and the Low-Cost Airline 
should be expected to gain additional benefits.  
3. Airport Size. Based on the Network Carrier and Low-Cost Airline route structures, a 
greater percentage of hub-to-hub flights would be expected. Since the Fractional Operator 
has a majority of its flights operating from/to non-hub airports, this removes a significant 
set of constraint factors related to ATC ground stops/holds, metering, etc. While potentially 
removing some opportunities for significant benefits (e.g., efficiently recovering from 
expiring ATC traffic management initiatives), it also potentially allows for more flexibility 
for in-flight route optimization and thus increased opportunities to use TASAR to 
accumulate smaller benefits.  
4. Scale of Operations. A clear difference exists in the number of pilots, the number of 
airborne flights, and the number of dispatchers utilized by the three operators, ranging from 
very large numbers for the Network Carrier to relatively small numbers for the Low Cost 
Airline and the Fractional Operator. These smaller operators have fewer available ground 
resources to optimize flights after departure, making a stronger case for flight optimization 
technology in the cockpit.  
Some general observations from the community survey are presented next. As survey results 
were received during 2013, future plans and actual levels of equipage of the surveyed operators 
may have later changed based on regulatory and market forces. The observations below represent 
operator equipage and plans as of 2013 and reflect differences between operators and their 
respective markets. 
1. Given a favorable cost-benefit business case for TASAR, all three operators could quickly 
equip for full TASAR functionality with the following three pieces of infrastructure.  
o Class 2 EFB: The operators have diverse plans for EFB use spanning all Classes of 
EFB hardware and operating systems (mix of Windows, LINUX, and iOS). All users 
should be able to utilize their EFBs to host TASAR, although Class 1 EFBs will need 
to interface to an AID. As of 2013, the operators were generally well on their way to 
having this capability that would support early adoption of TASAR. 
o Internet connectivity: As of 2013, the Fractional Operator had, and the Low-Cost 
Carrier was shortly to have, excellent internet access for their aircraft. The Network 
Carrier appeared to be the most challenged in network connectivity for future TASAR 
use, but could potentially leverage available cabin internet services they provide for 
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passengers to support flight deck applications such as TASAR. Additional certification 
would be required to address cybersecurity issues associated with connecting the cabin 
and cockpit domains. 
o ADS-B In: Anticipated ADS-B Out equipage levels for the three operators suggested a 
relatively slow deployment, resulting in a significant number of aircraft being 
unequipped for several years. In other words, a mixed-equipage environment was 
expected all the way to the 2020 mandate. Only one of the three operators had plans 
for ADS-B In equipage. TASAR may need to be bundled with other ADS-B In 
applications to form a sufficient business case for upgrading ADS-B Out to ADS-B In. 
2. Flight operations throughout the year typically offer ample opportunities for re-optimization 
of airborne flights, given the frequency of flight plan disruptions reported by pilots and 
dispatchers due to en route weather and ATC constraints on operational efficiency. 
3. Pilots have considerable latitude for making route modification requests, particularly for 
altitude and speed changes, guided by the company Operations Control Manual. Requests for 
lateral path changes are more likely to require dispatch approval, though dispatch approval is 
not frequently sought in practice. Sufficient pilot empowerment is in place at the surveyed 
operators to allow use of TASAR capabilities to seek improvements to the current flight plan. 
4. From a dispatch perspective pertaining to time spent on flight optimization, there is a tradeoff 
on time spent versus savings achieved. Given the current state of tools used in re-planning, the 
time it takes to use them to identify flight optimization opportunities and consider alternatives, 
and the already high workload dispatchers have in planning upcoming flights, little effort is 
typically expended by dispatchers on optimizing flights after departure. 
5. TASAR, with pertinent, accurate, and timely information on weather information and ATC 
constraints en route and at the destination, has the potential to provide significant flight 
optimization capabilities and increase operational efficiency.  
In summary, based on airspace user community input from 2013, TASAR equipage is readily 
achievable (with the possible exception of ADS-B In), frequent opportunities for TASAR 
utilization and benefit are expected, and TASAR procedures are consistent with the existing role 
of the pilot and availability of the dispatcher, thereby filling a key gap in maintaining flight 
operations efficiency.  
8.2. Airline Engagement  
Initial outreach to airlines focused on introducing the TASAR concept and soliciting input for 
the community survey described in the preceding section. As major airlines are not necessarily the 
most likely candidates to be “early adopters” of unproven aircraft technology, the outreach effort 
was expanded to include not just the major Network Carrier (traditionally the focus of NASA 
AOSP research) but also alternative stakeholders such as the Low Cost Airline and the Fractional 
Operator. Dedicated briefings were held with each of these operators with the intent (beyond 
soliciting input for the community survey) of laying the groundwork for potential industry-NASA 
partnerships and collaborative operational evaluations of TASAR. Though all three responded 
favorably to TASAR, the most affirmative response for a potential operational evaluation 
partnership came from the Fractional Operator. Essentially running a non-scheduled airline, 
fractional operators maintain diverse fleets of business jets and cater to clientele who expect 
cutting-edge technology. In this respect, such operators could be fertile ground for TASAR’s 
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technology insertion strategy. Ultimately, the collaboration with the Fractional Operator did not 
materialize in part due to departure of key personnel from the company but also a mismatch with 
AOSP’s traditional focus on the scheduled airlines.  
Over the life of the TASAR project, dedicated briefings were given to seven U.S. airlines: Alaska 
Airlines, American Airlines, Delta Airlines, JetBlue Airways, Southwest Airlines, United Airlines, 
and Virgin America. By the latter half of the project, Network Carriers were traveling to NASA to 
meet explicitly on TASAR and extending an invitation to their headquarters to brief a wide 
contingent of personnel from the various departments involved in investment decisions or 
operational use.  
The ability to give a demonstration of the actual TAP software connected to a laptop flight 
simulator was instrumental to the effectiveness of these outreach meetings. The “mobile demo” 
brought a tangible element to the briefing and discussions, and it provided a hands-on experience 
to participants, which in turn generated heightened interest in the technology. 
The presentations on findings from the preliminary analyses on TASAR benefits, safety, and 
FAA authorization were also instrumental to the strong reception repeatedly received in these 
meetings. Having these results on hand, or knowing they were in progress, helped build the 
necessary credibility in the technology’s viability from the perspective of the airlines. When 
questions were raised in briefings, NASA generally already had relevant answers in published 
reports.  
By far the most effective approach for securing airline interest and engagement in the TASAR 
project was the strategy of inviting technical (tech) pilots from a variety of airlines to participate 
in the NASA flight trials (described in Chapter 11). Tech pilots perform many additional functions 
beyond flying scheduled operations, one of which is to evaluate new aircraft technologies for 
potential integration into the fleet. Inviting tech pilots to serve as technology evaluators in the 
flight trials served two purposes. It enabled the pilots to give NASA feedback on the features and 
operational acceptability of the TAP software, and it provided them the opportunity to assess the 
technology first hand for their airline and consider the possibility of conducting a collaborative 
operational evaluation with TAP installed on their aircraft. Most of the participating pilots were 
either the airline’s Director of Fleet Technology (or similar position) authorized to make 
technology decisions, or senior instructor pilots (captains) with enough clout to make technology 
recommendations to the director. Upon the completion of the first flight trial (FT-1) in 2013, four 
airlines expressed interest in pursuing the TASAR technology for their fleets, two of which signed 
Space Act Agreements (SAAs) with NASA to conduct operational evaluations on their aircraft in 
revenue service. 
Building on the contacts made with the airlines in FT-1, the strategy was employed again for the 
second human-in-the-loop simulation (HITL-2) and second Flight Trial (FT-2). To build interest 
within the tech pilot communities of the partner airlines, 10 of the 12 simulation sessions in HITL-
2 were reserved for these two airlines who supplied pilots of their choosing. In FT-2, six evaluation 
seats were reserved for these airlines, and four seats were provided to four other airlines, three of 
which were new to TASAR.  
8.3. Industry Engagement 
Although the aircraft operators (e.g., airlines) are the ultimate intended users of TASAR, the 
path to widespread commercial use is through the industry of aviation systems suppliers. It would 
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ultimately be necessary for one or more of these companies to get a commercial license from 
NASA for the technology and leverage it as needed to produce a commercial TASAR product that 
they then supply to the aircraft operator community. It would also most likely be incumbent upon 
industry to perform the engineering work to adapt the technology to each aircraft type and operator 
configuration. TAP or derivatives developed by industry require adaptation because of the 
variations in avionics systems, outputs, and wiring between fleets and to account for differences 
in aircraft performance. Also, the various configurations of EFB hardware and connectivity will 
require customized solutions.  
The industry companies that showed the earliest serious commercial interest in TASAR were 
providers of EFB-related hardware and providers of internal and external connectivity solutions. 
An attractive property of a software application like TASAR to these companies was its potential 
to help build the business case for their emergent product lines. Over time, more companies began 
to see TASAR as more than a “teaser” but actually a complement to their established product line 
and potentially even a principal product itself. It is too early to tell how these visions will unfold 
in the long term. Based on inquiries for evaluation licenses, the types of companies exploring 
commercialization of TASAR increased in diversity during the TASAR project. Table 7 shows the 
range of industries that showed commercial interest in TASAR and their associated diversity of 
motivations as gleaned from company discussions.  
Outreach to industry was initially performed through meetings requested of known points of 
contact and subsequently through invitations received to present TASAR in various venues. 
Presentations were initially given alongside talks on other new technologies, then more frequently 
in requested, dedicated TASAR briefings. Key opportunities also emerged through NASA’s new 
partner airlines, as they pointed NASA to existing or potential vendors that could supply the 
connected EFB platform for the operational evaluations. In each of these outreach activities, 
NASA’s mobile demonstration system greatly facilitated the communication of the concept and 
technology, just as it did in the airline briefings. And similarly, having published analysis results 
on hand regarding benefits, safety, and FAA authorization built confidence in the industry that 
TASAR was indeed a viable commercial product worthy of attention. 
Industries Commercial Interest 
Navigation avionics Offer TASAR in conjunction with flight management systems  
Airborne internet Offer TASAR as business case for the “connected cockpit” revolution 
EFB hardware & connectivity Offer TASAR to incentivize avionics-interfacing hardware/software products 
Surveillance avionics Offer TASAR to incentivize operators to equip with ADS-B IN  
Flight efficiency services  Offer TASAR to expand services to include rerouting with traffic avoidance 
Weather data services Offer TASAR to integrate with their weather data products 
Airlines Deploy TASAR across their fleets for fuel efficiency benefit 
Business aviation Deploy TASAR for point-to-point route optimization and range extension 
Original Equipment Manufacturer Use TASAR/TAP as a foundation for UAM autonomous flight planning 
Small Business innovators Develop TASAR to enhance their in-house innovative products and services 
 
Table 7. Diverse industries with diverse motivations for TASAR commercialization. 
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8.4. Government Organization Engagement 
TASAR outreach also extended to relevant Government organizations. The first such activity 
was a July 2013 briefing to FAA officials in AIR, AFS, and SBS. These offices write FAA policy 
for certification of EFB hardware, operational approval of EFB software applications, and ADS-
B technologies and procedures. The meeting purpose was to present the proposed technology with 
analyses of safety and approval requirements for critique and feedback. In doing so, it helped 
achieve a level of familiarity and support at the FAA that later paid dividends as other FAA 
officials contacted them with questions about TASAR. The FAA POIs for the two partner airlines, 
Virgin America and Alaska Airlines, sent inquiries to these offices after having received the 
applications submitted by the airlines requesting TAP be approved as EFB software. Pre-briefing 
these policy officials facilitated their dialogue with the POIs and the subsequent issuance of formal 
operational approval for both airlines. 
Another opportunity to brief FAA personnel was triggered by the second NASA flight trial in 
2015. FT-2 included a research objective of assessing ATC approvability factors associated with 
route modification requests through TASAR. (FT-2 is described in Chapter 11.2.) Achieving this 
objective involved stationing NASA team researchers at ATC facilities to observe the flight-test 
aircraft’s TASAR requests from the perspective of the air traffic controller, and then interviewing 
the air traffic controllers for their perspective on factors leading to request approval or denial. 
Outreach trips to the Atlanta and Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Centers in advance of FT-
2 provided the first opportunity to present TASAR to the ATC community, one that might have a 
wholly different perspective on the proposed technology than the user community. The current 
ATC system is largely centered on facilitating pre-approved flight plans that are well aligned with 
the airspace system structure (e.g., jet routes, sector geometries supporting dominant traffic flows). 
It was uncertain what the reception would be to an aircraft technology that continually prompts 
pilots to request route modifications that may deviate from that structure. In fact, the reception was 
quite favorable. They appreciated the technology design to accommodate ATC constraints and 
increase approvability, thus facilitating pilot/controller interactions and mitigating the impact on 
controller workload. More to the point, they appreciated being included at this early stage of the 
technology’s development and testing and having their input considered in its design. This 
outreach also reached beyond the initial meetings with facility managers and extended to the actual 
air traffic control workforce through on-site observations and interviews.  
The FT-2 activity also attracted the attention of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association 
(NATCA), the air traffic controller union. Their bargaining agreement gives them the right to 
negotiate with the FAA over their role in new technologies like TASAR. Prior to FT-2, NATCA 
approval was received to enable researchers to interview air traffic controllers. After FT-2 was 
complete and having received a copy of the FT-2 analysis report on the ATC observations, 
NATCA requested a full TASAR briefing. Through the briefing, they learned that the role of 
controller does not change with TASAR, and no controller training is required. Discussions 
centered on their concerns of the increased frequency of user requests and potential challenges 
integrating with other emerging technologies like time-based flow management. Though not 
strictly an outreach activity, these interactions with NATCA may eventually pay dividends when 
the opportunity arises to integrate TASAR and derivative technologies with emerging NextGen 
technologies such as Data Communications (Data Comm) that would alleviate some NATCA 
concerns. 
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Government outreach on TASAR also occurred through regular NASA-FAA quarterly meetings, 
technical interchange meetings, research transition teams, and meetings with key FAA technology 
leaders. Two such interactions centered on the likely synergy of TASAR with the FAA’s programs 
on Data Comm and SWIM. These leadership interactions generated substantial interest due to 
TASAR’s roadmap alignment with these programs. Data Comm will soon replace much of the 
voice communications between pilots and air traffic controllers, but only for those aircraft 
operators that voluntarily equip for Data Comm. It was clear to FAA Data Comm officials how 
TASAR could inspire such equipage because the integration could enable more sophisticated route 
modification requests while reducing pilot and controller workload. Similarly, SWIM leaders saw 
an opportunity in TASAR to showcase SWIM as a common data source for ground-based and 
airborne trajectory management technologies. Again, with SWIM being a voluntary system, 
TASAR could inspire the aircraft operator community to gain “Aircraft Access to SWIM” (the 
title of an FAA project with this goal). The capstone of outreach activities with the FAA was a 
TASAR endorsement by the venerable FAA Chief Scientist for NextGen, Steve Bradford, who 
invited NASA to Brussels to present TASAR to the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) Air Traffic Management Requirements and Performance Panel at their June 2017 
Technical Interchange Meeting, “Evolution Towards Global Trajectory-Based Operations 
(TBO).” 
TASAR’s Government outreach also extended to the Aviation Weather Center (AWC) of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The director of the AWC was invited 
to participate as an evaluation pilot in FT-1. This facilitated subsequent TASAR team access to 
NOAA expertise in atmospheric modeling supporting the aviation community (and many others). 
TAP consumes atmospheric data, including winds, temperature, and convective weather, with 
turbulence data intended for future development. The original plan was to exclusively use public 
data sources to facilitate technology transfer to the broadest cross-section of aircraft operators. 
Though the plan was partially modified due to Alaska Airlines policy requiring use of a private 
convective weather data source, TAP retained the use of NOAA wind and temperature data 
throughout the project.  
8.5. Broader Aviation Community Engagement 
Complementing the targeted outreach described above, which was generally dedicated 
interactions with specific individuals or companies, several opportunities emerged to talk to wider 
communities. Some opportunities were internally generated by NASA, such as “Industry Day” 
events where a cross-section of aircraft operators, aviation system suppliers, and related 
organizations attend to engage with NASA on current and future research. In fact, the first ever 
TASAR briefing occurred at a 2011 Industry Day sponsored by the NASA Airspace Systems 
Program. As this was before the TASAR project officially started, the briefing included a low-
fidelity mockup demonstration of the proposed technology. Another early opportunity emerged to 
connect with a representative of the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA). Later in the 
project, NASA was invited to brief TASAR to the “Friends and Partners of Aviation Weather” at 
an NBAA event. 
The most impactful venue for TASAR outreach in terms of dissemination to the broadest and 
most relevant community was the EFB Users Forum, the world’s largest industry conference on 
EFB technology. Held semiannually in locations alternating between U.S. and overseas locations, 
the EFB Users Forum is sponsored by the Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee, an 
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international standards organization that represents technical positions of the air transport industry. 
The EFB Users Forum attracts several hundred attendees from airlines, system integrators, 
hardware and software suppliers, and regulators to discuss operational and technical trends of 
interest to the EFB user community. One company interested in TASAR commercialization invited 
NASA to set up a TASAR demonstration at their booth for the June 2015 forum in Denver. The 
opportunity was leveraged to secure an invited TASAR briefing to the full audience of 400 
attendees. Jointly presented by NASA and Alaska Airlines, the presentation was very successful 
in generating a significant degree of interest in TASAR as indicated from a variety of domestic 
and international airlines, avionics vendors, and data connectivity suppliers through side meetings 
and requests for more information. NASA was invited twice more, presenting at the Vienna Forum 
in June 2017 and the Chicago Forum in June 2019.  
TASAR was taking hold in the consciousness of the aviation community as was evident by 
invitations for NASA to present TASAR to various industry working groups such as the 
Communications, Navigation, Surveillance Task Force (August 2015); the Boeing Data Comm 
Working Group (November 2015); the RTCA NextGen Advisory Committee Performance Based 
Navigation Task Group on Time, Speed, and Spacing (August 2016); the Base of Aircraft Data 
Users Conference (May 2017), the aforementioned Friends and Partners of Aviation Weather at 
the NBAA conference (October 2017); and the RTCA Special Committee 206 Aeronautical 
Information and Meteorological Data Link Services plenary session (March 2018). The number 
and diversity of these invitations indicated industry’s positive view on TASAR’s relevance to a 
broad spectrum of aviation activities. 
8.6. Research Community Engagement 
TASAR project accomplishments were shared with the research community primarily through 
conference publications and presentation. These methods for dissemination were to ensure that 
TASAR research findings were readily accessible to both the research and industry communities, 
while subjecting TASAR to welcomed scrutiny from peers conducting related research on other 
advanced trajectory management concepts and technologies. Every project year from 2012 to 2019 
had at least one TASAR conference publication, often several. The primary venue for publication 
was the annual American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Aviation Technology, 
Integration, and Operations Conference later consolidated under the AIAA AVIATION Forum 
(seven publications). Other venues included the AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
Conference (two publications), the Digital Systems Avionics Conference (two publications), the 
U.S.A./Europe Air Traffic Management Research and Development Seminar (one publication), 
and the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting (one publication). The NASA 
Scientific and Technical Information Program served as an additional venue for publishing the 
more lengthy reports and making them publically accessible online through the searchable NASA 
Technical Report Server. 
8.7. Public Engagement 
Supplementing the technical outreach activities were efforts to communicate the innovations of 
the TASAR project to broader aviation and non-aviation audiences through various public media. 
For instance, several TASAR articles appeared during the project lifespan in Aviation Week and 
Space Technology and Avionics Magazine, both of which are widely read throughout the aviation 
industry. A NASA press release announcing the partnerships with Alaska Airlines and Virgin 
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America spawned dozens of articles on TASAR by news outlets around the world. TASAR also 
received prominent mention in articles on the two airlines and their ongoing technology programs, 
as well as online articles and print publications of the industry companies supporting the 
NASA/airline partnerships. An example is a 2016 book written and published by Gogo (supplier 
of in-flight connectivity, i.e., airborne internet) on the rise and revolutionary impact of “connected 
aviation” [12]. The book highlights TASAR not only as a current-day example of leveraging 
connectivity to enhance route optimization but also how TASAR leads to autonomy in future 
aircraft operations.  
The NASA Technology Transfer Program also sponsored several outreach products to promote 
TASAR commercialization, including a one-hour online technical webinar, a promotional video 
on the technology, and an online fact sheet. TASAR was also featured on the radio series and 
podcast Innovation Now, which reaches a wide public audience. 
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9. Technology Prototype  
The centerpiece of TASAR is cockpit-based, connectivity-enabled, software technology that 
searches for and advises the pilot on route optimization opportunities, enabling the pilot to make 
“strategic requests” to ATC that produce operational benefits. TAP is NASA’s prototype of the 
envisioned TASAR software technology. Though the terms TAP and TASAR are sometimes used 
interchangeably, the intended distinction is that TAP is the software application, and TASAR is 
the concept of pilots using software applications (e.g., TAP or its derivatives) to proactively 
optimize their route as a first step on the roadmap of airborne trajectory management towards 
operational autonomy [7]. Based on the starting level of functionality built into the TAP prototype 
for the NASA TASAR project, the scope of route optimization as described in this report includes 
the aircraft’s lateral path and cruise altitude, with certain constraints applied to accommodate 
practical limitations of making voice requests to ATC. The concept of TASAR, however, extends 
beyond these limits to encompass optimizing the aircraft’s 4D trajectory (i.e., speed profile 
changes in addition to complex lateral path and altitude profile changes) unconstrained by the 
voice request limitations. In these respects, TAP will be able to support the full concept of TASAR 
with additional software development, either by NASA for future Research and Development 
projects or by industry through further commercial development of TAP or derivative products.  
NASA’s prototype TAP software technology is described in references [40] (original 2013 
description) and [41] (updated 2016 description). The sections below discuss its heritage, give a 
functional overview, and highlight unique features designed to increase its commercial viability 
and appeal. Table 8 presents the TAP version history with approximate release dates and the 
primary use of each version. 
Table 8. TAP software version history. 
 
TAP Version Release Date Primary use 
1 Nov 2012 Initial prototype 
2 July 2013 HITL-1 simulation experiment 
3 Oct 2013 FT-1 flight trial 
14-1 Sept 2014 HITL-2 simulation experiment 
15-2 June 2015 FT-2 flight trial 
15-3 Sept 2016 Alaska-compatible prototype 
15-4 Feb 2018 Alaska operational evaluation 
15-3.11 Dec 2018 License release (15-4 w/ BADA removed) 
19-6 Feb 2019 Project compete prototype 
 
9.1. Heritage from Autonomy Research Technology (AOP) 
TAP is a derivative of the AOP software, NASA’s research prototype of an advanced flight-deck 
automation system to support self-separation of aircraft [13]. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
motivation for TASAR is rooted in the vision of aircraft operational autonomy in which aircraft 
manage their own trajectories throughout most of their flight without the assistance of ATC. In 
support of extensive experimental research into aircraft operational autonomy (as described by 
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AFR, a NASA concept for airborne operational autonomy) and its central function of self-
separation (i.e., an aircraft independently detecting, resolving, and preventing conflicts with other 
aircraft), NASA developed AOP to investigate functional requirements for the AFR-enabling 
onboard automation technology that would enable AFR [6][9]. AOP was developed and used in 
multiple batch and HITL simulation experiments in the period 2001–2012, culminating in a pair 
of HITL simulations with airline pilots and air traffic controllers conducting “mixed operations” 
in which AFR (autonomous) and IFR (ATC-managed) aircraft coexist without segregation in high-
altitude en route airspace [11].  
The intent of building AOP was to enable investigations of technical and operational feasibility 
of the AFR concept. AOP’s design philosophy was to ensure that any negative findings of AFR 
feasibility were not the inadvertent byproduct of some inadequacy of the technology used in the 
assessment. The design goal therefore was to include in AOP’s architecture and suite of functions 
a sufficient degree of fidelity and sophistication to maximize the likelihood of AFR operational 
feasibility when tested in conditions simulating complexities of real-world operations. As it turned 
out, this early design approach was instrumental in enabling AOP to later serve as the foundation 
for a derivative tool (TAP) that could be taken out of the lab, installed in multiple aircraft including 
an airliner, and be used in actual airline operations.  
Two sophisticated functions that set AOP apart were leveraged in TAP. These were its conflict 
detection algorithm (AOP CD) [42] and its “pattern-based genetic algorithm” for airborne conflict 
resolution (AOP PBGA) [43]. AOP CD was uniquely sophisticated in several respects. First, it 
was designed to incorporate “trajectory intent” information if available, but also to work in the 
absence of intent information. Intent information includes planned turns, altitude changes, and 
speed changes, and it can apply to the ownship or the traffic aircraft. More intent information 
yields a more accurate trajectory prediction and therefore more accurate detection of conflicts 
between trajectories. Airborne availability of intent information is limited today to ownship 
information but may increase in the future for traffic information. The ability to handle varying 
degrees of availability of intent information is critical to operational feasibility of a mixed 
operations concept like AFR, since availability will likely vary between aircraft.  
Second, AOP CD accommodates trajectory prediction uncertainties due to factors such as 
navigation modeling errors and atmospheric effects. These effects accrue from differences 
between the trajectory prediction model’s assumptions and the actual complex characteristics of 
the aircraft and the atmosphere. AOP mitigates these effects by applying “4D uncertainty bounds” 
to the along-path, cross-track, and altitude dimensions of the predicted trajectory for the ownship 
and every traffic aircraft. Enveloping the baseline trajectory prediction, these uncertainty bounds 
can be tailored to the particular prediction errors associated with each dimension and further 
customized by factors such as auto-flight system characteristics. The result is fewer “missed alerts” 
(i.e., a false-positive conflict), an important safety element in autonomous operations. 
AOP PBGA provided a sophisticated method to search for a “strategic resolution” to a detected 
conflict. In the parlance of AOP, a strategic conflict resolution is essentially a modified flight plan 
consisting of the addition or removal of intermediate waypoints from the FMS “active route” that 
resolves the detected conflict and avoids creating any other conflicts within defined time horizons. 
(In contrast to a strategic resolution, a “tactical” resolution would be a single maneuver, e.g., a 
heading change, to resolve the detected conflict with the return plan to be determined later.) The 
sophisticated aspect of AOP PBGA is its ability to search a large quantity of candidate route 
changes, account for a multitude of diverse “fitness” factors, and through successive generations 
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of mating and mutation, home in on the optimal solution, where “optimal” is defined by a fitness 
function. For instance, as AOP PBGA evaluates candidate route changes (starting with random 
sampling), it applies fitness penalties to those in conflict with traffic, weather, and SUA while 
rewarding those that are more “on time” and have greater cost savings (measured in time or fuel). 
Characteristics of route-change “winners” are perpetuated as-is or through mating to future 
generations, while “losers” are dropped. (A more detailed description of the algorithm is presented 
in reference [43].) The outcome of AOP PBGA is a strategic route change that is both conflict free 
(within defined parameters) and optimized for cost and schedule adherence. Batch simulation 
studies, with randomized-geometry encounters up to five times today’s traffic density, have shown 
AOP CD and AOP PBGA to be highly effective self-separation algorithms [10]. Similar studies 
have stress-tested the algorithms in various ways, and refinements have produced software code 
that is both robust and computationally efficient. As will be discussed, TAP leveraged these 
algorithms and therefore benefited from AOP’s years of development, testing, and debugging. 
In addition to TAP leveraging the heritage of AOP’s algorithms, it also inherited a software 
architecture that was designed to work in a realistic avionics environment. As mentioned earlier, 
AOP’s design philosophy was to incorporate fidelity high enough that AFR infeasibility could not 
be attributed to simplifying assumptions of the technology prototypes used in the research 
assessments. A principal example was the specification used for avionics input data into AOP. The 
NASA desktop flight simulator used for AFR research was purposefully designed with a simulated 
ARINC 429 avionics data bus, the standard used on most higher-end transport category aircraft 
that defines the data protocol for the exchange of avionics data within the aircraft. Furthermore, 
the simulator’s FMS used the ARINC 702A characteristic in the specification of route data on the 
avionics data bus. Adherence to these industry standards brought AOP in close alignment with 
how a commercial automation system would receive data in an actual aircraft environment, with 
all of its limitations in content, data precision, and transfer rate. AOP’s input/output subsystem 
was designed to handle these inputs and work within their constraints, thus adding another check 
on AFR technical feasibility. However it also put AOP in a position to provide TAP an excellent 
foundational architecture adaptable to a hardware avionics environment. This factor was 
instrumental in the rapid development of TAP and its readiness for flight testing early in the 
TASAR project. 
9.2. Functional description 
TAP’s function is to continuously probe for candidate route modifications (including lateral path 
and cruise altitude changes) that optimize the flight across the entire route while avoiding the 
creation of conflicts with traffic, weather, and SUA. TAP implements the strategic trajectory-
management functionality prototyped in AOP in a non-safety-critical application appropriate for 
current-day use.  
9.2.1. Inputs 
Through onboard connectivity to avionics data, and internet connectivity to external data 
regarding the operational environment, TAP maintains a current model representation of the flight 
and the relevant airspace. Figure 7 shows that the model’s inputs include the state of the aircraft 
(e.g., position, altitude, speed, track, weight), the aircraft’s active route to the destination, an 
atmospheric model including winds and temperature, current and predicted locations of convective 
weather, the published activation schedules of SUA, and the state vectors of nearby broadcasting 
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traffic aircraft. TAP’s three primary algorithms, TAP Trajectory Generator (TAP TG), TAP 
Conflict Detector (TAP CD), and TAP Pattern-Based Genetic Algorithm (TAP PBGA), ingest 
these dynamically updated data, along with user entries and pre-installed (non-dynamic) data, to 
support the pilot in route optimization. TAP CD and TAP PBGA were inherited directly from AOP 
(with modifications for TASAR, for example new maneuver templates in TAP PBGA). TAP TG 
was newly developed for the TASAR project, employing a novel behavioral modeling 
methodology to make it more adaptable to a wide variety of aircraft types [44]. 
9.2.2. Optimization  
As prototyped in this project, TAP’s degrees of freedom to optimize the route include the 
aircraft’s lateral path and cruise altitude. Periodically (typically once per minute), TAP PBGA 
conducts a search for route modifications to improve a specified flight-optimization parameter. 
Selected by the pilot, the optimization parameter most typically used is the operational cost of the 
flight (combining fuel burn and flight time according to a given Cost Index). Thus TAP seeks to 
minimize the operating cost through proposed changes in the aircraft’s lateral path and cruise 
altitude. Other options for optimization include pure flight time optimization and pure fuel burn 
optimization. For every candidate route modification generated by TAP PBGA, TAP TG computes 
flight time and fuel burn to the destination, as it also does for the current route. The route 
modifications with the greatest savings are favored by TAP PBGA as it proceeds through multiple 
generations of candidate route modifications. 
Figure 7. Variety of inputs and algorithms used by TAP for conflict-free route optimization. 
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9.2.3. Constraints 
Constraints are applied in the TAP PBGA search process to enhance acceptability of the 
proposed route modifications to the pilot and air traffic controller, both of whom must concur with 
the proposed change for it to be executed and produce the desired benefit. For example, to enhance 
pilot acceptability, TAP avoids proposing route modifications that intersect with current and 
forecast convective weather, as such routes would likely be rejected by the pilot who is responsible 
for avoiding hazardous weather. Weather design considerations for TAP are described in reference 
[45]. To enhance ATC acceptability, TAP avoids proposing route modifications that would create 
a traffic conflict or intersect with an active SUA, both of which would result in ATC denying the 
request. Conflicts with traffic, SUAs, and weather along the candidate route modifications are 
detected by TAP CD and are incorporated in TAP PBGA by adding significant fitness penalties, 
essentially removing them from the “gene pool” and discouraging the generation of similar route 
modification candidates. 
TAP facilitates voice communication of requests by constraining the proposed lateral path to 
published (fixed location and name) waypoints, while also limiting the maximum number of 
waypoints added to two but not limiting the waypoints bypassed, thus keeping the voice requests 
and responses short. In addition, the pilot is able to specify a farthest waypoint “limit” for the route 
modification to rejoin the active route, allowing the pilot to use their operational experience with 
ATC approvals to restrict the longitudinal extent of the request and increase the likelihood of 
approval. The pilot can also set an upper limit to altitude searches to ensure compatibility with 
FMS altitude limits. 
9.2.4. Route Modification Solutions 
TAP produces three independently generated route modification proposals, or solutions: (1) a 
lateral solution, which modifies the path but not the altitude; (2) a vertical solution, which modifies 
the cruise altitude but not the lateral path; and (3) a combination (“combo”) solution, which 
modifies both. Each solution type presented to the pilot is the most optimal, conflict-free solution 
identified within its degrees of freedom (lateral, vertical, or combo). This multi-dimensional 
optimization design provides pilots with alternatives, rather than just a single recommendation, 
which is intended to increase TAP’s usefulness when other factors unknown to TAP may dictate 
a pilot’s choice of maneuver.  
9.2.5. User Interface 
The TAP user interface was developed through an iterative human-factors design process and 
subsequently enhanced over the course of the TASAR project. Human factors principles were 
applied to enhance usability and situation awareness (SA) without significantly affecting pilot 
workload. Figure 8 shows the primary TAP user interface for TAP’s automatic mode (“Auto 
Mode”). In this mode, TAP displays the three solutions on selectable buttons (Lateral, Vertical, 
and Combo), the predicted outcomes in fuel burn and flight time (savings are shown in green), and 
a graphic preview of any of the route modifications relative to the active route (TAP solution is 
shown in cyan).  
In addition to Auto Mode in which TAP periodically generates and displays route modification 
advisories for pilot consideration, TAP also has a “Manual Mode” in which the pilot may enter a 
route modification from scratch or modify a selected Auto Mode solution. Figure 9 shows the 
Manual Mode user interface, depicting a pilot-entered route modification that conflicts with traffic. 
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The pilot could use this information to either wait for the traffic indication to clear before making 
the ATC request or modify the request to be clear of traffic. 
The TAP user interface design was issued a U.S. patent in 2018 [46]. 
Figure 8. TAP v15-4 user interface shown in Auto Mode. 
Figure 9. TAP v15-4 user interface shown in Manual Mode depicting a traffic conflict. 
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9.3. Features Enhancing Commercial Appeal for Technology Transfer 
A number of distinguishing features were included in TAP’s design with the intention of 
increasing TAP’s appeal to be commercialized by industry vendors and widely adopted by the 
aircraft operator community. They include a flexible software architecture adaptable to a variety 
of host platforms and aircraft types, the use of industry standards where possible, and unique 
functionality that sets TAP apart as state-of-the-art route optimization technology worthy of 
industry and operator investment and adoption. Each of these features is described next. 
9.3.1. Flexible System Architecture 
TAP’s system architecture is shown in Figure 10. The TAP software is distributed among four 
“executable” software components all installed onboard the aircraft: TAP Engine, TAP Display, 
TAP Display Adaptor, and External Data Server. This distributed software architecture permits 
TAP to be hosted on a single EFB platform or, if desired, on several computing platforms 
connected by a Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) local network. All four 
TAP software components can be compiled for Windows or Linux operating systems from a single 
code base, and the TAP Display can also be compiled for the iOS operating system for installation 
on the iPad (widely popular among airlines and business aviation as an EFB user interface). 
TAP Engine is the main processor of TAP. It accepts and reads all data inputs, reformats them 
as needed for internal use, performs all processing necessary to generate route optimization 
advisories, and responds to all pilot commands on TAP Display that affect processing. Its central 
architecture, algorithms, and performance are derived from AOP. Its input processor was rewritten 
Figure 10. TAP's distributed system architecture. Credit M. Underwood. 
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to receive avionics data via the ARINC 834 standard, or “Simple Text Avionics Protocol” (STAP), 
a communication protocol for non-certified EFBs to communicate with certified avionics. 
TAP Display is the graphical user interface that enables the interaction between the pilot and the 
software. It displays TAP’s route optimization solutions, time/fuel outcomes, conflict 
characteristics, and additional information about the state of the system. TAP Display also accepts 
and implements entry of all pilot control instructions and is adaptable to many EFB configurations, 
operating systems, display aspect ratios, and device orientations. 
TAP Display Adaptor (TDA) handles communications between TAP Engine and TAP Display. 
TDA receives all display-related data from TAP Engine, adapts it to the communication protocol 
of the hardware configuration, and sends it to TAP Display. It handles all pilot commands from 
TAP Display and relays them to TAP Engine. In configurations where TAP Display is operating 
on a tablet device, TDA also re-synchronizes connections with TAP Display after it has been put 
to sleep or pushed into background operation while another application is in use. 
External Data Server (EDS) manages the connection, download, and processing of data from 
sources other than the ownship’s avionics via the STAP feed. Downloads implemented for the 
TASAR project included wind and temperature data from the Rapid Refresh service available from 
NOAA, SUA activation schedule from the FAA SUA website, and convective weather polygons 
from a NASA-based server connected to a commercial weather data service provider. EDS is 
designed to be expandable to incorporate additional data sources as desired. 
9.3.2. Conformance to Industry Standards 
As much as possible, TAP was designed to use industry standard interfaces and data formats to 
ease adaptation to many different aircraft types and configurations. Inputs for avionics data, 
navigation and airspace data, and atmospheric data all benefited from this approach, but exceptions 
needed to be made for weather and aircraft performance data. 
Avionics Data Standards 
Avionics data are accessed by TAP Engine via an ARINC 834 data feed in STAP format, a 
common standard for EFB applications to process avionics data. TAP contains an avionics data 
map that identifies which data elements are available on which port and from which “equipment 
code” (i.e., avionics device). Initially, TAP was capable of reading STAP data only from ARINC 
429 avionics devices, but subsequently was updated with the capability of reading ARINC 717 
avionics inputs, increasing the availability of data for future adaptations.  
A critical data input required by TAP is route data from the FMS or similar system. TAP’s initial 
design was to process route data according to the ARINC 702A specification, the standard for 
advanced FMS typically installed in new generation transport aircraft. In fact TAP initially 
inherited AOP’s design to read ARINC 702A-3, an advanced version generally not yet used 
commercially, and so TAP’s design was “walked back” to the more common version ARINC 
702A-1 which required TAP to work with less data content. As an example, ARINC 702A-3 
provides route waypoint data with latitude/longitude coordinates and the waypoint name (typically 
three or five characters). ARINC 702A-1 provides only the latitude/longitude coordinates and no 
names, a critical shortcoming for TAP’s function of facilitating route modification requests via 
voice communications where waypoint names are a practical requirement. New functionality was 
therefore added in TAP to infer waypoint names by comparing the received route coordinates with 
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a published waypoint database. While effective, it requires the pilot to confirm the names were 
correctly inferred.  
In preparing for the TASAR flight trials conducted in a Piaggio Avanti flight-test aircraft, it was 
necessary to adapt TAP to read route data in the format native to the aircraft’s avionics: the General 
Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) format. GAMA format differs from ARINC 702A-
1 in that waypoint coordinates and names are provided, but only for the next eight waypoints. This 
created another adaptation challenge by excluding the destination airport from the transmitted 
route data for most of the flight. This information is required by TAP TG to build full trajectories, 
necessary in computing flight time and fuel burn to the destination for route optimization. The 
issue was resolved by requiring the pilot to enter the destination airport upon starting TAP. As a 
result, TAP now supports two route-data industry standards: ARINC 702A-1 and GAMA. 
Another industry standard used by TAP is Display Traffic Information File (DTIF) as defined in 
ARINC 735B, the standard for traffic computers capable of supporting the display of ADS-B 
information. TAP uses the DTIF data to produce traffic-aircraft state vectors for use in near-term 
conflict detection by TAP CD. The underlying logic built originally in AOP CD supports traffic 
intent, and therefore TAP CD is readily adaptable to incorporating traffic intent data once it is 
available onboard.  
Airspace Data Standards 
Two datasets are pre-installed in TAP: airspace data that requires periodic updates, and aircraft 
performance model data that is fixed for a given aircraft type (e.g., 737-900ER). The airspace data 
includes published waypoints, airport elevations, and SUA geographical boundaries, and they are 
all derived from the Coded Instrument Flight Procedures (CIFP) dataset published by the FAA, 
updated on a 28-day cycle, and modeled to the ARINC 424 standard. The TAP software package 
includes a preprocessing executable routine that extracts the pertinent data from the massive CIFP 
and converts it to TAP’s internal formats.  
Aircraft Performance Standards  
Unfortunately, aircraft performance is one significant area where an industry standard could not 
be adopted by TAP. The International Air Transport Association sponsors a Standardized 
Computerized Airplane Performance (SCAP) Task Force that has defined six specifications for 
aircraft performance (takeoff, landing, climb-out, inflight, noise, and aircraft performance 
monitoring) in an attempt to foster industry standardization. Some specifications (e.g., takeoff and 
landing) have indeed evolved into well-used industry standards, but the inflight performance 
specification is not widely used by aircraft manufacturers, who have opted instead to each use their 
own specifications. Some manufacturers even have different inflight performance specifications 
for different aircraft they offer. Furthermore, the Piaggio Avanti used for the TASAR flight trials 
had its aircraft performance data only available as numeric tables in the printed Pilot’s Operating 
Handbook. Given that aircraft performance data comes in widely disparate formats (e.g., printed 
data, electronic data files) supporting a variety of modeling methods (e.g., kinematic, kinetic) and 
that aircraft behavior varies significantly among aircraft types (e.g., turboprops, jets), a novel 
approach was implemented for TAP aircraft performance modeling. Instead of following a single 
industry standard (which does not exist), TAP TG itself was designed to be easily adaptable to 
these variants. The method (described in reference [44]) separates aircraft performance behavior 
(e.g., the method an aircraft uses to achieve a climb, such as constant thrust or constant vertical 
rate) from the underlying math models, yielding a highly flexible, state-of-the-art approach to 
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aircraft performance modeling. The result is a single code base that can support multiple aircraft 
types, performance behaviors, and fidelity of available performance data. The capability was 
exercised multiple times in the course of the TASAR project by adapting TAP TG to three distinct 
aircraft types: the Piaggio Avanti (turboprop), the Dassault HU-25 Guardian (former business jet), 
and the Boeing 737-900ER (commercial transport). 
In adapting TAP for the Boeing 737-900ER, the plan was to incorporate Boeing’s “Level 1” 
high fidelity aircraft performance dataset as supplied by Boeing to Alaska Airlines. (A similar 
approach was planned for the Airbus A320 in the partnership with Virgin America.) However, the 
Boeing Level 1 data were deemed critical sensitive data and not initially permitted to be used for 
this purpose. While an agreement between NASA and Boeing was eventually reached to allow its 
use, a backup plan was implemented instead to use the Base of Aircraft Data Version 4 (BADA 4) 
aircraft performance model through a license agreement acquired from Eurocontrol for the 
TASAR project. BADA 4 uses a single proprietary BADA 4 Specification in conjunction with a 
separate BADA 4 Dataset for each supported aircraft type. These elements were incorporated into 
TAP to conduct the Alaska Airlines operational evaluation but are not available for TAP licensing. 
Atmospheric Data Standards 
For representing wind and temperature data, TAP adopted the industry standard format used in 
meteorology for sharing gridded binary data, Gridded Binary Edition 2 (GRIB2). EDS retrieves 
these gridded data from NOAA in GRIB2 format and converts them to an internal format used by 
TAP Engine. 
TAP did not use an industry standard for specifying the polygons representing convective 
weather, as three-dimensional (3D) polygonised products of this sort are not yet prevalent in the 
aviation weather data industry. The specification used by TAP is straightforward: a set of 
latitude/longitude vertices with floor and ceiling altitudes and start/end times of validity. Forecast 
polygons are represented by setting a future start time. Weather design considerations for TAP are 
presented in reference [45]. 
9.3.3. Unique Route Optimization Features 
TAP is distinguished by several unique route optimization features that sets it apart from other 
tools as state-of-the-art technology worthy of commercial development and adoption. First and 
foremost is its location onboard the aircraft, where the pilot can devote substantial attention to 
route optimization during cruise flight, more so than a ground-based dispatcher responsible for 
dozens of current and future flights. This provides an opportunity to accrue greater savings, for 
example through frequent application of smaller route modifications, in addition to the less 
frequently available larger route modifications. Four additional features are highlighted below. 
Multi-Objective Optimization 
TAP’s route optimization capability is particularly powerful in that it supports not just one but a 
variety of optimization objectives, and the pilot can switch objectives during the flight while TAP 
is running. In addition to searching for flight time savings (useful if the flight is delayed or an 
unscheduled operation), TAP can also independently search just for fuel savings, which may be a 
more relevant objective if the flight is on time or early. Even more powerfully, TAP has a “trip 
cost” optimization objective option that combines time and fuel costs based on the Cost Index 
supplied with the flight plan. Whereas Cost Index today is typically fixed for a given flight, TAP’s 
capability unlocks the future potential for dynamically updating the Cost Index during the flight 
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based on changing priorities, or fine tuning it for a particular aircraft to gain the greatest 
optimization advantage, or even generating Cost Index as an additional TAP output to be entered 
in the FMS to help meet a desired arrival time as fuel-efficiently as possible.  
These three optimization objectives (time, fuel, and trip cost) are meant only to be representative 
of the many more optimization objectives TAP could support. Thanks to the flexibility of TAP 
PBGA’s fitness function, TAP can minimize or maximize essentially any mathematically 
definable function of arbitrary complexity, provided that the necessary data are available and 
processing is implemented to assess each candidate route against those data. For instance, using 
geospatial turbulence maps as an input data source (either gridded or polygonised data), a term 
could be added to the fitness function to include ride quality as an additional factor in route 
optimization (e.g., balancing passenger comfort against trip cost). This illustrates TAP’s 
tremendous potential for expansion as a sophisticated airborne trajectory management tool. 
Multi-Dimensional Optimization 
Another unique and compelling feature of TAP is its capability for route optimization in multiple 
dimensions. TAP produces three solution types: optimizing just the lateral path, just the cruise 
altitude, and (particularly unique) an independently optimized combination of lateral path and 
cruise altitude. This third solution type can be effective in several ways, for example, finding the 
most efficient lateral path to request at the most wind-friendly altitude, or making a desired altitude 
feasible that was otherwise blocked by traffic by “sidestepping” the traffic. Even the vertical 
solution (which recommends a cruise altitude change while keeping the current lateral path) has 
particular merit. Pilots typically use two methods to determine when to perform a step climb, a 
common action on longer flights as the aircraft becomes lighter. One method is to climb at the 
waypoint indicated in the flight plan, determined well before departure using (now old) wind 
forecasts, fuel burn estimates, and aircraft performance data. The other method (often in 
combination with the first) is to consult the FMS for its recommended optimum altitude, computed 
dynamically but without reference to the aircraft’s future trajectory or wind field. In contrast, TAP 
uses up-to-date wind data and full trajectory integration to determine the optimal cruise altitude. 
Pilots can use TAP to validate the flight plan’s step climb waypoint recommendation or to make a 
decision to advance or delay the climb to the FMS optimum altitude, given TAP’s incorporation 
of the effect of updated winds integrated along the entire trajectory. 
Common and Uncommon Optimization Solutions 
TAP is also distinguished by its ability to find non-obvious route modifications, that is, those 
that would not normally occur to a pilot such as the common request to “go direct” (i.e., make a 
short cut) to a downstream FMS waypoint. Using the power of its genetic algorithm, TAP explores 
a broad spectrum of candidate route modifications that include those simple “directs” but go much 
farther by exploring hundreds of non-direct routes through additional waypoints in the airspace 
before rejoining the FMS route at various potential locations. To further increase the search 
options, the published waypoints TAP uses in its search also include the Navigation Reference 
System (NRS) waypoints defined by the latitude-longitude grid. This extensive search of candidate 
route modifications account for winds and various constraints (e.g., traffic, weather, and SUA) and 
converge through a generational “survival of the fittest” contest to produce the most optimal, 
conflict-free solution. Figure 11 shows an example of a non-direct solution that saves fuel. While 
the TAP prototype constrained its solutions to published waypoints to facilitate voice requests and 
hand entry into the FMS, the underlying TAP algorithms derived from AOP work with arbitrary 
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latitude/longitude coordinates. This capability can be unleashed in future implementations where 
TAP is connected to avionics with the ability to push route modifications to the FMS and to ATC 
through Data Comm. This will also be the opportune time to expand TAP PBGA pattern templates 
to include more complex route structures. 
Traffic-Aware Benefits  
A significant innovation in TAP is the integral use of ADS-B traffic data without a certified 
Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI). Most ADS-B applications require a CDTI as an 
integral part of performing some operational function. Whether for maintaining positional 
awareness in reduced visibility or to enable the pilot to verify a selected target for an in-trail 
procedure or interval management, the CDTI places a traffic symbol relative to the ownship on a 
map display. Due to safety implications, certification of such traffic displays increase the cost of 
system implementation and could be a hidden barrier for adopting TASAR (a non-safety-critical 
application). To reduce such potential barriers of adoption, TAP only includes traffic data in its 
route optimization processing. The only displayed indications of traffic are (1) the message 
“TRAFFIC” if TAP CD determines the route modification has a traffic conflict, and (2) a display 
of the state vector and altitude of the traffic aircraft, but not its position. Figure 9 (p49) shows an 
example of these indications. Their purpose is to advise the pilot against making the ATC request 
due to the potential conflict with traffic. They also provide just enough indication of whether the 
conflict is temporary (e.g., traffic that is crossing or climbing/descending) or long term (e.g., traffic 
that is parallel and level), which can aid in a pilot’s decision to briefly hold the request until the 
Figure 11. Beneficial non-direct route modification identified by TAP’s genetic algorithm. 
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indications clear or to pursue other options. Using this “traffic aware” feature of TAP to time the 
request to ATC could yield significant benefits in more often achieving approval for the desired 
route modification than having it denied.  
Though ADS-B is not strictly required by TAP to produce route optimization solutions, it is 
highly important in another respect: pilot acceptance. The more ATC approves route modifications 
derived from TAP, the more likely pilots will continue to use TAP and the more benefits will 
accrue. Conversely, more denials will likely reduce usage and benefits. While traffic is not ATC’s 
only consideration in approving route modification requests, separating traffic is their primary 
function. Accommodating traffic in route modification requests is therefore the most impactful 
method for increasing likelihood of ATC approval and thus in achieving the full benefits of in-
flight route optimization. It is unlikely that any ground-based route optimization tool can match 
TAP’s performance in this respect, given TAP’s access to real-time ADS-B data and its role 
directly supporting the pilot who actually makes the request to ATC. This underscores the power 
and commercial potential of airborne route optimization technology: leveraging its access to 
relevant and timely data on the aircraft and operating environment, presenting to the pilot a range 
of viable optimization alternatives, and becoming an integral part of the strategic decision making 
of pilots as they transform into proactive trajectory managers.  
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10. Human Factors Assessment 
Embedded directly in the TASAR acronym is the word “Aircrew” referring to the aircraft flight 
crew, i.e., the pilots. Including the pilots in TASAR’s name purposefully highlights the essential 
role they fulfill in the TASAR concept. Whereas software technology clearly has a central function 
in enabling cockpit-based route optimization, the pilots themselves ultimately make the decision 
of whether to optimize the route and what route modification requests to make to ATC. In other 
words, the role of the technology is not just to make aircrew requests more strategic but also to 
empower aircrews themselves to be more strategic and to grow into the role of proactive trajectory 
manager. To achieve this vision in the long term, the TASAR technology in the near term must 
successfully be integrated into the cockpit environment as a useful tool and be accepted by pilots 
as an integral part of their decision-making process. These requirements dictate that special 
attention be paid in this project to human factors that reflect the pilot’s interaction with and 
experience using the TASAR technology and that enable the pilot’s critical role in achieving 
operational savings through TASAR. Human factors will figure significantly in the level of success 
TASAR achieves in its early operational implementation. 
Activities throughout the project included a focus on human factors. The intention from the 
outset was to pursue an iterative, human-centered, design and evaluation process as the technology 
matured through a series of simulation experiments, flight trials, and an airline operational 
evaluation. Each step in the process would produce human-centered improvements to the 
technology and a set of artifacts documenting the findings of human factors assessments, in case 
they were needed for receiving operational approval. The activities described in this chapter 
focused specifically on human factors. As subsequent chapters indicate, human factors remained 
an important and ongoing element in maturing the TASAR technology through multiple flight 
trials and the airline operational evaluation. 
Presented in this chapter are high-level summaries of two HITL simulation experiments 
conducted at the University of Iowa’s Operator Performance Laboratory. The assessments were 
conducted in a fixed-based flight simulator of a Boeing style, transport aircraft flight deck with 
TAP integrated into the simulator as an EFB application. Long-distance flight scenarios through 
U.S. domestic airspace were generated for the experiments, and they included regions of dynamic 
weather that generated multiple opportunities for the pilot to use TAP. This research environment 
enabled structured study of several human-factors issues. The first simulation experiment, HITL-
1, focused foremost on issues potentially impacting TASAR operational approval – pilot workload 
and distraction – while also assessing the design and usability of an early prototype of the TAP 
user interface. The second simulation experiment, HITL-2, incorporated a major design update to 
the TAP user interface. Conducted in preparation for the upcoming airline operational evaluations, 
HITL-2 validated a Computer-Based Training (CBT) tool developed for TAP, evaluated TAP’s 
impact on other uses of the EFB, and assessed the design and usability of the updated TAP user 
interface. 
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10.1. TASAR Human-in-the-Loop Simulation 1 
10.1.1. Objective 
The purpose of HITL-1 was to assess the usability of TAP on a commercial airline flight deck 
and to determine the level of interference, if any, that TASAR introduced to the normal working 
environment of the flight deck. The usability assessment was important for determining whether 
TAP’s functions and interface design would be operationally acceptable and effective for airline 
pilots. Assessing the potential for cockpit interference would inform any concerns for operational 
approval, with the results of HITL-1 serving as valuable artifacts for approving officials should 
they be desired. HITL-1 was conducted in August 2013. 
Two potential interference areas were of specific interest in HITL-1. One was the effect that the 
presence of TAP in the cockpit would have on pilot workload. Though en route flight is generally 
considered low workload for airline pilots on highly automated, modern commercial transport 
aircraft, there are times during en route flight when workload could increase, for instance when 
flying in areas of convective weather. While TAP is not a weather avoidance tool, it is an additional 
system within the pilot’s scan pattern that could have an adverse effect on workload. The 
simulation experiment presented an opportunity to quantify any such effect. The other item of 
interest regarding interference was the potential for TAP to distract the pilot from monitoring 
flight-deck systems for off-nominal events. TAP is hosted on the pilot’s EFB, normally located 
outside the forward field of view. If the pilot is fixated on the EFB for significant periods of time, 
the forward displays may receive less attention, potentially causing an impact on the pilot’s 
monitoring of aircraft systems. In the simulation environment, off-nominal events could be safely 
induced to assess any distracting effects of TAP.  
10.1.2. Method 
Twelve participants, all active airline pilots, were used in the HITL-1 experiment, one for each 
day of simulation runs. Each pilot flew two flights each lasting approximately 2.5 hours, one flight 
with TAP and one flight without TAP. The simulation facility, shown in Figure 12, was a fixed-
based simulator representative of a commercial transport flight deck. For HITL-1, the EFB 
hardware was a Goodrich SmartDisplayTM Class 2 EFB mounted on the left side of the Captain’s 
station. TAP was installed on the EFB and 
was connected to the simulator’s avionics 
data through an emulated ARINC 834 data 
server. The subject pilot sat in the Captain’s 
seat and, in addition to operating TAP, 
performed “pilot flying” (PF) duties. These 
duties included exercising control of the 
aircraft, selecting the most appropriate 
flight path, initiating and performing 
checklist items, and approving/executing 
FMS changes. Serving as First Officer in 
the “pilot monitoring” (PM) role was a 
“confederate pilot,” an employee of the 
simulation facility with a scripted role. The 
PM assisted the PF with any requests and 
Figure 12. Flight simulator with TAP v2 on the Captain's 
EFB. Photo by M. Cover. 
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questions as a minimalist crew member. The duties of the PM included calling out the checklist 
items, monitoring the execution of the checklist, managing dispatch communication, handling the 
ATC radio calls, and making all FMS entries except execution. A confederate air traffic controller 
monitored the aircraft and the local simulated traffic from a station outside the simulator and 
provided approvals and denials of route modification requests as dictated by the design of each 
use case. The role of dispatcher was scripted, with messages being received by the PM and relayed 
to the PF. 
The simulated flight consisted of a partially flown, transcontinental route from New York (JFK) 
to Los Angeles (LAX), traversing airspace impacted by convective weather. Figure 13 shows the 
purposefully inefficient flight-plan route that 
conservatively accommodated the weather. 
Designed into the flight were five sequential 
TASAR “use cases” listed in Table 9. Each use 
case was based on a weather-related condition 
that required a route change, either initiated by 
the pilot or by dispatch. The pilots experienced 
all five use cases on both flights, regardless of 
whether TAP was available for the flight, 
though they were presented in a different order 
on the two flights.  
 
Table 9. TASAR use cases exercised in HITL-1. 
 
USE CASE TAP Mode Participant Information Source/Action 
1 AUTO 
The wind at the current ownship altitude is suboptimal for the direction of 
flight; however winds at another altitude are more favorable for the direction 
of flight. TAP offers alternatives based on change for more favorable winds. 
2 AUTO 
A convective weather pattern earlier in the flight caused a reroute; however, 
this weather pattern is now dissipating making the original route a more 
efficient route. TAP offers alternatives. Reroute initiated based on 
dissipating convective weather polygon, inviting a more favorable route. 
3 MANUAL 
Dispatch sends a message to the aircraft to request a reroute to waypoint 
“ABC” and then to “DEF” when able. “ABC” is an off-route waypoint and 
“DEF” is on the active route. Pilot evaluates dispatch request in TAP and 
requests route change. 
4 MANUAL 
ATC issues a hazardous weather broadcast to indicate moderate to severe 
turbulence in the region ahead of the aircraft at the current altitude; 
however other altitudes are reporting only light chop. Pilot manually enters 
and evaluates alternatives in TAP, requests reroute. 
5 MANUAL 
The flight needs to avoid weather cells, and the pilot would like to request 
to deviate. Pilot evaluates possible alternatives in TAP to avoid weather 
and requests reroute. 
 
Figure 13. Simulated TASAR flight for HITL 
simulation experiments. 
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For flights with TAP, the first two use cases 
were designed to trigger use of TAP in Auto 
Mode, in which TAP monitors for optimization 
opportunities and presents them to the pilot. In this 
early version of the TAP software, use of Auto 
Mode involved two interface screens, as shown in 
Figure 14. The first screen (a) presented the 
optimization solutions in the lateral, vertical, and 
combo dimensions, and the second screen (b) 
displayed the optimization solution selected by 
the pilot.  
The remaining use cases were designed to 
trigger use of TAP in Manual Mode, in which the 
pilot builds a route modification for TAP to 
evaluate time and fuel outcomes and to determine 
whether the route modification conflicts with 
traffic, weather, and SUA. The Manual Mode user 
interface of this early version of TAP is shown in 
Figure 14(c).  
A single “off-nominal condition” was presented 
in a single use case of each flight. The off-nominal 
condition was representative of a relatively rare 
event that the crew needed to recognize and 
manage but was not so severe as to force an 
emergency. This off-nominal event comprised a 
fuel-imbalance evolution that required 
performance of an appropriate checklist and 
several fuel-system manipulations. The alignment 
of the off-nominal condition with the use cases 
was rotated through all five use case possibilities 
across the twelve participants. The use cases 
without the off-nominal condition were 
considered nominal conditions. Restricting the 
off-nominal condition to a single use case in each 
flight and changing the order of use cases between 
flights minimized the likelihood of learning 
effects. 
The independent variables of the experiment 
were TAP availability (TASAR ON and TASAR 
OFF) and flight condition (nominal or off-
nominal), arrayed in a two-by-two, within-
subjects experimental design. The five use cases were included as mechanisms to trigger reroute 
decisions but were not treated as independent variables in the experimental design.  
The dependent variables (i.e., the measurements of the experiment) included several groupings 
of system metrics. Timing metrics recorded the time to detect and respond to events such as a TAP 
(a) Auto Mode screen. 
(b) Selected optimization screen. 
(c) Manual Mode data entry interface. 
Figure 14. TAP v2 user interface tested in HITL-1. 
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reroute advisory or the off-nominal condition (i.e., fuel imbalance). Timing data were collected 
using an eye tracking system in the simulator. The eye tracking system was also used to measure 
region-of-interest metrics, indicating the time the participant spent looking at different areas in the 
cockpit. A workload metric assessed the pilot’s cognitive loading in self-reported subjective terms 
via a standardized workload survey completed by the pilot after each use case. An objective 
workload metric derived from electrocardiogram measurements was obtained but later removed 
from the analysis due to concerns regarding the metric’s validity. Two additional standard surveys 
assessed the pilot’s perceived ratings of SA and TAP system usability and were supplemented by 
a questionnaire on TAP’s functions and user interface. 
10.1.3. Results 
The following are the high level results from HITL-1. A complete description of the experiment 
design, methods, apparatus, analyses, and results are presented in reference [47]. In the summaries 
below, objective results are presented first, followed by subjective results. 
On average it took pilots 87 seconds after the use case trigger event occurred to detect TAP’s 
display of a new route modification advisory, and an additional 83 seconds to initiate a request to 
ATC. These response times are reasonable and acceptable for non-urgent events on an airline flight 
deck operating in nominal conditions.  
For the off-nominal condition, measurements quantified pilot promptness in detecting the 
presence of the off-nominal condition, making the correct decision, and executing the correct 
actions. Comparisons were made between the TASAR ON and TASAR OFF flights. There was 
no statistically significant difference in response time to the off-nominal event when TASAR was 
ON when compared to when TASAR was OFF. This indicates that TASAR did not interfere with 
the detection of this flight-critical, off-nominal event. 
An additional distraction concern was that the presence of TAP could potentially disrupt the 
standard eye-scanning pattern of the pilot on the flight deck. Using the eye tracker, the percentage 
of gaze occupancy within selected areas of interest (Primary Flight Display (PFD), Multi-
Functional Displays, Mode Control Panel, EFB, and outside view) was assessed continuously 
across the flight. (Limitations of the eye tracking installation resulted in times when eye tracking 
was lost. Therefore, the data collected had instances when data was not present.) The largest 
percentage of recorded glance time was to the Captain’s PFD, an expected result given the flight-
critical nature of the information on the PFD. There was no statistical difference in glance 
occupancy percentage to the PFD when TASAR was ON when compared to when it was OFF, 
providing evidence that TAP did not interfere with the pilots’ normal aircraft instrument scan.  
Subjective measurement of pilot perceived workload, using a standard workload survey 
administered after each use case, indicated a small but statistically significant workload increase 
between TASAR OFF and TASAR ON conditions. As a practical matter, the increase was not 
significant, as the mean workload ratings were very low: 1.25 (TASAR OFF) and 1.60 (TASAR 
ON) on a 10-point Bedford scale. Looking specifically at the use cases with the off-nominal 
condition, the analysis did not indicate a statistically significant difference in pilot perceived 
workload with TASAR ON versus TASAR OFF. Similar subjective measurements of pilot SA 
showed no statistically significant effect from the presence of TASAR. 
Pilots completed a system usability survey following each use case in the TASAR ON condition. 
Mean ratings of approximately 87 on a 100-point scale were recorded for both Auto Mode and 
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Manual Mode, with no statistically significant difference between the two modes. The scores 
represent a user preference baseline to serve as a comparison with future versions of the TAP user 
interface. Pilots also completed a post-simulation questionnaire which indicated that the 
participants found the TAP user interface easy to work with, useful, and easy to understand. 
Feedback on specific areas of the TAP user interface design were incorporated into an updated 
design tested in HITL-2 and ultimately used in the airline operational evaluation. 
In summary, HITL-1 indicated no adverse effects of TASAR on human factors affecting 
operational approval such as workload and distraction. While pilots gave high ratings to the design 
and usability of the TAP user interface, several pertinent recommendations triggered a design 
update that was subsequently evaluated in HITL-2. 
10.2. TAP User Interface Design Update 
The project context that spawned a second HITL simulation experiment was the emerging 
opportunity to conduct an airline operational evaluation of TASAR. Information gathered from 
HITL-1 and FT-1 resulted in human-factors design improvements to the TAP user interface, many 
of which were implemented in a significant redesign that also brought the user interface more in 
line with the style and features common to tablet-based EFB “apps.” Adapting TAP to a tablet 
platform was motivated by the discovery that many prominent airlines were adopting the iPad as 
their EFB interface of choice. It became clear that if TAP was to be considered relevant in the EFB 
industry, it would need to be compatible with the iPad. This was confirmed through outreach 
activities and by one of the most frequent comments from FT-1 participants: “Let us know when 
TAP is available for the iPad.” Alaska Airlines being among those adopting the iPad as their EFB 
was the deciding factor in moving forward with the redesign. However, since the iPad was not a 
ubiquitous EFB selection among airlines (Virgin America, for one), maintaining cross-platform 
compatibility with Windows® and Linux operating systems was critical to the strategy of making 
TAP widely adoptable in the industry. A cross-platform development approach using the open-
source software development toolkit known as Qt was selected, which provided an opportunity to 
completely refresh the design of the user interface, this time with specific intent to incorporate 
human factors design principles to enhance TAP usability and appeal without compromising pilot 
workload.  
The updated user interface design, shown in Figure 15, incorporated several functional changes 
in addition to the clearly more intuitive, user-friendly styling. First was the addition of an 
interactive “Startup Checklist” screen, made necessary to accommodate data interface 
characteristics of Alaska Airlines’ B737-900ER aircraft. The existing data interface lacked several 
key data parameters needed by TAP for trajectory processing and solution display, therefore 
requiring the pilot to manually input these parameters. In particular, the FMS route data excluded 
such items as origin, destination, waypoint names, Cost Index, cruise altitude, and cruise speed. 
The Startup Checklist screen was created to enable the pilot to make these entries, and in the case 
of waypoint names, to verify inferred data (e.g., waypoint names inferred from supplied 
latitude/longitude coordinates and an installed waypoint database). Other items on the screen 
enabled the pilot to confirm system status information (e.g., TAP version, connection status, and 
databases) and to set an optimization parameter.  
The most substantive user interface changes for Auto Mode were consolidation into a single 
screen and the inclusion of a “visualization panel” or map showing a more complete depiction of 
the FMS active route, along with TAP route-modification advisories or “solutions.” The 
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redesigned interface was more graphical than the 
previous text-oriented interface, allowing preview 
and selection of any of the three solution types. It 
was also more user-interactive and information 
rich with the ability to zoom and show data layers 
including a depiction of winds, weather polygons, 
and SUAs. The specific purpose of these display 
layers, which were added based on feedback from 
HITL-1, was to help the pilot interpret, 
understand, and accept TAP advisories.  
In accordance with FAA standards in effect at 
the time, the own aircraft (“ownship”) position 
was not displayed but could be inferred as being 
at the bottom center of the map display in its 
default “track up” view. An alternate “north-up” 
view was also selectable, with buttons allowing 
the user to step through the route waypoints. The 
interface update added the ability to specify a 
limiting optimization waypoint and removed the 
solution filters which pilots in HITL-1 and FT-1 
said were unnecessary. It also added a data-feeds 
status menu and cruise-settings windows where 
these values entered on the Startup Checklist 
could be monitored and updated. Finally, it added 
a message bar that displays processing status, 
conflict information, and other system indicators 
for the user.  
The Manual Mode screen also underwent a 
significant update by mirroring the graphical style 
of the Auto Mode screen, retaining many common 
elements, and completely redesigning the method 
for entering off-route waypoints. Whereas the 
previous method was to specify a bearing and 
distance from the ownship via text entry, the 
updated method allowed the pilot to touch the 
desired location on the map, from which TAP 
would locate the nearest published waypoint to 
that location. Keyboard entry by waypoint name 
(via an onscreen keyboard) was also provided, if a 
specific known waypoint is desired. A “tray” 
contained each element of the proposed route 
change as a button that could be selected, edited, 
or deleted. The rejoin waypoint and flight level 
buttons triggered scrollable windows to select the 
appropriate entry. 
(a) Startup Checklist screen. 
(b) Auto Mode screen. 
(c) Manual Mode screen. 
Figure 15. TAP v14-1 user interface tested in 
HITL-2. TAP v15-2 used a similar design. 
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An architectural change to TAP was also made at this time to allow the TAP Display, as a tablet 
application, to “sleep” or move to the background while the pilot uses another app on the tablet 
EFB. The only visible effect on the user interface was a brief “refresh” of data upon returning to 
TAP. 
10.3. TAP Training Materials 
In an effort to reduce as many barriers as possible to airlines adopting the TAP software, as well 
as to facilitate the upcoming airline operational evaluations, TAP training materials were 
Figure 16. TAP Computer-Based Trainer. 
Human Factors Assessment 
65 
 
developed to provide detailed instruction and reference material for pilots on the features and use 
of TAP. FAA policy requires pilot training on EFB applications, though the method of training is 
generally left up to the operator. Training costs can be a barrier to technology adoption, and so 
every effort was made to generate materials suitable for the training requirement to minimize 
airline expense and adoption delay. The three TAP training materials developed by NASA were 
an Operating Procedures Handbook, a Flight Manual Bulletin, and a CBT (Figure 16). The 
expectation was that airlines would use the CBT as the primary training tool and provide the 
documents as supplemental written reference material available onboard the aircraft. The Flight 
Manual Bulletin is a brief synopsis of TAP’s primary screens and functions. The Operating 
Procedures Handbook is a detailed reference guide for TAP, providing company guidelines and 
policy, a TAP system overview, detailed procedures for each TAP operating mode, and additional 
information.  
As the primary training tool, the TAP CBT was designed to give comprehensive instruction on 
TAP’s user interface features and interpretation of key elements of displayed information. An 
interactive CBT format was chosen over a more traditional training methodology to enhance 
knowledge transfer and retention [48]. Considerable effort was also put forth to encompass the key 
training topics in as compact a CBT product as possible to further minimize training-time costs for 
adopting airlines. Based on partner airline guidance, CBT duration of about 30 minutes was 
targeted. Multiple iterations of the CBT were developed over the life of the project, with 
enhancements made as TAP’s user interface matured.  
10.4. TASAR Human-in-the-Loop Simulation 2  
10.4.1. Objectives  
The second HITL simulation experiment was prompted by the likelihood of two airlines 
conducting operational evaluations of TAP within the next few years. In preparation for these 
evaluations, HITL-2 was chartered with three primary objectives. First was to evaluate the 
significant design update of the TAP user interface to ensure adequate usability and to assess any 
impact on the findings from HITL-1 regarding workload and distraction. Though no adverse 
impact on these findings were expected because the intended function and capabilities of TAP 
were largely unchanged, the redesigned user interface could attract increased pilot attention given 
the additional information displayed. It was considered prudent to experimentally verify the HITL-
1 findings, given that the airlines would be conducting operations with the updated user interface. 
Second was to assess how TAP usage might affect other operational uses of the EFB. Airlines 
use EFBs for a variety of purposes, such as viewing charts, weather information, aircraft manuals, 
logbooks, and checklists. While accessing other apps, TAP would be running in the background 
but not visible to the pilot, potentially affecting the pilot’s propensity to use it. Similarly, TAP’s 
presence as a compelling EFB application might interfere with the accomplishment of other tasks 
that make use of other EFB applications. The experimental setting of the simulator would provide 
the opportunity to assess these interactions prior to the operational evaluation. 
Third was to determine an effective means for training a large number of airline pilots on TAP. 
The operational evaluation could potentially involve many hundreds of pilots cycling through the 
TAP-equipped aircraft. Effective training could mean the difference between success and failure 
of the operational evaluation in the near term, and operational benefits from TASAR in the long 
term. While the FAA requires airlines to provide pilot training on EFB applications, the training 
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method is not specified. Training could be provided through a simple bulletin. Given the unique 
interactive nature of the TAP application as compared to other EFB applications that present 
largely static data, and given the critical role of the pilot in the success of the TASAR operational 
evaluation, the NASA team developed the TAP CBT to maximize the likelihood that TAP would 
be used properly and provide the best possible results. The experimental objective, therefore, was 
to determine the efficacy of CBT training relative to instructor-led training that allows for personal 
tailoring. 
10.4.2. Method 
HITL-2 was conducted in October/November 2014 at the University of Iowa Operator 
Performance Laboratory, using essentially the same flight simulator apparatus used in HITL-1 but 
with the exception that TAP was displayed in HITL-2 on a Dell Venue Pro 11 tablet. The intended 
experimental methodology was to replicate the conditions, scenarios, and data collection used in 
the TAP flights of HITL-1, allowing a between-experiments comparison of usability, workload, 
and distraction between the two user interface designs. Unfortunately, a significant amount of 
experimental data loss occurred in HITL-2, limiting the analyses that could be performed. The off-
nominal condition in HITL-1 (i.e., fuel imbalance) was inadvertently not replicated in HITL-2, 
making a comparison of distraction effects not possible. The objective workload metric derived 
from electrocardiogram measurements was removed from the analysis due to concerns regarding 
the metric’s validity. In addition, eye-tracking data collection errors precluded analyses of timing 
and region-of-interest metrics. Like HITL-1, HITL-2 was a fully contracted activity. The 
experiment design was overseen by NASA and was reviewed through the Crew Systems and 
Aviation Operations Branch experiment review process. Both a dry run and a dress rehearsal were 
performed, although without NASA onsite presence to save resources and to enable similarity to 
the upcoming data collection environment. Despite these preparations, numerous stressors 
(financial, personnel, and technical) affected the contractor experiment team in the months and 
weeks prior that may have contributed to some of these oversights during data collection. In 
retrospect, although the contractor reported readiness for experiment execution, a cautionary pause 
prior to data collection to ensure these issues were adequately addressed might have reduced these 
errors.  Nevertheless, some comparisons between the experiments were possible and are presented 
below.  
Similar to HITL-1, the simulation runs in HITL-2 were organized into two cross-country flights 
(of which ~2.5 hours were flown), but with both flights this time being TASAR ON flights. The 
TASAR OFF condition of HITL-1 was not replicated in HITL-2. The flight scenarios were 
identical to those in HITL-1 with the exception of the off-nominal condition which was not 
replicated. The first flight represented a “TAP-only” condition (same as HITL-1, “TASAR ON”), 
and the second flight added special events each requiring the use of a second EFB application in 
addition to TAP (“TAP+2ndApp”). The five use cases embedded in the TAP-only flight were the 
same as HITL-1 and are shown in Table 9 (p59) and the third column of Table 10. For the 
TAP+2ndApp flight, the special events added to the use cases to trigger the use of a second EFB 
application (different app for each event) are shown in the fourth column of Table 10. An 
additional take-off use case was also added to HITL-2 to exercise a new “cruise settings” interface 
function in TAP. 
HITL-2 included 12 airline pilot participants, none of which had participated in HITL-1. As 
preparations were underway for conducting the TASAR operational evaluations, both airlines 
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supplied multiple pilots to participate in HITL-2: five pilots from Virgin America, and four pilots 
from Alaska Airlines. To evaluate the CBT efficacy as a standalone pilot training tool, six of the 
12 pilots were given instructor-led training in a presentation format, and the remaining six were 
given the CBT without instructor-led training.  
The independent variables of the experiment were TAP user interface (a 1x2 between-
experiments comparison of initial and revised user interface designs), EFB multi-tasking (a 1x2 
within-subjects comparison of TAP-only and TAP+2ndApp), and TAP training method (a 1x2 
between-subjects comparison of instructor-led training and CBT training). As indicated earlier, an 
Table 10. TASAR use cases used in the second flight in HITL-2. 
 
USE CASE TAP Mode Participant Information Source/Action Special Event 
Take Off N/A 
Pilot adjusts flight level in TAP after ATC 
assigns a different altitude as final than 
originally planned until aircraft is out of New 
York center. Pilot should recognize on own 
or recognizes amber light on TAP. 
None 
1A AUTO 
The wind at the current ownship altitude is 
suboptimal for the direction of flight; 
however winds at another altitude are more 
favorable for the direction of flight. TAP 
offers alternatives based on change for 
more favorable winds. 
ATC requests pilots to go into a hold 
for ~10 minutes while an issue with the 
center radar is fixed. Pilots look up fuel 
burn rate tables to ensure there is 
enough fuel to reach destination. 
2A AUTO 
A convective weather pattern earlier in the 
flight caused a reroute; however, this 
weather pattern is now dissipating making 
the original route a more efficient route. 
TAP offers alternatives. Reroute initiated 
based on dissipating convective weather 
polygon, inviting a more favorable route. 
A medical situation is radioed up to the 
cockpit from the lead flight attendant. 
Pilot initiates the MedLink checklist to 
follow procedure with dispatch and the 
doctors on the ground. 
3A MANUAL 
Dispatch sends a message to the aircraft to 
request a reroute to waypoint “ABC” and 
then to “DEF” when able. “ABC” is an off-
route waypoint and “DEF” is on the active 
route. Pilot evaluates dispatch request in 
TAP and requests route change. 
None 
4A MANUAL 
ATC issues a hazardous weather 
broadcast to indicate moderate to severe 
turbulence in the region ahead of the 
aircraft at the current altitude; however 
other altitudes are reporting only light chop. 
Pilot manually enters and evaluates 
alternatives in TAP, requests reroute. 
ATC requests pilots to go into a hold 
for ~10 minutes while an issue with the 
center radar is fixed. Pilots look up fuel 
burn rate tables to ensure there is 
enough fuel to reach destination. 
5A MANUAL 
The flight needs to avoid weather cells, and 
the pilot would like to request to deviate. 
Pilot evaluates possible alternatives in TAP 
to avoid weather and requests reroute. 
Dispatch notifies crew of disabled 
aircraft at destination airport that has 
temporary closed the main runway. 
Crew evaluates alternate airports in 
case the disabled aircraft cannot be 
removed in time of arrival. Involves 
looking up landing performance for 
weight and runway conditions. 
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inadvertent omission from HITL-2 of the off-nominal event (fuel imbalance) precluded a between-
experiments verification that the updated TAP user interface design does not induce distraction 
from normal flight deck duties. However, the special events introduced for the EFB multi-tasking 
assessment were all higher criticality duties relative to route optimization and therefore provided 
some insight on TAP’s potential for distraction. As before, the use cases were not treated as 
independent variables in the experimental design but rather were included as mechanisms to trigger 
reroute decisions using TAP. 
Dependent measures in HITL-2 were intended to be the same as HITL-1, except eye-tracking 
data collection errors in HITL-2 precluded analysis of timing and region-of-interest metrics. 
Subjective data collection included measures of perceived workload, usability, and SA. Post-
simulation questionnaires were also issued to the pilots. 
10.4.3. Results  
The following high level results from HITL-2 are limited as a result of exclusion of the off-
nominal event and issues with eye-tracking data collection. A complete description of the 
experiment design, methods, apparatus, analyses, and results are presented in reference [49]. 
The first analysis objective was to assess the updated TAP user interface (Figure 15, p63), 
including comparisons to the initial user interface (Figure 14, p60) where possible. An analysis 
comparing the subjective measurement of perceived pilot workload between HITL-1 (initial TAP 
user interface) and HITL-2 (updated TAP user interface) did not detect a significant difference in 
perceived pilot workload with the change in user interface design. The result confirms the HITL-
1 finding that pilot workload is not adversely affected by the presence of TAP in the tested use 
cases, even with the significant design update to the user interface. 
Subjective assessments of system usability and SA also showed no significant differences 
between the user interface designs. All subjective ratings for the updated TAP user interface were 
favorable: very low perceived workload, high system usability, and high SA. Pilot ratings of 
display elements indicated high ratings of comprehension, usability, and usefulness for nearly all 
features, with the exception of the ATC response buttons. These buttons enabled pilots to record 
whether ATC approved or denied a route modification request, a non-essential entry for operations 
and included only for data analysis purposes in the upcoming operational evaluations. These 
buttons would likely be removed in commercial versions of TAP.  
The second analysis objective was to assess the impact of TAP on EFB multi-tasking. The first 
TAP flight had no additional special tasks beyond using TAP to address the use case events (TAP-
only), whereas on the second TAP flight, special events were added to most use cases that required 
additional action by the pilot using other applications on the EFB (TAP+2ndApp). A comparison 
of subjective workload ratings between the TAP-only flight and the TAP+2ndApp flight indicated 
marginally higher pilot-perceived workload on the TAP+2ndApp flight. The finding is consistent 
with the second flight having extra tasking related to the special event.  
Subjective ratings of TAP usability were not affected by EFB multi-tasking. Rather than 
switching back and forth, all pilots only switched to the second EFB application once, and then 
they switched back to TAP once they completed the tasks requiring the second EFB application. 
This indicates that the pilots prioritized the special events higher than using TAP, an appropriate 
response given that the special events were always higher criticality to the flight than route 
optimization. It also indicates that TAP did not distract the pilots from conducting these higher 
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criticality duties. Subjective ratings indicated a reduction in SA with the addition of the special 
events, a finding that is commensurate with the increased task complexity that was introduced with 
the special events, which were always presented without warning.  
The third analysis objective was to assess the efficacy of the CBT as a standalone training tool 
for pilots. Comparisons were made between the two groups of pilots that received either instructor-
led training or the CBT. The difference in subjective (i.e., perceived) workload between the 
training methods was not statistically significant. Observations by the confederate pilot and test 
director in the simulation cab during the simulation runs indicated that the CBT-trained pilots 
appeared to be more engaged with TAP and be more assured in TAP interactions than the 
instructor-trained pilots. TAP usability was rated higher by CBT-trained pilots, whereas there was 
no difference in SA ratings.  
In summary, the updated TAP user interface was rated highly by pilots, indicating likely 
suitability for operational use, and it presented no workload increase over the initial user interface. 
TAP was not found to present any issue with EFB multi-tasking, and the special events requiring 
use of the EFB for non-TAP purposes always took precedence over TAP usage. The TAP CBT 
was effective as a standalone training method, potentially producing greater pilot engagement and 
perceived system usability. Both factors would likely lead to increased pilot use of TAP, which 
would be beneficial to the operator in terms of increased operational benefits from TASAR. 
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11. Flight Trials 
More than any other activity, the two NASA TASAR flight trials in 2013 and 2015 effectively 
established the TASAR project on a trajectory toward achieving its goal of technology transfer to 
industry. Certainly, the flight trials played a necessary and crucial role in advancing TASAR to 
TRL 6 by transitioning the TAP software from the laboratory to a “relevant environment” onboard 
an aircraft operating in the NAS. Navigating this transition involved solving numerous engineering 
challenges and resulted in technology that was more mature and field-proven. Just as important, 
however, was the witnessing of this transition by airline decision-makers and key industry players. 
In retrospect, it is evident that some early decisions by the NASA team for the flight trials 
established connections to certain industry companies and leaders that would later play key roles 
in amplifying TASAR’s progression toward higher TRL and commercialization. In effect, the 
companies and people with the earliest exposure to TASAR were among those who would position 
themselves to bring it to market.  
No market exists without a customer, however, and the flight trials were instrumental in securing 
interest by several prominent airlines in possibly acquiring TASAR technology for their fleets. 
Most airlines have tech pilots who, among other duties, evaluate emerging technologies and 
champion the integration of a few choice technologies into their fleets. Here, the flight trials 
intersected with the TASAR outreach strategy. The NASA team invited senior tech pilots from a 
cross-section of airlines to assist NASA in the flight trials as evaluation pilots. Not only would 
they help NASA mature its technology by providing their extensive expertise as senior airline 
pilots, they would have the opportunity to evaluate the technology for themselves, seeing it up 
close performing its actual function in an actual flight environment. From this convergence of 
interests, NASA emerged from the first flight trial with two partner airlines and the rare 
opportunity to take the technology forward into an operational evaluation in airline revenue 
service. Furthermore, interest had taken root with several other airlines participating in the NASA 
flight trials, and they would follow the partnerships and evaluations with interest and remain 
engaged with NASA and its partner airlines along the way. In other words, a market for TASAR 
in the airline community was beginning to form, spawned from the NASA TASAR flight trials. 
The challenge of actually conducting a flight trial fewer than two years into the project should 
not be understated. As described earlier, TAP was derived from AOP, a research prototype 
software system that had only operated in a desktop simulation environment. While reconfiguring 
AOP into TAP, the software team also had to develop a software architecture capable of connecting 
to a live aircraft avionics data feed and adapt TAP to be compatible with the flight test aircraft, a 
Piaggio Avanti high-performance turboprop aircraft with unique avionics data characteristics and 
performance modeling. Meanwhile, the aircraft itself would need equipment installed and certified 
to provide the new “connected EFB” architecture for which TASAR was designed. The first 
section below describing FT-1 summarizes the work performed to create the first TASAR-capable 
aircraft and the objectives, design, and outcomes of the first TASAR flight trial that validated 
TAP’s usability in the real world. The second section describes the second flight trial, which 
leveraged essentially the same flight-test platform to prepare for the upcoming airline operational 
evaluations, reducing deployment risk for the partner airlines wherever possible. The third section 
briefly summarizes the plan for a third flight trial (FT-3) on weather data integration. FT-3 was 
initiated but not completed due to a change in programmatic funding and priorities. 
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11.1. TASAR Flight Trial 1 
The first TASAR flight trial was conducted in November 2013, 20 months after the February 
2012 project kickoff. Complementing the FT-1 summary presented below are further details in 
references [50] and [51]. 
11.1.1. Objectives 
The primary motivation for flight-testing TAP was to bridge the critical divide between TRL 4 
(component testing in a laboratory environment) and TRL 6 (system testing in a relevant 
environment). As this would be the first airborne operational test of TAP, a conservative set of 
objectives was established to incrementally verify the TAP system of integrated software and 
hardware, building towards operational use of the tool. The four objectives of FT-1 were: 
1. Verification of the TAP data interfaces 
2. Verification of the TAP software functionality in flight 
3. Assessment of TAP usability in an operational environment 
4. Opportunity-based TAP route optimization requests to ATC 
The first objective was to confirm that TAP successfully ingested and managed data from an 
operational (and potentially noisy) avionics data environment. Having been tested up to this point 
in a relatively pristine simulation environment, TAP needed a flight test to verify that the required 
data were received, that the data were sufficient for processing, that any real-time environment 
factors such as data drops and lags were properly handled, and that TAP could sustain operations 
under these conditions for the duration of a typical flight. It also provided a good opportunity to 
discover corner cases regarding any data parameters for which TAP may have been designed with 
incorrect assumptions.  
The second objective was to confirm that TAP performed its various functions in flight as it did 
in simulation. This primarily involved exercising all of the functions while attempting to “break” 
the system with heavy use. However, purposefully not included in FT-1 was validation of time and 
fuel savings estimates from TAP route optimization solutions, other than identifying clearly-
incorrect estimates. A methodology to validate savings was later developed and tested in FT-2. 
The third objective complemented HITL-1 by evaluating TAP usability from a pilot’s 
perspective. The flight environment introduced variables not easily replicated in the university’s 
fixed-based flight simulator, such as ambient lighting changes, turbulence, and the operational 
tempo of actual flight. As mentioned earlier, FT-1 also provided an opportunity to introduce 
TASAR to airline decision-makers and create the context for follow-on exploratory partnership-
building discussions. 
The fourth objective was to make actual route modification requests to ATC based on TAP 
advisories, where opportunities presented themselves. This objective was treated as lower priority 
than the other three, since any approved requests would have the effect of removing route 
inefficiencies needed to support the first three objectives. Once these objectives were met on a 
given flight, the evaluation pilots were given the opportunity to select a TAP solution for request 
to ATC and execution, if approved. 
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11.1.2. Apparatus 
A Piaggio P180 Avanti, operated by 
Advanced Aerospace Solutions, served as 
the test aircraft for the flight trial. The 
aircraft is shown in Figure 17. As described 
in reference [51] four characteristics of this 
test platform directly supported the 
objective to accelerate the operational 
readiness of TAP: the aircraft retained its 
Normal Category airworthiness category, it 
was certified for single-pilot operations, it 
had a large cabin, and it had a broad flight 
envelope. Retention of a Normal Category 
Certificate of Airworthiness streamlined 
the reuse of the TAP software for 
subsequent deployments of the system and 
provided further evidence to early adopters 
of TAP suitability for commercial use. The single-pilot certification eliminated restrictions 
regarding the occupancy of the copilot’s seat, thereby providing cockpit seating for the evaluation 
pilot, and it also enabled the use of uncertified software on the non-handling side of the cockpit. 
The Avanti’s large cabin accommodated a seven-person test-crew comprising a safety pilot, an 
evaluation pilot, the test director, a flight test engineer, a data engineer, a TAP software engineer, 
and a NASA researcher. A broad flight envelope was deemed essential to achieving the objective 
of hosting TAP in a representative operational environment. The Avanti was certified for all-
weather single-pilot operations. It had a cruise speed of approximately 375 knots (0.65M) at 28,000 
ft and a ceiling of 41,000 ft. The aircraft was fuel-efficient, allowing for longer test missions, and 
the cabin was large enough to accommodate the full test crew with their laptops and recording 
equipment. 
Four hardware adaptations were made to the Avanti to support the TASAR flight trials. The first 
was installation of a certified AID. As TAP must interface to a number of aircraft data sources, 
which could vary widely from aircraft to aircraft, a decision was made to standardize all TAP-to-
aircraft interfaces through an AID that embodied all of the required data connectivity. A compact 
United Technologies Corporation Aerospace Systems (UTAS, formerly Goodrich, later Collins 
Aerospace) AID was chosen, which incorporated multiple ARINC 429 input channels and 
packaged the 429 data in ARINC 834 format for TAP consumption. (A later generation UTAS 
AID would eventually be chosen by Alaska Airlines for the TASAR operational evaluation.) Use 
of industry-standard protocols mitigated technical risk for future TAP installations because the 
TAP software remains agnostic to the aircraft interfaces upstream of the AID.  
The second adaptation was the integration of the Goodrich/UTAS SmartDisplay G500 Class 2 
EFB. For risk mitigation purposes, a requirement for the chosen system was for it to support a 
certified operating system, should it eventually be required in future testing. No such requirement 
emerged. The EFB was selected to meet the physical size and processor performance expectations 
of EFBs thought likely to be used by the prospective operator community. In FT-1, the TAP 
application was hosted locally on the SmartDisplay which communicated with all of the pertinent 
aircraft data systems via the AID. The evaluation pilot’s EFB was mounted on the copilot’s right-
Figure 17. Piaggio Avanti flight-test aircraft used in FT-1 
and FT-2. Photo by author. 
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side windshield using dual suction cups, as 
shown in Figure 18. Additional instances of 
TAP were hosted on a second 
SmartDisplay EFB and two engineering 
laptops available to crewmembers in the aft 
cabin, for independent TAP evaluations 
and debugging purposes.  
The third adaptation was to install a 
certified Inmarsat broadband link to enable 
TAP to access internet data sources for in-
flight data updates. For FT-1, the internet 
link was used specifically to connect to 
NOAA web services to receive hourly 
wind-field updates. Internet connectivity 
was later used in FT-2 to also receive SUA schedule and weather polygon data, whereas in FT-1, 
SUAs were considered always “hot” and weather polygons were not tested. The internet system 
bandwidth was limited to 200 kbps, due to size constraints of the installed low-profile, low-gain 
blade antenna. Though a higher bandwidth system would have enabled more efficient flight 
testing, it provided a good test condition to establish performance acceptability in low-bandwidth 
installations. The Inmarsat hardware also provided a full-service router for the aircraft, allowing 
several TAP instances to share the internet data received by a single EDS. 
The fourth adaptation was to install an updated Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
(TCAS) capable of ADS-B In, a data source central to the TASAR concept of traffic-aware route 
optimization. To ensure the transferability of the TAP installation to future operational platforms, 
the field-proven Aviation Communication & Surveillance Systems (ACSS) TCAS 3000SP ADS-
B In/Out capable TCAS was installed. For the Avanti, ACSS created a software patch enabling 
the ADS-B In system to output DTIF traffic data, normally triggered by the presence of a CDTI 
(not installed). Coincidentally, Alaska Airlines aircraft were equipped with the ACSS TCAS 3000 
SP. ACSS would later upgrade and certify the Alaska Airlines units to ADS-B In for the TASAR 
operational evaluation. 
The TAP software tested in FT-1 was TAP v3, functionally equivalent to TAP v2 tested in HITL-
1 but included an updated user interface with some usability enhancements, for instance, 
improvements in touchable areas and buttons for better visibility and labeling. Several data status 
screens were also added for use only by TAP software engineers, not evaluation pilots. The 
updated user interface tested in FT-1 is shown in Figure 19. Note that this interface design, tested 
in November 2013, preceded the TAP v14-1 design of HITL-2, shown in Figure 15 (p63) and 
tested in October/November 2014. 
11.1.3. Method 
A 10-flight 30-hour flight-evaluation campaign was planned including four hours of shakedown 
testing and 26 hours of dedicated TAP evaluations. Nine test flights were successfully completed, 
with one flight aborted due to a non-TAP aircraft equipment malfunction. The trials were 
conducted on IFR flights in the NAS along the U.S. eastern seaboard, with all flights originating 
and terminating at the Newport News / Williamsburg International Airport (KPHF). Several 
“round-robin” routes (i.e., out and back without an intermediate landing) were designed, based on 
Figure 18. EFB installation in the Avanti Cockpit. Photo by 
Advanced Aerospace Solutions. 
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published high-altitude IFR navigation aids and fixes. Four flight profiles were selected to exercise 
TAP’s route optimization functionality in the presence of potential SUA and traffic conflicts (see 
Figure 20). By varying the geographic regions and altitudes of the flight profiles, TAP exposure 
to complex airspace factors (i.e., traffic densities and SUAs) could be approximately managed. 
The intention was to start at low complexity with Route 1 (low traffic density with no SUAs) and 
gradually increase complexity to Route 6 (high traffic density with SUAs). Table 11 shows the test 
matrix of FT-1 as flown. The routes were coordinated each day with ATC traffic managers, and at 
their request, the final three flights planned for Route 6 were flown as Route 5 due to high ATC 
workload.  
The flight crew consisted of a safety pilot (pilot-in-command) and an evaluation pilot. Nine 
senior IFR-rated evaluation pilots were employed in the study, consisting of six senior airline 
captains, one senior first officer, and two highly experienced aviators. The operator communities 
represented were major, regional, and low-cost airlines, and high-end General Aviation. An 
evaluation pilot on the internal NASA TASAR team conducted the end-to-end systems checkouts 
and procedure rehearsals on flight 1, and the remaining flights were performed with the eight 
external evaluation pilots. The evaluation pilots received approximately two hours of dedicated 
TAP training on the day of their flight. During the flight, they performed structured TAP evaluation 
(a) Auto Mode main screen. (b) Auto Mode selected optimization. 
(c) Manual Mode data entry interface. (d) Manual Mode evaluation screen. 
Figure 19. TAP v3 user interface tested in FT-1. 
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procedures established for the outbound and inbound legs of the round-robin flight, while also 
completing multiple in-flight questionnaires and workload surveys. Each evaluation pilot was 
thoroughly debriefed post-flight. 
The safety pilot played no role in the evaluation pilot’s use of TAP, except for providing 
assistance in the configuration of the aircraft’s displays and interacting with the FMS as requested. 
The safety pilot performed all normal aircraft operations during the outbound legs of each flight, 
but assigned radio communications duties to the evaluation pilot during the inbound legs to provide 
representative PM workload for this phase. The cabin crew typically comprised five personnel: a 
Figure 20. FT-1 round robin routes from KPHF. From ref. [51]. 
(b) Center: Route 3 south of KPHF,  
low altitude. 
(a) Route 1 west of KPHF, 
 high altitude. 
(c) Right: Routes 5 and 6 northeast 
of KPHF, high altitude and low 
altitude, respectively. 
Table 11. FT-1 test matrix. From ref. [51]. 
 
Flight 
#  
Route 
#  
Direction  Initial Flight 
Level (FL)  
Traffic 
Density  
SUA 
Proximity  
1  1  CCWa FL300 Low No 
2  Flight 
aborted  
- - - - 
3  3  CCW 16,000 ft. Low Yes 
4  3  CWb 16,000 ft. Low Yes 
5  5  CCW FL340 High No 
6  5  CW FL340 High No 
7  6  CCW FL210 High Yes 
8  5c  CW FL310 High No 
9  5c,d  CCW FL310 High No 
10  5c,d  CW FL310 High No 
aCounterclockwise. bClockwise. cOriginally planned as Route 6. 
 dIncluded minor revision to route to eliminate route overlap. 
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test director, a flight test engineer, one or two TAP software engineers, and one or two NASA 
researchers. The test director orchestrated and performed all aspects of evaluation-pilot data 
collection during the flights. The aircraft flight test engineer managed the aircraft’s data systems 
and TAP interfaces. The TAP software engineers exercised TAP independently from the 
evaluation pilot and performed any necessary real-time troubleshooting. The NASA researchers 
also operated independent instances of TAP for real-time monitoring and testing. 
11.1.4. Results 
A summary of FT-1 results is presented in four sections, corresponding to the four flight trial 
objectives: (1) TAP Data Interface Verification; (2) TAP Functionality Verification; (3) Pilot 
Subjective Evaluation; and (4) TAP Operational Use. See references [50] and [51] for detailed 
results. 
TAP Data Interface Verification 
As FT-1 was the first opportunity to adapt TAP to the avionics environment of an actual aircraft, 
the initial phases of TAP integration posed a number of challenges related to the aircraft-side data 
sources. Chief among these was the GAMA subset of ARINC 429 data output by the Avanti FMS, 
which differed from the enhanced 429 structure used in the NASA simulation of transport category 
aircraft. GAMA data are usually used for the display of route and waypoint symbology on flight 
displays. To meet TAP data requirements, these data had to be supplemented by other sources, 
such as the Flight Data Recorder bus. 
The flight-trial version of the TAP software was developed in iteration with the aircraft 
integration activity. Three data-related problems hampered the pre-test integration efforts on the 
ground. TAP required the aircraft to provide valid in-flight air data in order to function, which 
entailed the use of an unwieldy Air Data Computer test set for all ground tests to stimulate an in-
flight condition. Similarly, a complex procedure was required to force the Inertial Navigation 
Systems into a simulation mode that would allow the aircraft to generate usable groundspeed data 
for TAP. In addition, limited satellite signal reception in the airport environment compromised 
EDS connectivity during ground testing. Due to these issues, the integration logistics were more 
challenging than originally anticipated. Advantage was taken of additional data collection tools in 
the TAP software, FMS, and aircraft computer servers that enabled the unattended collection of 
TAP data while the aircraft was engaged in flights unrelated to TAP. These data could then be fed 
through a playback capability of the TAP software to conduct integration testing. Almost 40 hours 
of these in-flight opportunity data were collected, reducing the dedicated TAP-integration flight 
time requirement to 3.2 hours. After the troubleshooting was completed, a successful end-to-end 
system test was performed immediately prior to the shakedown flight. The TAP data interfaces 
functioned satisfactorily thereafter, allowing TAP to perform as designed and EDS to successfully 
download the updated wind data. Nevertheless, a number of data problems persisted during the 
flight trials, including data dropouts, latency, and vertical speed noise. These artifacts are inherent 
to a live avionics and ADS-B environment, though some were artifacts of the flight testing. 
Maximizing the FT-1 testing opportunity, up to five instances of TAP were operated 
simultaneously on each flight, each connecting to the AID’s ARINC 834 server. As the AID was 
designed to serve only two clients (a pilot EFB and a copilot EFB), the server occasionally became 
overloaded, resulting in data dropouts and latency. Though this would not generally manifest in 
an operational environment with only the two AID clients, the finding did uncover a potential 
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weakness. The limiting case was found to be the transfer of a full flight route, which required 
multiple messages from the FMS to fully define the route. This was the only data label with inter-
arrival times that frequently exceeded TAP’s processing frame of one second. It highlighted the 
potential for dropouts to coincide with flight route changes that could result in TAP optimizing 
against an out-of-date flight route.  
Examination of vertical speed data for both the ownship and ADS-B traffic indicated vertical 
speed variations of up to ±4000 feet per minute, which was particularly noticeable during periods 
of turbulence. TAP does not use vertical speed for ownship predictions, but there was a concern 
about the stability of traffic ADS-B vertical speed values and the impact they may have on traffic 
trajectory prediction. Vertical speed is used by TAP to predict the vertical component of the ADS-
B traffic trajectory since the target altitude is not part of the ADS-B message set received by TAP. 
In a simulation environment, the vertical speed value is generally stable and accurate. In flight, 
turbulence may result in brief accelerations that, in turn, can result in temporarily large vertical 
speed being broadcast. The vertical speed noise could potentially cause TAP to generate advisories 
that are traffic-incompatible and/or less beneficial, if not otherwise mitigated. No significant 
outliers or noise was observed for any other ARINC data labels across the nine flights. 
TAP Functionality Verification 
In nearly all cases, TAP passed the initialization-sequence connection tests, entered the online 
mode at 10,000 ft as designed, and generally operated correctly and stably throughout the flight. 
Two aspects of the software caused occasional problems during the trials: the aircraft performance 
model and the ADS-B vertical speed fluctuations discussed above. TAP trajectory generation and 
optimizations rely on an accurate digital aircraft performance model, which was unavailable for 
the Avanti test-bed aircraft. Development of such digital models from aircraft performance 
handbooks is time-consuming and expensive, and the magnitude of the task was underestimated. 
As a compromise, a performance model of a generic twin-engine, medium-sized jet was scaled to 
approximate the en-route performance of the Avanti (a high-performance turboprop). This 
approximation impacted TAP’s predictive capability and curtailed all route optimization 
computations while the aircraft was climbing or descending. Use of this model also introduced 
errors in the fuel and time calculations that made precise quantification of the optimizations 
difficult. An accurate Avanti model was developed for FT-2 as was a new trajectory generator that 
is more flexible to variations in available performance data [44]. 
Pilot Subjective Evaluation 
Generally, the evaluation pilots rated usability of TAP as high, and their perceived workload was 
low, which is consistent with the findings in HITL-1. Nearly all workload ratings were below 3 on 
the 10-point Bedford scale, indicating that workload was tolerable for the task, and they had 
enough spare mental capacity for all desirable additional tasks during flight operations. In the post-
flight questionnaire and debrief, they reported that operating the TAP software application was 
relatively easy, with average scores above 5 on the 7-point Likert scale.  
The evaluation pilots were asked to select from a list of 28 items those they considered to be the 
main benefits of TASAR and the TAP application. No limit was placed on the quantity they could 
select. Benefits directly related to the flight itself, including fuel and time savings, optimal routing, 
and airspace hazard avoidance, were most prevalent in their selections. TASAR was also viewed 
by most evaluation pilots as providing equipage justification for ADS-B In, EFB, and cockpit 
internet access. Completing the set was the reduction in workload for pilots in assessing route-
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change impacts and the reduction in workload for air traffic controllers in flight optimization. Not 
selected by the majority were workload reductions for pilots and controllers in other areas (e.g., 
communication, coordination, maintaining SA). Interestingly, no evaluation pilot identified 
dispatcher workload reduction in post-departure flight optimization as a main benefit of TASAR. 
When taken together with the prevalent selection of optimal routing as a TASAR benefit, it may 
indicate a pilot perception that dispatchers do not often perform post-departure flight optimization. 
If true, TASAR may be well-positioned to fill this gap in current operations. 
The evaluation pilots emphasized the importance of consistency in TAP’s advisories, both 
between Auto Mode and Manual Mode, and over time. These comments were elicited when TAP 
presented fluctuating optimizations over relatively short timespans. Based on detailed post-flight 
analysis, these fluctuations were generally valid outcomes resulting from changing trajectory 
dynamics or new intruder traffic, making optimal routes temporarily unavailable. Nevertheless, 
the evaluation pilots were clearly more comfortable when TAP settled on a single solution for an 
extended period. This led to a software design update where TAP’s genetic algorithm would 
include the previous solution in the competitive search for the next solution, resulting in more 
stability unless clearly superior solutions emerged or the previous solution was no longer conflict-
free. Evaluation pilots also desired a more detailed depiction of the current route on the TAP user 
interface and greater use of the EFB’s touch-screen interface (e.g., for entering waypoints), both 
of which were incorporated into the significant design update of the TAP user interface (Figure 
15, p63) tested subsequently in HITL-2 and FT-2. 
TAP Operational Use 
TAP processed 710 unique ADS-B targets (i.e., traffic aircraft) during 19.5 hours of data 
collection (which excluded the departure and arrival flight phases). Analysis of ground-recorded 
traffic data indicates this was approximately 12 percent of the total traffic (non-ADS-B and ADS–
B) within ADS-B detection range. About 85 percent of ADS-B traffic was first detected between 
50 and 100 NM of the ownship. TAP’s “traffic aware” functionality was already producing results 
on Flight 1, during which TAP indicated a traffic conflict on a proposed route modification entered 
in Manual Mode.  
Figure 21 illustrates a route optimization 
from Flight 3 in relation to the original route 
and the SUA areas to be avoided. The red 
polygons represent the Seymour Johnson 
Echo Military Operations Area (SEY JON 
MOA) SUA. The green route indicates the 
original flight plan, and the yellow route 
indicates the “as flown” trajectory, flown 
counter-clockwise. Approximately halfway 
between waypoints ILM (far right) and 
FAY (bottom), the evaluation pilot 
consulted TAP for an optimization solution 
and made a route modification request to 
ATC, receiving approval shortly before 
reaching FAY. The solution and ATC 
clearance consisted of direct LANHO 
(waypoint chosen by TAP from its 
Request 
LANHO CVI 
Route 3 
Counter-Clockwise 
SEY JON MOA 
Cleared by 2125' 
Figure 21. FT-1 SUA avoidance example. Base image from 
Google EarthTM. 
RDU 
LVL 
CVI 
LANHO 
FAY 
ILM 
KPHF 
Green route is the planned route. Yellow route is as flown. 
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waypoint database), direct CVI (the “rejoin” waypoint), bypassing FAY, RDU, and LVL from the 
original route. This solution passed just barely north of SEY JON MOA, illustrating TAP’s 
function to optimize the route while avoiding restricted airspace. However on a different flight in 
different airspace, a similar request resulted in ATC issuing a modification that provided additional 
separation from the SUA airspace, indicating a potential need for additional buffering in some 
situations. TAP was subsequently modified to include an SUA buffer (but which was later removed 
during the airline operational evaluation due to several “false positive” interactions of the active 
route with SUAs that resulted in acceptability concerns by pilots; further study of SUA buffering 
is therefore needed). 
In total, 12 TAP-inspired ATC requests were made: two were denied, nine were approved, and 
ATC was unable to directly respond to the request in one case due to workload and/or frequency 
congestion. Some factors unique to the test design may have affected the ATC responses. These 
included the unusual round-robin nature of the flight paths, and the special treatment of the test 
aircraft by ATC. 
The most significant outcomes of FT-1 were substantial increases in TAP maturity and visibility. 
With credit to the high-performing TASAR team, FT-1 uncovered and, in short order, verified 
solutions for numerous integration, functionality, and performance issues inherent to an actual 
flight environment. Notwithstanding these considerable challenges, FT-1 validated TAP as an 
effective and powerful route optimization tool for pilots, making a substantial, positive, and lasting 
impression on the evaluation pilots from a cross-section of airlines and operator communities. FT-
1 triggered immediate partnership-building meetings, ultimately resulting in two SAAs to conduct 
formal operational evaluations in airline revenue service. This long-shot but welcomed 
advancement toward the TASAR vision had three effects. It triggered a significant reset of internal 
expectations and plans for the TASAR project’s reach, which now would extend to TRL 7 (system 
prototype demonstration in an operational environment). Press coverage of the airline partnerships 
triggered attention from industry on the commercial potential of TASAR. The high stakes resulted 
in a second HITL and flight trial to enhance readiness, reduce risk, and maximize success of the 
upcoming airline/industry operational evaluations of TASAR.  
11.2. TASAR Flight Trial 2 
FT-1 was essentially a generic flight trial of TASAR, validating whether TAP could be integrated 
into an aircraft and be used in an operational flight environment. However, the new airline 
partnerships to test TAP in their aircraft and their operational environment quickly brought focus 
to the question of how best to reduce risk and achieve the best chance for the airlines to successfully 
use and evaluate TAP on revenue flights. A second flight trial, FT-2, emerged as a means to 
increase operational readiness by anticipating and addressing integration and operational issues 
with the target airline environment in mind. Given these two airlines have very different platforms 
(i.e., airframes and avionics) and to remain within budget, FT-2 focused its technical integration 
where necessary on the Alaska Airlines implementation, which was to be the first of the two 
airlines to reach implementation readiness. However both airlines participated in FT-2, and the 
outcomes of FT-2 were geared to benefit both airlines wherever possible. 
Seven technical objectives were identified for FT-2, all targeting the overarching goal of 
increasing operational readiness for the airline evaluations: 
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1. Verify to the degree possible the extent to which TAP operates with partner airline 
hardware  
2. Verify processing of additional external data intended for the airline evaluations 
3. Assess the methodology to characterize the accuracy of TAP computed outcomes  
4. Assess acceptability of TASAR requests to air traffic controllers 
5. Assess acceptability of TAP route modification advisories to airline pilots 
6. Assess in-flight usability and acceptability of the updated TAP user interface  
7. Assess effect of TAP on flight crews and Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
FT-2 took place over a two-week period in June 2015, using the Piaggio Avanti aircraft in the 
same configuration as FT-1 but with EFB hardware updated to approximate the anticipated Alaska 
Airlines environment. Three types of flights were conducted: 
• Charter Flights: data were collected during charter operations on a non-interference basis 
for the purpose of systems checkout prior to formal data collection for the seven 
objectives; 
• Evaluation Flights: data for Objectives 1–6 were collected during round-trip flights, 
staged from KPHF, with evaluation pilots; and 
• Positioning Flights: data were collected for Objective 7 while positioning the test aircraft 
between its home base in Montreal and KPHF with a fully qualified Avanti aircraft crew. 
The FT-2 evaluation flights were designed as a pair of origin-destination flights to be more 
representative of airline operations than the round-robin flights of FT-1. Six pairs of evaluation 
flights were conducted, one pair per day with a non-flying day in between. In each pair, the 
outbound flight departed KPHF and flew approximately 2.5 hours to one of three destination 
airports and landed. After a short break, the inbound flight departed that destination airport and 
returned to KPHF taking approximately 2.5 hours. The destination airports were: 
1. Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport (KBHM), Alabama 
2. Montgomery Regional Airport (KMGM), Alabama 
3. Tampa International Airport (KTPA), Florida 
The conduct of each flight called for two evaluation pilots to fly per day. On the outbound leg, 
one evaluation pilot flew in the cockpit performing PM duties. The other pilot flew in the cabin. 
On the inbound flight, the pilots reversed roles. Both pilots on both legs had a functional instance 
of TAP to use in the evaluation. The first evaluation flight day served as a rehearsal, with two 
TASAR team pilots performing as evaluation pilots. The five remaining evaluation flights included 
evaluation pilots from Alaska Airlines, Virgin America, and a variety of other airlines. Each pilot 
was trained using the TAP CBT in anticipation of the partner airlines training their own crews 
using the same method. The TAP CBT was verified as an effective training tool in HITL-2. 
Representative routes flown between KPHF and the three destination airports are shown in 
Figure 22. The KBHM and KMGM routes were designed to interact with traffic in the vicinity of 
Atlanta (KATL), whereas the KTPA routes were proximate to multiple SUAs while interacting 
with significant coastal traffic flows. The flights traversed Washington, Atlanta, and Jacksonville 
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Air Route Traffic Control Centers, with most of 
the en route segments occurring in Atlanta 
(ZTL) and Jacksonville (ZJX) Centers. TASAR 
researchers monitored the flights from the ATC 
control rooms at ZTL and ZJX as part of 
accomplishing Objective 4, assessing ATC 
acceptability of TASAR requests. The requests 
were generally scripted to test acceptability of 
various factors involving route changes (e.g., a 
route change that clips an ATC sector), as TAP 
algorithms were not guaranteed to produce the 
desired factors. This scripted approach better 
permitted the on-site researchers to interview 
the air traffic controllers about these factors. 
The researchers working with traffic managers 
prioritized the requests for each flight 
depending on conditions of the day (e.g., 
weather, playbook routing, traffic flow 
restrictions). They coordinated the desired 
requests with the flight team prior to each flight. 
The following sections summarize the 
purpose, method, and findings of each FT-2 objective. Further details can be found in references 
[52] and [53]. 
11.2.1. Objective 1: Verify that TAP operates with partner airline hardware 
The purpose of Objective 1 was to identify potential issues that may prevent TAP from operating 
properly on the EFB and associated hardware of the upcoming airline operational evaluation. The 
FT-2 approach was to test TAP in a configuration as close as possible to the hardware and data 
configurations anticipated to be used by Alaska Airlines. Since the Alaska Airlines configuration 
was not finalized by the time of FT-2 planning, assumptions were made where necessary. 
Diagrams of the respective EFB system architectures on the Alaska Airlines and Piaggio Avanti 
aircraft, shown in Figure 23, illustrate the planned similarities and some of the necessary 
differences.  
Both configurations incorporated the same iPad Air, UTAS Tablet Interface Module (TIM), and 
UTAS AID hardware, though only the iPad was able to host TAP software in both configurations. 
The TAP software development to enable Universal Serial Bus (USB) data connectivity through 
the TIM was not available for FT-2, nor were the Gogo processor and the AID hardware version 
capable of hosting third-party software applications. TAP was also not yet configured to run in a 
Linux environment, and therefore separate WindowsTM processors on the Piaggio Avanti were 
used to host the remaining TAP software components. The ADS-B receiver used for FT-2 was the 
same receiver expected to be used by Alaska Airlines (ACSS TCAS 3000SP). Other differences, 
previously discussed for FT-1, were avionics data streams with unique formats and data rates due 
to differences in each aircraft’s FMS hardware. Compared to FT-1 where up to five TAP instances 
were connected to the ARINC 834 server (causing AID performance issues), only three TAP 
instances were connected in FT-2: two for the evaluation pilots and one shared by NASA 
Figure 22. FT-2 representative routes. Base image 
from Google EarthTM. 
 
Washington, Atlanta, and Jacksonville Air Route 
Traffic Control Centers are shown in orange. 
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researchers and TAP engineers. Still, this represented a conservatively higher load placed on the 
AID than would be expected during Alaska Airlines operations. 
Data collection for this objective required no actions by personnel onboard other than starting 
TAP and transferring the recorded files post-flight. TAP and EDS automatically recorded all data 
required to complete Objective 1 post-flight analyses. Metrics were calculated to quantify data 
dropouts, data noise and outliers, ADS-B characteristics, TAP inter-process communications, and 
TAP performance.  
Data Dropouts 
Analysis of data inter-arrival times indicated that large data dropouts were rare in the Piaggio 
Avanti configuration. Only one large dropout of 55 seconds was recorded, occurring on a flight 
when TAP was initiating a subscription to the AID. This confirmed FT-1 findings that showed a 
higher likelihood of dropouts when the AID is experiencing higher loads. All other dropouts across 
the entire FT-2 dataset were small, with none exceeding three seconds. Inter-arrival times between 
date/time messages exceeded 1 second 47 percent of the time but exceeded 1.25 seconds only 0.1 
percent of the time, an impact that was determined to be negligible.  
Data Noise and Outliers 
Analysis of decoded-data value changes over time confirmed that no data outliers or unusual 
noise were present, with the exception of altitude rate (i.e., vertical speed), which is consistent 
with FT-1 results. The largest change in ownship altitude rate was correlated with in-flight 
turbulence. TAP has additional ownship intent information regarding target altitude that mitigates 
altitude rate noise. However, such intent information is not available for traffic aircraft through the 
ADS-B DTIF data. An analysis of a candidate ADS-B altitude rate filter was performed to 
determine whether the filter would sufficiently reduce data noise. The analysis, presented in 
reference [52], concluded that applying an altitude rate filter would not significantly improve the 
altitude component of ADS-B traffic trajectory predictions due to lack of intent information. While 
filters may decrease noise, they also decrease the probability of detecting a traffic aircraft departing 
Figure 23. Architecture comparison of Alaska Airlines and FT-2 test configurations. 
Flight Trials 
83 
 
level flight from its current altitude or leveling off from a climb or descent. Before implementing 
such a method it is suggested to explore internet-based sources of traffic intent information such 
as SWIM. 
ADS-B Characteristics 
Analysis of ADS-B data showed that more aircraft were detected by the ownship during FT-2 
(216 unique aircraft detected per flight) than FT-1 (79 unique aircraft detected per flight). This 
could be due to FT-2 being conducted in more traffic-dense airspace primarily near Atlanta and/or 
more aircraft being equipped with ADS-B in the 19 months since FT-1. ADS-B traffic aircraft 
were generally first detected at a farther distance from the ownship during FT-2 than FT-1. The 
reasons for this difference could be different characteristics of installed ADS-B Out systems and 
different interference characteristics experienced during FT-2 as compared to FT-1. There was no 
significant change to the ownship ADS-B system’s reported quality of ADS-B messages received 
during FT-2 (98.6 percent of messages valid) compared to FT-1 (98.9 percent of messages valid). 
TAP discards all invalid ADS-B messages to prevent using unreliable data. 
An analysis was also performed to determine the effect of ADS-B traffic data on TAP’s route 
optimization solutions. TAP data files recorded on one of the TAP instances running onboard were 
replayed post-flight with ADS-B data removed. For this instance of TAP, there were a total of 939 
TAP Engine optimization runs during FT-2 which were re-run without ADS-B traffic. Of the 939 
invocations, 186 (19.8 percent) had different results after removing the ADS-B traffic. In 50 cases 
(5.3 percent) TAP found a solution without ADS-B traffic but could not find a solution with ADS-
B traffic. The remaining 136 cases (14.5 percent) consisted of TAP finding different solutions with 
and without ADS-B traffic. TAP route modification requests that do not take nearby traffic into 
account are considered less likely to be approved by ATC, thereby reducing potential benefits and 
pilot acceptability of TAP.  
TAP Inter-process Communications 
Reliable messaging between TAP Display and TAP Engine is important for the stability and 
health of the software. The TDA was added to the TAP software architecture to support periods 
where the iPad may be sleeping or running a different app. An analysis of messages from the TAP 
Engine to the TAP Display (via the TDA) indicated all messages were received except those sent 
when the iPad was either sleeping or turned off. Messages in the opposite direction were all 
received except for when the TDA was shut down before the TAP Display. This finding resulted 
in the Alaska Airlines architecture design that gave the TAP Display the role of managing launch 
and shutdown of all other TAP components.  
An analysis of inter-process data latency indicated transitory latencies of up to eight seconds. 
These latencies started after the iPad had to re-synchronize due to, for example, initial start-up or 
entering sleep mode and lasted up to about fifteen seconds after re-sync (i.e., there were multiple 
messages that experienced latencies and the last one occurred about fifteen seconds after re-sync). 
After this transitory condition passed, 99.7 percent of messages arrived with a latency of less than 
0.2 seconds. However, this latency may also be due to hardware performance issues since it was 
observed that these high latencies occurred near the times of wind update synchronizations that 
contained a lot of data. This condition could serve as a hardware performance test case whereby 
large amounts of data are sent from the TAP Engine to the TAP Display to assess whether sending 
large amounts of data is causing problems. This issue was later seen in the Alaska Airlines 
operational evaluation. 
Flight Trials 
84 
 
TAP Performance 
TAP performance is characterized by skipped processing frames (due to in-cycle processing 
taking longer than the 1-second processing frame duration), TAP PBGA completion time (i.e., 
computation of route optimizations), and hazards processing time. Other than one instance of 345 
consecutively skipped frames due to a TAP software error, only 51 skipped frames were recorded 
throughout all of FT-2, occurring randomly. This indicated that hardware CPU performance did 
not negatively degrade TAP during FT-2. 
The TAP PBGA was invoked 1,958 total times during FT-2 across all TAP Engines. The 
maximum, mean, and standard deviation of the time to complete PBGA processing was 38 
seconds, 5.7 seconds, and 4.4 seconds, respectively. These statistics confirmed that hardware CPU 
performance did not negatively degrade TAP during FT-2. 
Hazards processing time is the time to create trajectories for ADS-B target aircraft and avoidance 
polygons for SUAs and convective weather. The maximum TAP hazards processing time during 
FT-2 was 0.05 seconds, indicating that hazards processing time was not a factor during FT-2. One 
reason for the low hazards processing time is that there were few convective weather hazard 
polygons used by TAP in FT-2. The maximum convective weather, SUA, and ADS-B traffic 
hazards processed at one time during FT-2 was 12, 564, and 35, respectively. It was expected that 
TAP on partner airline aircraft will interact with more convective weather hazard polygons than 
were experienced during FT-2. 
11.2.2. Objective 2: Verify processing of additional external data  
The purpose of Objective 2 was to evaluate the performance of TAP in obtaining external data 
using an airborne internet connection and transferring the data locally to the TAP Engine. The 
internet system on the Piaggio Avanti was different than the internet systems on Alaska Airlines 
and Virgin America aircraft. Therefore, the focus was to evaluate TAP’s EDS capabilities using 
the Piaggio Avanti internet system as a conservative proxy to the assumed aircraft internet systems. 
The Piaggio Avanti internet system was a conservative proxy because it is a satellite system (200 
kbps) that has approximately 1/15th the bandwidth of the Gogo cell tower-based system (3 Mbps) 
used by Alaska Airlines. 
Three types of data were obtained in FT-2:  
1. Gridded winds and temperature aloft from the NOAA Rapid Refresh (RAP) weather 
prediction model 
2. SUA activation schedule from FAA SUA public website 
3. Convective Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET) polygons from Weather 
Services International (WSI, later The Weather Company, an IBM Business) 
There are three stages to TAP’s process of incorporating external data from the internet. The 
first stage is EDS downloading the data via the internet. During FT-2, the onboard EDS had a 
complementary Ground Data Server (GDS) that downloaded weather data from WSI, Alaska 
Airlines’ approved weather data provider. This initial version of GDS only processed WSI 
Convective SIGMET polygons and filtered out all other WSI data not relevant to TAP. The second 
stage is EDS performing a format conversion. During FT-2, EDS converted WSI and public data 
to TAP’s internal format without any preprocessing by GDS. The third stage is transferring the 
data in TAP format to the TAP Engine via a socket connection. 
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A download test of each data source was conducted through a web browser during charter flights. 
This download test was performed to resolve configuration issues. EDS ran normally during FT-2 
evaluation flights by attempting to download external files according to a schedule defined in an 
EDS configuration file. Successful downloads were verified by checking that wind barbs were 
shown on the TAP Display. If winds were not shown then internet availability was verified and 
EDS was restarted. Verification of other data sources were confirmed by examining the EDS 
download folder on the TAP engineer laptop. 
Objective 2 data collection was fully automated without the need for pilot or TAP engineer 
actions during flight. Four metrics were used to evaluate TAP’s ability to obtain external data: 
percent of external files downloaded completely, latency between EDS request and remote server 
response, bandwidth consumed by downloads, and minutes after scheduled download time that 
data file is received by TAP.  
EDS downloaded 60.5 MB during the 22 flight hours analyzed. The average performance of 
EDS and the internet system in terms of the success rate (79–89 percent), latency (4.8–5.7 
seconds), bandwidth (0.76 KB per second), and minutes behind schedule (9.7 minutes) were 
acceptable for FT-2 and are expected to be improved with the significantly higher bandwidth of 
Alaska Airlines’ Gogo internet system.  
11.2.3. Objective 3: Assess the methodology to characterize TAP outcomes  
The purpose of Objective 3 was to assess the completeness and effectiveness of a methodology 
developed to verify the accuracy and stability of TAP-computed outcomes, i.e., the predicted 
changes in flight time and fuel burn resulting from executing a given TAP-proposed route 
modification. The methodology uses TAP-recorded data, collected in-flight, to perform the 
verifications in a post-flight analysis. The plan was to use this methodology on data collected on 
partner airline flights during initial testing to verify TAP outcome performance before TAP is used 
by pilots for operational trials. The FT-2 objective was to dry-run the methodology to provide for 
any refinements if needed. 
To verify the accuracy of TAP’s predicted time- and fuel-to-destination savings, the 
methodology compares actual aircraft states to TAP predictions and generates fuel-burn and 
groundspeed error metrics. To verify solution stability, the methodology collects the time history 
of TAP-generated solutions (i.e., route modification advisories), allowing them to be qualitatively 
reviewed for stability issues. For example, the stability test uncovered an issue where successive 
runs of the TAP optimization algorithm returned slightly different solutions. Such occurrences are 
an inherent risk with a real-time (i.e., time constrained) application of a genetic algorithm. In cases 
where the second running of the algorithm was worse than the first, the stability plots showed that 
TAP was returning a sub-optimal solution. The TAP software was modified to refresh the 
outcomes for its previous advisory (after first checking that no new event invalidated the solution) 
and then to compare it to the latest result from the genetic algorithm. TAP would then return the 
more efficient solution of the two. This change resulted in a noticeable improvement in the stability 
of TAP solutions and computed outcomes. 
Objective 3 data were successfully collected for all 12 evaluation flight segments. The new TAP 
TG algorithm [44], developed out of a need identified in FT-1, was brought online during FT-2. 
Extensive shakeout testing of the new TAP TG occurred using data from the first four FT-2 
evaluation flights. During these four flights, TAP was reverted to using the FT-1 TG to 
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successfully achieve the other FT-2 objectives. The data from these flights was still valuable to 
Objective 3 in refining the tools for identifying accuracy analysis segments. 
The methodology for assessing the accuracy of TAP-computed outcomes required the 
identification of stable, level, un-accelerated flight segments for comparing TAP predications to 
recorded state data. The aircraft navigation system should have FMS lateral navigation engaged, 
and no FMS route changes should be executed during the segment. The original plan was to use 
20-minute analysis intervals, a compromise between the preferred interval of 30 minutes and the 
expectation of shorter uninterrupted intervals due to route changes required for other FT-2 
objectives. However, this would have resulted in only five usable 20-minute intervals over all 12 
flights as there were a number of route changes made during each flight. Therefore the analysis 
was performed using 10-minute intervals resulting in 17 usable intervals.  
For each interval, the analysis computed metrics to quantify TAP’s prediction accuracy of fuel 
burn and flight time (represented as average ground speed) over the length of the segment. The 
final metrics are TAP Fuel Factor and Ground Speed (GS) % Error, calculated as shown in Eq. (1) 
and Eq. (2): 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟
𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟  (1) 
 
where: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ𝐹𝐹 –  𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ𝐹𝐹
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 − 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹  
 
𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ𝐹𝐹 –  𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑤𝑤ℎ𝐹𝐹
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 − 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹  
 
 
 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 % 𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝− 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟 𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 × 100 (2) 
 
where: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 =  𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 − 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 
 
𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹 𝑤𝑤𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 =  𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹ℎ 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 − 𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹 
 
These interval metrics are averaged over each flight, and these flight averages are then averaged 
over all flights to produced Average TAP Fuel Factor and Average GS % Error metrics for the 
particular aircraft being analyzed. For the fuel savings outcomes, the closer the Average TAP Fuel 
Factor is to 1, the more accurate the TAP outcomes are. This fuel factor was generated in a similar 
approach to the aircraft performance monitoring method used by airlines to adjust the fuel 
performance of their flight planning software and FMS. For the time savings outcomes, the closer 
the Average GS % Error is to zero, the more accurate the TAP outcomes are. Ground speed error 
has a direct effect on the time predictability of a flight. Because the time intervals used to generate 
this number in FT-2 were only 10 minutes, this number would not provide the full picture of time 
prediction for TAP. For example, the time prediction accuracy three hours ahead of the aircraft 
would be impacted much more significantly by the lack of accurate wind forecasts beyond those 
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covered by the current RAP data (which updates every hour) than are these short predictions. 
Regardless, understanding the accuracy of these shorter predictions could help identify potential 
issues specific to TAP by highlighting larger than expected errors, and therefore short predictions 
were considered acceptable for this dry run of the methodology in FT-2. When later applied to the 
Alaska Airlines 737-900ER aircraft in the testing leading up to the operational evaluation, much 
longer stable flight-segment intervals were available. 
Analysis of the eight flights using the new TAP TG was performed over the 17 intervals. The 
average TAP Fuel Factor for the Piaggio Avanti was 0.946 with minimum and maximum sub-
interval values of 0.866 and 1.017, respectively. A value of 1 indicates a perfect prediction of the 
observed fuel burn. The calculated values were consistent with pilot feedback that the TAP TG 
fuel burn predictions appeared reasonable. It is likely that many errors in predicting fuel burn 
impact both the active route prediction and a proposed route change prediction in the same way, 
cancelling each other out when calculating fuel savings and thus not affecting accuracy in 
determining fuel savings.  
The average GS % Error for the Piaggio Avanti was 0.170, with minimum and maximum sub-
interval values of –4.935 and 6.380, respectively. A value of 0 indicates a perfect prediction of the 
ground speed, which is a direct measure of time required to cover a defined distance. On average, 
TAP was generally doing a good job in predicting ground speed and hence time-of-arrival 
estimates, but the minimum and maximum sub-interval values (5-6% error) were larger than 
expected. Further analysis determined that TAP’s predicted Mach and calibrated airspeed (CAS) 
were significantly higher than the actual values, indicating an issue in the TAP Piaggio Avanti 
aircraft performance model when predicting cruise speed. It was determined that the speed change 
algorithm was insufficient to properly capture speed changes for the Piaggio Avanti which, during 
many flight segments, was not maintaining a constant Mach or CAS during cruise, but rather was 
maintaining a max power setting. As a result, the speed change algorithm was enhanced, and 
experience was gained in preparation for similar prediction accuracy analysis to be conducted in 
the upcoming airline operational evaluation. 
In summary, Objective 3 to exercise the methodology for characterizing TAP computed 
outcomes and solutions was successfully met. The data collection was confirmed to be sufficient 
for the accuracy and stability analysis methods, and the analysis tools were refined to provide 
automated calculation of the desired metrics and visualization plots to support an analysis of the 
final results. The data collection and analysis tools were determined to be ready for conducting 
accuracy assessments using partner airline data. 
11.2.4. Objective 4: Assess acceptability of TASAR to air traffic controllers 
The purpose of Objective 4 (referred to as Objective 4A in reference [52]) was to gain insight 
on factors affecting route-modification request acceptability from the perspective of the air traffic 
controller. This objective aligns with one of the precepts of TASAR, that increasing the likelihood 
of ATC approval will ultimately increase the benefits achieved by the operator. TAP incorporates 
several design features with this precept in mind: avoid traffic conflicts, avoid incursion into active 
SUA, use published navigation aids, and limit requests to at most two off-route waypoints. In FT-
2, Objective 4 aimed to affirm these design features and determine what additional features might 
be productive to include in future updates to the TAP software to increase likelihood of ATC 
approval. 
Flight Trials 
88 
 
It is important to note that it is not the objective of TASAR to get all requests approved. While 
it is certainly a desired outcome, pursuit of ATC approval as the exclusive objective runs counter 
to TASAR’s approach of leveraging the flexibility of ATC operations to optimize the flight. Some 
route modification requests are always unacceptable to controllers, such as ones that violate the 
separation requirement with another aircraft. Other acceptance criteria depend on characteristics 
of the airspace and the operating conditions at the time of the request. Building constraints into 
TAP’s route optimization algorithms that account for all possible factors leading to a request denial 
would undermine the degrees of freedom that controllers have to approve requests, such as 
coordinating with another affected sector controller. TASAR leans on these ATC degrees of 
freedom to accommodate the operator’s preferred route modification where practicable, while 
being respectful of known constraints that preclude the possibility of approval or that adversely 
affect the controller. In this way, TASAR intends to enhance the generally collaborative 
relationship between pilots and controllers to achieve greater efficiency in operations.  
A challenge, however, is accommodating ATC acceptability factors when some of the critical 
information defining those factors is not readily available. For instance, sector maps are not 
generally published and available in electronic format, aircrews do not know when their handoff 
to the next sector controller is imminent, and Letters of Agreement (LOA) within and between 
ATC facilities that dictate controller requirements for delivering aircraft are not available to 
operators. Rather than attempt to obtain this information for prototype inclusion and testing in 
TAP, FT-2 took the approach of observing requests made in the absence of the information and 
interviewing controllers afterward on the importance of these acceptability factors. 
FT-2 focused on gaining insights on two categories of controller acceptability factors:  
1. Interaction with airspace structure such as sector boundaries and SUA 
2. Maneuver complexity such as the number of waypoints and combo maneuvers 
FT-2 also investigated the interaction between these and environment factors such as workload 
and traffic patterns. Outcomes of the analysis were recommendations for TAP advisory 
characteristics that address the identified acceptability factors. 
As shown in Figure 22 (p81), FT-2 routes traversed ZTL and ZJX. Through advance 
coordination with the FAA and NATCA, a research team was stationed onsite at these facilities to 
observe aircraft interactions with ATC from the controller’s perspective. The observations 
consisted of two components: 
1. Observation of scripted route modification requests that were designed to test 
hypothesized acceptability factors and were made by the test pilot. Researchers 
monitored the pilot-controller communications during these requests and elicited 
acceptability factors from the controller through follow up interviews and questionnaires. 
2. Observation of pilot-controller communications in sectors without the test aircraft 
traveling through and eliciting general acceptability factors through follow up interviews 
and questionnaires. 
A list of hypothesized acceptability factors was generated and confirmed during preparatory 
visits to ZJX and ZTL. Two sets of factors were considered: controlled factors that were varied 
directly through scripted requests, and environment factors that were varied indirectly. Eight 
controlled factors representing airspace structure interactions and maneuver complexity levels are 
described in Table 12 (six factors are depicted graphically). The acceptability of the factors in 
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Table 12 depends on uncontrolled environment factors, four of which are the controller who 
handles the request, traffic density, traffic flow type (arrival, departure, or en route), and workload. 
It was considered important to attain a variation in these uncontrolled factors such that they would 
not mask the effects of the controlled factors. Therefore, these factors were varied indirectly by 
flying at different times so that requests were made from different controllers and during different 
traffic patterns and densities. In addition to conducting morning and afternoon flights, the 
departure times were varied in the morning and afternoon to induce some variability of these 
uncontrolled factors. 
Table 12. Controlled ATC acceptability factors evaluated in FT-2. From ref. [53]. 
 
1. SUA: Requests designed to fly close to three 
miles (typical buffer) from an SUA 
2. Sector boundaries: Requests designed to fly 
along and across boundaries between sectors  
     
3. Sector intrusion: Requests designed to cross in 
and out of sectors 
4. Handoff: Requests made during or close to 
handoff status 
  
5. Multiple centers: Requests made to cross from 
one center to another  
6. Multiple waypoints: Request designed to 
include one and multiple waypoints 
  
7. Multiple maneuvers: Request designed to 
include altitude and lateral maneuvers 
8. Fix type: Request designed to use fixes in low 
altitude (E class) in addition to high altitude 
SUA
Sector boundary
Sector intrusion
Handoff 
Center boundary
ZJX
ZTL
 
  
 
 
 
 
Flight Plan
Request
Flight Plan
Request
Flight Plan
Request
Flight Plan
Request
Flight Plan
Request
Flight Plan
Request
Flight Trials 
90 
 
 
 
To invoke the factors in Table 12, scripted requests (rather than TAP-generated requests) were 
employed, and detailed scenarios were designed for each request. The scenarios were collected in 
a booklet that was used by the ground observers and the TAP engineer onboard who was in charge 
of planning and timing the requests. The scenario order was determined by the ground observers 
before each flight and communicated to the TAP engineer onboard such that the two teams were 
coordinated at the start of each flight. 
For observations of the test aircraft, one observer shadowed the controller of the sector where 
the flight was traveling and making requests. Once the next sector along the flight’s route was 
determined with high certainty (but before handoff) the other observer started shadowing the 
controller of the next sector in anticipation of the flight’s arrival. Some flights made fewer than 
three requests and some flights made up to four requests. Some factors that were concluded quickly 
as non-important were de-emphasized, such as the class of the fix used in a request (factor 8 in 
Table 12). ATC facility personnel assisting the ground-based research team were instrumental in 
helping to modify the scripted scenarios based on their knowledge of procedures, common 
controller behavior, and the forecast weather for the day.  
Detailed results of the ATC observations for Objective 4 are presented in reference [53]. A total 
of 36 route modification requests were made during the flight trial. Three requests were made in 
Washington Center airspace where no observers were present. Seven requests were made 
according to TAP advisories, 28 requests were made according to scripted scenarios designed to 
invoke the factors in Table 12, and one request related to an evolving weather event was not 
scripted beforehand but rather was planned during the test. Of the 36 requests, eight were rejected 
due to various factors (handoff status, unfamiliar fix in request, opposing traffic stream, holding 
in the next sector due to weather, intrusion of recently activated SUA, proximity to airspace 
boundaries, incursion into another center, request counter to ATC facility letter of agreement) that 
are further detailed in reference [53]. Nine were accepted with a delay; for example, the request 
was rejected first and then accepted after the controller conducted needed coordination or resolved 
any traffic implications due to the request. The remaining nineteen requests were accepted with no 
significant observed issues.  
With the help of the facility personnel assisting the observers, interviews with the observed 
controllers were scheduled (in consultation with the supervisors) after the flight exited from the 
sectors of interest. The main data source for identifying and characterizing controller acceptability 
of pilot requests was the interviews with the controllers. Fifty controllers were interviewed, 35 in 
ZTL and 15 in ZJX. Four types of information were collected from each interviewed controller: 
(1) demographic information; (2) general request acceptability statistics and factors; (3) 
information regarding observed events, mostly events related to the scripted scenarios; and (4) 
information regarding the hypothesized acceptability factors. Assessment of each factor was 
obtained from each interviewed controller under three subjective workload levels (high, moderate, 
and low) as individually defined by each controller. 
The controllers estimated that 30 to 50 percent of pilots make requests in nominal conditions, 
increasing to over 90 percent under bad weather and turbulent conditions. The most common 
requests are short cuts, followed by altitude change requests, and then weather deviation requests. 
By far, traffic confliction was mentioned the most frequently by controllers as the first factor they 
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consider when evaluating pilot requests. Other factors ranked as important were arrival/departure 
flow interactions, flow restrictions, and workload. Most controllers said they reject less than 10 
percent of pilot requests, with all responses below 50 percent. Traffic confliction was the dominant 
reason for rejecting a request.  
The following nine summaries describe insights and recommendations about hypothesized 
controller acceptability factors. These results derive from observations, controller interview data, 
and analyses of specific scenarios observed in FT-2 and detailed in reference [53].  
Request to fly close to active SUA 
Controllers were asked how close a route modification request can be to an active SUA and still 
be acceptable. The required minimum separation from an active SUA is 3 nmi. The majority of 
controllers answered that they would accept requests that are at the legal minimum distance of 3 
nmi under low workload, but they require 5 nmi under high workload. This response is one of 
many where controller workload was a determining factor in acceptability. No mechanism and 
data source is currently available for informing TAP of the controller’s workload state. Until these 
exist, it will be up to the pilot’s judgment to make any adjustments to accommodate controller 
workload.  
Request to fly along sector boundaries 
Controllers were asked how close to the boundary between two sectors can a requested trajectory 
travel in order to be acceptable. The main issue with flying close to the boundary between sectors 
is the necessity of a “point out.” If an aircraft flies closer than 2.5 nmi from a sector boundary, the 
controller in charge of the aircraft has to call the controller of the adjacent sector to have him/her 
monitor the aircraft as well. This procedure is known as a “point out” and causes an increase in 
workload. Although it is very common for controllers to point aircraft out, under high workload 
they can decide to either reject or delay a request that needs a point out in order to create enough 
separation from the sector boundaries and avoid the coordination necessary for the point out. Most 
controllers, in all workload situations, indicated they would accept a request that has the aircraft 
flying along the boundary between two sectors (requiring a point out) though the desired separation 
from sector boundaries increased at high workload. 
Request causing sector intrusion 
Controllers were asked if they would accept requests that intrude briefly into another sector (clip 
a sector) and, if not, how far they would want a request to be to avoid clipping. The issue in clipping 
a sector is causing a point out to the clipped sector similarly to the previous factor (flying along 
sector boundaries). Controllers are required to point out an aircraft that clips a sector, potentially 
adding workload to the controllers of the sector that is being clipped and to their own because of 
the coordination it requires. To avoid the point out, as explained for the previous factor, controllers 
would have to keep the aircraft more than 2.5 nmi away from the adjacent sector’s boundaries. 
The majority of controllers answered that they would accept requests that clip sector boundaries 
(requiring a point out) regardless of workload. Based on the smaller emphasis of the controllers’ 
responses on maintaining distance from sector clipping compared to when flying along boundaries, 
it is more acceptable that a route modification request does not take into consideration the clipping 
of a sector if that provides an optimal solution. 
 
 
Flight Trials 
92 
 
Time of request before handoff to next sector 
Controllers were asked how close they would allow the aircraft to be to its handoff to the next 
sector while still accepting a request, rather than telling the pilot to make the request to the next 
sector. Controllers are required to hand off an aircraft to the next sector when the aircraft is still in 
their airspace. If they forget to hand off an aircraft, the system will automatically flash the aircraft 
when within 3 nmi from the sector boundaries. If the controller of the next sector takes the handoff, 
he/she may not be talking to the aircraft yet, but the control of the aircraft has been taken. For this 
reason, it frequently happens that a pilot makes a request to a controller who is not in control of 
the aircraft anymore. This happens close to the handoff because pilots have no awareness of the 
sector boundaries or the status of the handoff procedure. If a request is made in this situation, the 
controller has to call the controller of the next sector and ask to hand the aircraft back to her/him, 
introducing additional workload. Controllers responded they desired requests be made 2–5 minutes 
prior to handoff initiation, depending on current workload. To accommodate this constraint, TAP 
would require a sector map and logic to estimate proximity to handoff. The additional software 
complexity this introduces may not be beneficial, given that pilots will simply be informed to make 
the request to the next controller.  
Time of request after handoff from sector 
Controllers were asked how soon after they receive the handoff from another sector they would 
entertain a trajectory change request. Based on the controllers’ responses, this factor was 
characterized by two parameters: (1) the acceptable request time after the handoff and (2) the 
acceptable request distance after crossing the sector boundary. Most controllers preferred knowing 
a request immediately after the handoff, even under high workload, which helps them in planning 
for the request. If the requesting aircraft is not in his/her airspace yet, the controller has the option 
to delay the response. If the trajectory change request is urgent, for example for weather deviation, 
the controller has the option to call the controller of the previous sector and ask to obtain control 
for maneuvering the aircraft. In this way the controller can accommodate the request right away 
but with added workload. This situation arises again because of the lack of knowledge of the sector 
boundaries by the pilots. The majority of controllers replied that they would handle the request 
once the aircraft is in their controlled airspace (zero distance from the boundary). If a sector map 
is incorporated into TAP, an estimation of the effect of this delayed approval could be incorporated 
into the outcome computations, though with little practical benefit. Under low workload, most 
controllers replied that they do not mind calling the previous controller and asking permission to 
handle the request early, which is typically granted.  
Time of request before handoff to next center  
Controllers were asked how close they would allow the aircraft to be to its handoff to another 
Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) while still accepting a request, rather than telling the 
pilot to make the request to the next center. The situation is analogous to handoffs to sectors, except 
that the receiving sector controller is located in another facility. During the interviews controllers 
repeatedly stated that, while historically the handoff to another center had been more problematic, 
with the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) the handoff to another center is as simple 
as the handoff to another sector inside their own center. Therefore no accommodation is needed to 
distinguish between sector and center handoffs. 
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Request with additional waypoints 
Controllers were asked how many additional waypoints (beyond a simple “direct” to a 
downstream waypoint) they would accept in a route modification request. The majority of 
controllers responded that under high workload they would accept two additional waypoints or 
four or five additional waypoints under low workload. TAP’s current design of adding at most two 
additional waypoints is therefore acceptable even under high ATC workload. In fact, through the 
interview, most controllers replied that under low workload levels they would not have any 
problem in changing the entire route of a flight. Controllers also replied that the number of 
acceptable waypoints to be added to a route depends on how familiar they are with the waypoints. 
The more familiar they are, the easier it is for them to add these waypoints to the route.  
Request with combined lateral and vertical maneuvers 
Controllers were asked if a route modification request that includes both lateral and vertical 
components is acceptable under different workload conditions. No quantitative data were 
presented in reference [53] for this factor because most controllers answered that the combination 
of lateral and vertical maneuvers does not constitute a problem. TAP’s current design of producing 
combo solutions is therefore acceptable. Sometimes moving to a different altitude could even be 
advantageous for their workload. Some controllers replied that it can only become an issue if the 
altitude part of the request puts the aircraft in a different stratum of airspace. In that case, they have 
to hand the aircraft off to another sector, either above or below them, adding to their workload.  
Request with unfamiliar waypoints  
Controllers were asked if a trajectory change request that includes Class E (low altitude) 
waypoints is acceptable when flying in Class A (en-route) airspace under different workload 
conditions. No quantitative data were presented in reference [53] for this factor because almost all 
the controllers answered that the airspace class is irrelevant as long as the waypoint’s name is in 
the system. Some controllers replied that the familiarity with the waypoints can be an issue. If a 
request includes a waypoint that they are not familiar with, their workload increases because they 
need to search for the waypoint’s location to assess the impact of the route modification. TAP’s 
use of waypoints that are sometimes unfamiliar may occasionally result in a rejected request, as 
was experienced on a couple of occasions in FT-2. 
In summary, the Objective 4 analysis led to the following determinations: Incorporation of a 
sector map into TAP and associated logic to minimize airspace structure factors (e.g., sector 
clipping, handoff impacts) may increase request approval rates under conditions of high controller 
workload, but the challenges of identifying these conditions and the limited availability of relevant 
data sources (e.g., up-to-date sector maps, LOAs) did not warrant implementing these functions in 
TAP during this project. Indeed, all of the controllers interviewed showed an enthusiastic reaction 
to the possibility of pilots being aware of the sector boundaries and accounting for them in making 
their requests. However, it was not determined to be currently practical to implement. It may be 
prudent to put a greater emphasis on integrating TAP with Data Comm, which will facilitate a 
number of the ATC acceptability factors identified here.  
11.2.5. Objective 5: Assess acceptability of TAP advisories to airline pilots 
The purpose of Objective 5 (Objective 4B in reference [52]) was to identify characteristics of 
TAP’s route modification advisories that may impact acceptability to pilots. These characteristics 
included those associated with the complexity and the geometry of the computed solutions. The 
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proximity of solutions to weather or SUA were not included in this assessment primarily because 
of the lack of control of these variables in the flight test. 
The complexity of TAP solutions is characterized by the number of waypoints and whether an 
altitude change is included, as shown in Table 13. Complexity is also dictated by the type and 
familiarity of off-route waypoints. TAP uses common navigation aids like the Very-high-
frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR) and five-letter intersections and fixes found on en-route 
charts, as well as the less common five-character NRS waypoints established on a latitude-
longitude grid. Pilots (and controllers) are generally familiar with the VORs and some intersections 
on routes they frequent, but they may need to phonetically spell out less common waypoints. In 
such situations, the quantity of off-route waypoints may become a limiting factor for acceptability 
in a voice-communications environment. 
Defining the geometry of TAP solutions are several variables dictating the time, distance, or turn 
angle along various legs as shown in Figure 24. Specifically, these include: 
• δm: time or distance from present position to initial turn  
• dm, dc, and dr: time or distance between waypoints 
• ϴ, ϒ, β, α: trajectory turn angles 
Unlike in Manual Mode, TAP’s Auto Mode does not enable the pilot to control the time, 
distance, or turn angle variables directly. Rather, TAP optimal solutions are automatically found 
using any combination of these geometric characteristics within predefined limits. 
To assess these complexity and geometry characteristics, evaluation pilots were given the 
opportunity to evaluate TAP advisories as they naturally occurred during the flights. The planned 
routes were sufficiently sub-optimal that TAP frequently provided solutions. Though the short 
flight lengths, general lack of weather, and non-uniform winds produced few opportunities to 
evaluate the more complex solutions, a sufficient number occurred and enabled feedback from the 
evaluation pilots on solution acceptability. Feedback was provided primarily through in-flight and 
post-flight questionnaires. Detailed results are presented in reference [52]. A general summary of 
findings are presented here. 
Table 13. Complexity characteristics of TAP route modification advisories. 
 
Dimension Advisory Complexity Example Advisory 
Lateral Direct to FMS waypoint only RJOIN 
Lateral One off-route waypoint + FMS rejoin waypoint OFRT1 RJOIN 
Lateral Two off-route waypoints + FMS rejoin waypoint OFRT1 OFRT2 RJOIN 
Vertical Altitude change only FL350 
Combo Altitude change + Direct to FMS waypoint only FL350 RJOIN 
Combo Altitude change + One off-route waypoint + FMS rejoin waypoint FL350 OFRT1 RJOIN 
Combo Altitude change + Two off-route waypoints + FMS rejoin waypoint FL350 OFRT1 OFRT2 RJOIN 
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Pilot feedback indicated that the range of complexity of TAP advisories in Table 13 was 
acceptable for a voice environment but should not increase in complexity until a Data Comm 
environment is available. Most pilots agreed that two off-route waypoints was the maximum that 
TAP should provide, which is consistent with air traffic controller preference for high-workload 
situations (Objective 4 finding). Pilots (like controllers) found combo requests (with both lateral 
and vertical components) to be acceptable, even though it is not common practice to make such 
requests today. The use of common and less common waypoints was also considered acceptable, 
though most pilots recommended against using Class E (low altitude) fixes when flying in Class 
A (high altitude) airspace. 
Pilots found the geometry characteristics of time/distance between waypoints and turn angles to 
be acceptable. Time/distance to the initial turn point was generally acceptable but occasionally too 
small. Their feedback was that the first fix in the solution should be far enough away to allow for 
reasonable decision-making time, ATC communications, and other operational delays. At least 
one actual request in FT-2 did not meet this criteria and had to be modified after a delayed ATC 
response. Comments were also received on TAP’s selection of altitudes, suggesting that pilots be 
allowed to define selectable ranges or a maximum altitude. A maximum altitude control was 
subsequently added to TAP. Pilots also suggested a new capability whereby TAP could generate 
solutions that start at a future point along the FMS route. 
11.2.6. Objective 6: Assess TAP user interface  
The purpose of Objective 6 (Objective 5 in reference [52]) was to assess workload, SA, and 
usability of the TAP user interface (referred to here as the Human Machine Interface, or HMI), as 
hosted on an iPad, during flight operations. The HMI tested in FT-2 (TAP v15-2) was essentially 
the same as that tested in HITL-2 (TAP v14-1), shown in Figure 15 (p63). However in addition to 
testing this landscape orientation of the HMI design, a portrait orientation (Figure 25) was 
implemented and tested as well in FT-2. The reason for two orientations was to accommodate the 
preferences of airline pilots that would use TAP in the upcoming airline operational evaluation. 
Pilots have the choice of landscape or portrait orientation when mounting their EFB interface 
(iPad) in the cockpit. Since switching between TAP and other EFB applications was expected to 
occur frequently in flight, a portrait mode option was added to accommodate pilots with that 
preference and to avoid the need for physically reorienting the hardware during flight. The TAP 
Figure 24. Geometry characteristics of TAP solutions. 
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Display software was developed to automatically switch between landscape and portrait according 
to the device’s internal orientation sensor.  
Before departure on the test flights, the evaluation pilots were provided training consisting of a 
Flight Operations Bulletin (FOB) and a CBT module. The FOB contained a detailed description 
of the TAP software application, general information about how TAP works, and instructions 
regarding the operation of TAP. The CBT (Figure 16, p64) was a 30-minute interactive, stand-
alone training module administered on an iPad. The CBT included voice-over narration 
demonstrating each of the features and functions of the TAP HMI.  
Once airborne and shortly after the aircraft passed 10,000 feet where TAP becomes operational, 
the evaluation pilots began their interaction with the TAP HMI according to a set of predefined 
tasks enabling them to interact with each of the HMI features. This procedure enabled the 
evaluation pilots to comprehensively familiarize themselves with the TAP HMI in an operational 
flight environment before performing a formal evaluation approximately one hour into the flight. 
In-flight questionnaires included the Bedford Workload Scale, the Situation Awareness Rating 
Technique (SART), and the System Usability Scale (SUS). Post-flight questionnaires included the 
Bedford Workload Scale, the SART, and the TAP HMI evaluation. References [52] and [54] 
contain descriptions and references for these subjective measures along with complete findings of 
the Objective 6 analysis. Selected results are provided below. 
The Bedford Workload Scale ratings were analyzed to measure perceived pilot workload in 
performing tasks with the TAP HMI. As depicted in Figure 26(a), the evaluation pilots reported 
their cognitive workload as low (M = 2.64, SD = 0.84) in terms of the Bedford scale of 1–10, with 
Figure 25. TAP v15-2 user interface tested in FT-2, shown in portrait mode. 
(a) Auto Mode screen. (b) Manual Mode screen. 
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a rating of 1 indicating insignificant 
workload and a rating of 10 indicating a 
very high level of workload and task 
abandonment. A median of 3 indicates that 
interaction with the TAP HMI during FT-2 
did not create a significant level of 
workload and that most pilots had spare 
capacity and completed their tasks 
satisfactorily. 
The calculated scores from the SART 
were analyzed to measure perceived SA in 
performing tasks with the TAP HMI. As 
depicted in Figure 26(b), the evaluation 
pilots reported mid-range SA scores (M = 
7.93, SD = 2.95) in terms of SART scoring 
(1–14), indicating a nominal level of 
situation awareness with the TAP HMI 
present during FT-2. 
The SUS yields a single calculated score 
representing a composite measure of the 
overall usability of the system being 
evaluated. As depicted in Figure 26(c), the 
evaluation pilots provided high usability 
ratings for the TAP HMI (M = 80.0, SD = 
14.33) in terms of SUS scoring, indicating 
a high degree of perceived usability of the 
interface used during FT-2. 
The post-flight questionnaire consisted of 
five-point rating scales regarding overall 
comprehension, usefulness, and usability of 
the TAP HMI as well as questions about 
specific display features. The overall 
ratings for each of the three display screens 
(Startup Checklist Screen, Auto Mode 
Screen, and Manual Mode Screen) are 
shown in Figure 27. For all three categories, 
5 was the most positive rating and 1 was the 
most negative rating. The overall ratings 
were generally very high. Specifically for 
the Startup Checklist and Auto Mode 
Screens, the pilots reported that the 
comprehension of the display screens was 
either Easy or Very Easy (M = 4.43, 4.79; 
SD = 0.76, 0.43, respectively). The Manual 
Mode Screen was found to be slightly less 
Figure 26. FT-2 pilot subjective ratings of using TAP. 
From ref. [54]. 
(a) Workload. 
(b) Situation awareness. 
(c) System usability. 
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comprehensible (M = 3.86, SD = 0.86), with 
43 percent of pilots reporting that 
comprehension was Somewhat Easy. All 
three display screens were found to be either 
Useful or Very Useful, and either Usable or 
Very Usable.  
Pilot ratings of individual display features 
were generally high. Mean ratings were 
above 4.0 for nearly all display features 
except three features rated as either Not 
Useful or Somewhat Useful: cruise settings, 
data feeds menu, and ATC response buttons. 
The data feeds menu provides information 
on the status of external data (winds, 
weather, and SUA), and the ATC response buttons have no operational function and were included 
only to aid post-flight data analysis. The concern was the cruise settings rating. These settings 
(cruise altitude and cruise speed) are important inputs that depend on pilots keeping them up to 
date with settings in the FMS (which were not automatically transmitted to TAP in the test aircraft). 
Incorrect values could significantly affect TAP’s computation of time and fuel outcomes and 
therefore pilot decisions about TAP advisories. The issue would emerge again in the operational 
evaluation with Alaska Airlines, for which cruise settings were also not automatically available 
from the FMS, prompting the development of an automated altitude and speed tracking algorithm. 
In summary for Objective 6, the evaluation pilots reported their cognitive workload as low, 
indicating that interaction with the TAP HMI did not create a significant level of workload and 
that most pilots were able to complete their tasks satisfactorily. The evaluation pilots rated the 
TAP HMI as having a high degree of usability. A nominal level of SA was indicated with the TAP 
HMI. However, when asked about SA on the post-flight questionnaire, the pilots indicated that 
TAP enhanced their SA in the cockpit. Overall ratings of comprehension, usefulness, and usability 
of the HMI display screens and display features were generally high. As a result of this analysis, 
no significant HMI changes were deemed necessary prior to the deployment to Alaska Airlines for 
the operational evaluation. As will be described, some changes were made during that evaluation, 
particularly in the area of weather data depiction, which was not yet fully developed by the time 
of FT-2. 
11.2.7. Objective 7: Assess effect of TAP on flight crews and CRM 
The purpose of Objective 7 (Objective 6 in reference [52]) was to gather insights and develop 
recommendations on the use of TAP by a two-person flight crew. Coordination between flight 
crew members, commonly referred to as Crew Resource Management, is important to maintaining 
an effective distribution of tasks and workload while ensuring common SA between the crew 
members. Some cockpit systems are designed to display synchronized information on multiple 
displays, which aids CRM. As a research prototype, TAP was developed with only a single display. 
Since the EFBs are typically mounted near each pilot’s side window, viewing a TAP display from 
across the cockpit would be difficult and thereby complicate coordination. An alternative is to have 
two instances of TAP running, one on each pilot’s EFB. However, since the prototype software 
supports only one display, the two instances would have unsynchronized data, even though they 
Figure 27. FT-2 ratings of the three primary TAP 
Display screens. From ref. [54]. 
COMPREHENSION      USEFULNESS        USABILITY 
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share the same inputs. Thus, in preparation for the airline operational evaluations, a study of the 
CRM aspects of TAP usage was included in FT-2. 
The 12 evaluation flights in FT-2 were conducted as single-pilot operations, made possible by 
the Piaggio Avanti being certified for such operations. The safety pilot in the left seat was formally 
responsible for all cockpit duties, even though some duties were delegated to the evaluation pilot 
in the right seat to simulate PM workload. However, a CRM evaluation could not be properly 
conducted in this environment because the two pilots were not formally trained to a set of Avanti 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), and no evaluation pilots were Avanti qualified.  
In an alternate approach, TAP usage was evaluated in an airline-representative two-crew CRM 
environment using two type-certified Piaggio Avanti captains, using the same SOPs and CRM 
practices that are employed for public transport flights in the Avanti. The CRM evaluations were 
conducted during the two positioning flights between the aircraft’s Montreal home base (CYUL) 
and KPHF. The majority of data were collected during the southbound flight. Limitations in the 
number and type of Canadian airspace fixes in TAP’s ARINC 424 database caused operational 
issues during the northbound flight to Montreal. This was not a problem during the southbound 
flight because TAP was not used operationally before entry into U.S. airspace, and a full set of 
fixes were available to the software at that time. On the northbound leg, many of the vital “look 
ahead” fixes, including the destination airport, lay in Canadian airspace, for which there was 
limited database coverage. 
A build-up approach was used to explore all major TAP operational functionality, under every 
permutation of Manual/Auto Modes and PF/PM operations, as shown in Table 14. Various 
subjective evaluations of workload, CRM effectiveness, SA, Multi-Function Display (MFD) and 
cross-checking acceptability were performed. TAP procedure timing was also objectively 
measured. Apart from TAP usage, PM duties included the following: cross-check autopilot modes, 
program the FMS, cross-check altitudes, make radio calls, read checklists, confirm pilot checklist 
items, and perform copilot checklist items. PF duties included the following: control autopilot; 
cross-check FMS entry; enter altitude pre-selector values; perform pilot checklist items and 
confirm copilot checklist items. Either or both operators may operate the radar and MFD as needed. 
Table 14. TAP CRM configurations evaluated in FT-2. 
 
Test 
# 
TAP Operator TAP Modes Evaluations 
1 PM only Manual Mode Workload, SA, and MFD  
2 PM only Auto Mode Workload, CRM, SA, and timing  
3 PF (secondary) 
PM (primary) 
Manual and 
Auto Modes 
Workload, CRM, SA and timing 
4 PF (primary) 
PM (secondary) 
Manual and 
Auto Modes 
Workload, CRM, SA and timing  
5 PF only Auto Mode  Workload, CRM, SA, timing, and MFD  
6 PF only Manual Mode Workload, CRM, SA, timing, and MFD  
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A combination of in-flight and post-flight subjective data were obtained for each CRM mission. 
Detailed results are presented in reference [52]. Primary conclusions are presented below. 
In summary, the CRM evaluation demonstrated the utility and usability of TAP for two-crew 
CRM and SOP operations. Almost all combinations of single-pilot TAP operations subjectively 
reduced crew workload and optimization planning / execution times relative to the crew’s frequent 
operating experience without TAP. Conversely, dual independent TAP operations created 
difficulties in attempting to synchronize the two sides of the cockpit, which adversely impacted 
CRM. Both the PF and PM stressed the need to be able to synchronize to a single solution in these 
circumstances. Although individual control of display settings, such as layers and scale factors, 
was deemed desirable, neither pilot saw any benefit in having independent and differing Auto 
Mode solutions. In fact, this decreased confidence in the system, increased workload, and reduced 
SA relative to single-pilot TAP operations. An important mitigation for this phenomenon would 
be to develop TAP SOPs whereby crews become accustomed to calling out the TAP mode, display 
range, and optimization limit, while coordinating solutions across the cockpit. This is identical to 
existing SOPs for coordinating FMS and autopilot/flight director mode changes. The far more 
preferable solution, however, would be to implement a bi-direction cross-fill/synchronization 
capability between the displays, similar to current FMS implementations.  
Subsequent to FT-2, and as a result of these CRM recommendations, a design effort was initiated 
to develop TAP to support two TAP Displays, using a master-slave approach. Since project 
resources were not available to implement the design, the CRM findings were communicated to 
Alaska Airlines with the recommendation to use only a single instance of TAP on flights in the 
operational evaluation (a recommendation generally followed).  
11.3. TASAR Flight Trial 3 
One element of TAP functionality not fully developed or evaluated in FT-2 was the handling of 
weather data. The one element of weather data included in FT-2 as a proof of concept was 
convective SIGMET polygons as received from WSI (Alaska Airlines’ approved commercial 
weather provider). FT-2 verified that weather polygons from a third-party weather data provider 
could be received in flight and displayed in TAP. However, the convective SIGMETs published 
during FT-2 flights happened to be positioned on the far side of the destination airports and 
therefore were untestable with TAP’s conflict detection and route optimization algorithms. More 
critically, a significant gap remained in TAP’s external data sources for weather, as no commercial 
or government weather data providers offered the polygon products (apart from SIGMETs) that 
TAP would need for representing current and forecast convective weather constraints. These 
products would be derived from radar reflectivity data or models covering the next two hours of 
flight. They would be a higher fidelity representation of the weather than SIGMETs and critical to 
include in the upcoming airline operational evaluations, given the significant interactions expected 
between route optimization and weather constraints on the airline flights. It became clear that 
NASA would need to provide a temporary data source for convective weather polygons for the 
operational evaluation, which later could be replaced by commercial products for regular 
operational use. NASA’s implementation of convective weather polygons, implemented through 
an enhancement to the functionality of the Ground Data Server (GDS), is described in reference 
[45].  
While the inclusion of GDS weather polygons filled this critical need, there was a concern that 
the ground-based weather products alone may be insufficient. Airline pilots are responsible for 
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keeping their aircraft clear of weather hazards, and the principal tool they use is onboard weather 
radar. While TAP is not a weather avoidance tool, it is intended to provide route optimization 
advisories that flight crews will find operationally acceptable, and weather compatibility is one 
key aspect of flight crew acceptability. This raised a concern that TAP route modification 
advisories might be unacceptable in the vicinity of convective weather if airborne weather radar 
data were not included in the advisory generation.  
Given these weather data issues, a third TASAR flight trial was planned focusing on integration, 
display, and use of weather data in TAP. FT-3 would be conducted prior to and concurrent with 
the airline operational evaluation. It would study the operational implications of each weather data 
source (e.g., ground, airborne, current, forecast) and assess various designs for their integration. 
These weather integration designs would address algorithmic integration as well as presentation 
and user interaction. Considerations would include appropriate look-ahead times, blending or 
overlay of weather data from disparate sources, and depicting 4D weather information on a two-
dimensional (2D) display.  
To conduct FT-3 with greater research flexibility over an extended testing period than was 
possible with the Piaggio Avanti, a NASA flight-test aircraft (HU-25A Guardian operating as 
“NASA 524” and shown in Figure 28) was selected and outfitted for TASAR flight testing. The 
role of the HU-25A in the larger suite of TAP software test facilities is described in reference [55], 
and the specific implementation and execution of TAP flight-testing in the HU-25A is described 
in reference [56]. Due to changes in programmatic funding and priorities, FT-3 was not completed 
as planned. However a number of key accomplishments were achieved and are noted in the 
following sections.  
11.3.1. Ground-based Convective Weather Data 
TAP’s optimization algorithms are designed to generate route modifications that are free of 
conflicts with a variety of hazard areas described by 4D polygons, including SUAs and convective 
weather. Each polygon is a prism described by a lateral shape that is extruded from the ground up 
to a given ceiling altitude. Its time of validity is defined as an interval bounded by specified 
activation and expiration times. A trajectory is considered to be in conflict with a 4D polygon if 
the aircraft is predicted to be within the polygon volume at any point during its time of validity. 
TAP filters the candidate trajectories it generates to ensure that the reroute advisories shown to the 
aircrew are free of conflicts with the current set of 4D polygons. 
Figure 28. NASA HU-25A Guardian flight test aircraft used in FT-3. From ref. [56]. 
Flight Trials 
102 
 
While TAP downloads wind and temperature 
data directly from the NOAA website via the 
aircraft’s airborne internet connection, it relies on 
a ground-based processor known as the Ground 
Data Server (GDS) to provide 4D weather 
polygons generated based on other ground-based 
data sources. Developed by NASA for this project, 
the GDS served as a post-processor of the data 
obtained from a commercial weather service 
provider, in this case The Weather Company 
(formerly WSI), and provided it in suitable 
polygon format to the EDS running onboard the 
aircraft, via the internet. Details of GDS polygon 
generation are presented in reference [45]. 
Examples of current and 15-minute-forecast 
convective weather polygons generated by GDS are shown in Figure 29. 
A weather implementation issue studied in FT-3 was the application of lateral buffers to the 
convective weather polygons. TAP assumes that the polygons already contain any operationally-
required buffer, as it does not add any additional spacing between candidate route modifications 
and the polygons. Initial FT-3 test flights were conducted with 20 nmi buffers, consistent with 
typical operational buffers applied by pilots in weather avoidance. The flight tests showed that 
non-discriminating application of the 20 nmi buffer was operationally unrealistic, greatly reducing 
TAP’s utility in the context of decision-making flexibility typically applied by pilots in weather 
avoidance. Alaska Airlines recommended the lateral buffers be reduced to 5 nmi, leaving pilots to 
apply standard operating procedures for weather avoidance, as they do already with route selection 
using airborne weather radar. Subsequent flights using the TAP software on both the HU-25A and 
on Alaska Airlines’ aircraft offered confirmation that the 5 nmi lateral buffer, in conjunction with 
the aircrew maintaining separation from the weather, provides a safe and realistic mechanism for 
optimizing flights near convective weather. 
11.3.2. Airborne Convective Weather Data 
To address the concern that TAP’s use of only ground data sources for convective weather data 
may produce unacceptable route modifications, an activity was initiated in FT-3 to develop and 
evaluate a prototype implementation in TAP of polygons derived from an airborne weather radar 
system. The objective was to determine guidelines for integrating airborne and ground-based 
weather data into TAP, exploring the issue from both the algorithmic and user interface 
perspectives. To conduct the research, a prototype “airborne weather radar processor” (AWRP) 
was developed that converted radar imagery (received from a radar display bus in ARINC 708 
format) into simplified polygons. The polygons were then supplied to TAP as a separate input 
from ground-based weather polygons. Details of the AWRP implementation are described in 
reference [45]. Example AWRP polygons are shown in Figure 30.  
Though a change in project funding and priorities precluded flight-testing the integrated 
capability, issues were identified that would need to be addressed in an operational 
implementation. For example, some airborne weather radar systems produce imagery that is highly 
dependent on manual tilt and gain settings, making TAP’s behavior inherently reliant on the pilot’s 
Figure 29. GDS convective weather polygons.  
Base image from Google EarthTM. 
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interaction with the radar. Newer multi-scanning radar systems overcome this limitation but are 
not typically designed to export the volumetric models of the convective activity to external 
applications. Issues of range and attenuation are also expected to be significant factors in designing 
an effective integration of airborne and ground-based weather data in TAP.  
11.3.3. Integration of Weather Data into the TAP HMI 
In contrast to state-of-the-art weather information display applications that typically present 
dozens of weather products overlaid on a map of the geographic region of interest, the design goal 
of the TAP HMI was to present only enough contextual information to the pilot to enhance 
understanding and trust in TAP’s recommended route modifications. Though the result was a 
generally “minimalist” display design, it was rated highly in FT-2 for comprehension, usefulness, 
and usability [54]. However, FT-2 did not include much weather information for the assessment, 
and therefore, FT-3 was planned in order to fill this assessment gap. Discussion of TAP HMI 
design changes to accommodate the depiction and interaction with weather information is 
presented in reference [45]. 
One significant HMI design element emerging from FT-3 prototyping and evaluation was a new 
“time slider” control to depict 4D weather information on a 2D display. The fundamental human 
factors challenge was to overcome how the user perceives the polygons on the display, even if the 
polygons representing different weather types (e.g., current and forecast weather) are drawn 
differently. When current and forecast polygons appear on the display at the same time next to the 
route information, the user is likely to immediately perceive them all as “now.” So if a TAP-
generated trajectory is drawn through a forecast weather polygon without indicating a conflict, it 
can be confusing to the user because it is not intuitive that the polygon is representing weather that 
will not be relevant to the trajectory when the aircraft arrives at that point in time. 
A reasonable solution was developed and tested in FT-3 by incorporating a functional tool (i.e., 
the time slider) that allowed the pilot to select increments of time to be displayed as opposed to 
displaying all of the weather polygons simultaneously. Using the time slider tool, the pilot can 
select different advances in time to view the respective weather polygons on the display, with a 
circular icon appearing on the TAP-generated route modification corresponding to approximately 
Figure 30. Airborne weather radar data and polygons generated by AWRP. From ref. [45]. 
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where the aircraft would be at that time. Figure 31(a) illustrates the time slider (square icon in 
bottom right of display) with the current time selected, and Figure 31(b) with one hour in the future 
selected. Notice the circular aircraft icon on the trajectory appears in the one hour forecast, and the 
avoidance polygons change location and size based on that particular forecast. 
11.3.4. Semi-Automating the TAP Cruise Altitude and Speed Settings 
The final accomplishment of FT-3 testing noted in this report is unrelated to weather data but 
highlights the general utility that NASA flight testing provided in identifying and resolving TAP 
implementation issues relevant to the airline operational evaluation. This case study, documented 
in reference [55], examined the design and development of algorithms to track and automatically 
set the cruise altitude and cruise speed parameters in the TAP Display (see Figure 25, p96). These 
parameters are used by TAP TG to predict the current trajectory and compute route modification 
solutions. The values typically change in flight but would not be automatically available to the 
TAP software via the ARINC 834 STAP feed in the Alaska Airlines implementation. Therefore, 
the flight crew would have to manually update the cruise altitude and cruise speed settings on the 
TAP Display anytime those parameters changed. Incorrect settings for either cruise altitude or 
cruise speed lead to inaccurate predictions of fuel and time outcomes, thus causing inaccurate and 
imprecise optimization solutions. Furthermore, feedback from Alaska Airlines tech pilots during 
flight-testing on the HU-25A indicated the pilot’s workload due to maintaining the TAP cruise 
altitude and speed settings would be unacceptable in an operational evaluation. 
To address these concerns, two algorithms were designed, implemented, and tested to allow the 
TAP Display to automatically track, infer, and set the cruise parameters – one for the cruise altitude 
and one for the cruise speed – based on the pilot’s initial settings of these parameters and the 
aircraft behavior as sensed through aircraft state data. Each of these algorithms operate in a 
continuous loop once the aircraft is above a configurable altitude. 
Figure 31. TAP v15-2 map display with time slider. From ref. [45]. 
(a) TAP Display showing nowcast polygons. (b) TAP Display showing 60-minute forecast polygons. 
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Initial laboratory tests were structured to identify gaps in the logic and set baseline parameters 
used to tune the algorithms. Subsequent testing in the HU-25A centered on identifying operational 
issues with the implementation of the logic, such as precision errors in cruise setting calculations 
or undesired trends during aircraft maneuvers. In one example occurring during the climb to the 
initial cruise altitude, a logic error in the automation inadvertently caused the cruise altitude setting 
in the TAP software to descend from the user initial setting in 1000-foot increments until it 
matched the aircraft’s barometric altitude while it was still climbing. This undesired behavior also 
manifested during step climbs or descents at cruise altitude, especially if the altitude change was 
greater than 4,000 feet. The logic was modified to prevent the algorithm from changing the cruise 
altitude setting in cases where the barometric altitude was converging towards the target cruise 
altitude. 
During a subsequent flight on the HU-25A, a second logic gap was identified in the updated 
version of the cruise altitude algorithm. On that particular flight, the aircraft was instructed to level 
off after takeoff at 4,000 feet for approximately 3 minutes before climbing to the desired cruise 
altitude of FL300. Due to the duration of the intermediate level off, the cruise altitude algorithm 
correctly inferred that the aircraft was in a steady-state error condition (i.e., the cruise altitude 
setting in TAP was FL300 while the aircraft was steady and level at 4,000 feet) and modified the 
cruise altitude setting in TAP accordingly to 4,000 feet. The algorithm performed as designed; 
however, from an operational perspective, the behavior was not desired. The logic was modified 
to include a check to determine if the barometric altitude of the aircraft was greater than a 
configurable minimum cruise altitude parameter before the algorithms would begin to operate. The 
altitude parameter was set to FL300 for the Alaska Airlines operational evaluation. 
After the final version of the cruise altitude and cruise speed algorithms were implemented and 
tested, they were delivered to Alaska Airlines. The tech pilots who initially raised a concern 
regarding a potential increase to the pilot’s workload due to the manual entry of the cruise settings 
in TAP were able to exercise the revised software during the Alaska Airlines operational 
evaluation. They provided positive feedback that the new functionality was acceptable and 
corrected the deficiency; that is, the correct cruise settings only had to be set once which resolved 
the workload concern and reduced a potential source of pilot error. In addition to correcting the 
deficiency, the tech pilots felt the revised algorithm increased confidence in the calculated fuel and 
time savings since the trajectory predictions now used the correct aircraft cruise altitude and speed 
values. 
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12. Operational Evaluation  
The capstone activity of the NASA TASAR project was an operational evaluation in airline 
revenue service. Completing such a visible evaluation was essential for TASAR to fulfill its near-
term goal of transferring technology to industry to enhance flight efficiency for today’s airspace 
users, while also laying the groundwork for its long-term goal of enabling operational autonomy 
for future airspace users. The outreach activities described in Chapter 8 were highly effective at 
generating significant community awareness and interest in TASAR. However, getting the 
industry to actually adopt TASAR requires breaking down significant barriers. NASA needed to 
eliminate risks to airlines and industry by proving the technology could indeed be deployed in an 
airline operational environment and that it produces sufficient cost savings to warrant the expense 
of its adoption. As a consequence, NASA itself incurred risks because no guarantee existed at the 
outset that the technology deployment would succeed or that sufficient cost savings would be 
demonstrated. However these risks were substantially mitigated by the broad-based risk-reduction 
Research and Development (R&D) activities described throughout this report and communicated 
to the community in conference publications in 2013, “Developing an Onboard Traffic-Aware 
Flight Optimization Capability for Near-Term Low-Cost Implementation” [57], and in 2015, 
“Achieving TASAR Operational Readiness” [58]. Indeed, these publications gave evidence that 
NASA did its homework in preparing TASAR for industry adoption. 
Conducting an airline operational evaluation required securing a partner airline. As described in 
Chapter 8, community outreach activities successfully generated interest in TASAR at multiple 
airlines. Among these activities, airlines were invited to participate in the first TASAR flight trial, 
giving them first-hand experience with the prototype technology in a live flight environment. 
Several airlines left the flight trial with concrete interest in TASAR, but two responded 
affirmatively to NASA’s proposal to conduct an operational evaluation. Subsequently in 2015, 
NASA executed SAAs with the two airlines, Virgin America and Alaska Airlines, to conduct the 
evaluations using their commercial transport aircraft. These were non-reimbursable agreements, 
meaning no funds would be exchanged, and each side would fund their side of the partnership. 
This by itself was a significant accomplishment. For two airlines to decide to invest their scarce 
discretionary resources in an operational evaluation of new NASA technology signified the 
technology’s true relevance in the industry and their confidence in NASA to deliver as a partner. 
And from NASA’s perspective, a self-funded partnership eclipses a contract relationship as a 
measure of strategic engagement with industry in accomplishing NASA’s mission of technology 
transfer. For TASAR to generate two such self-funded partnerships clearly underscored that this 
NASA innovation was achieving the coveted industry “pull” needed to achieve NASA’s mission 
of technology transfer. 
12.1. NASA and Partner Airline Objectives  
As stated above, NASA sought to eliminate risks and barriers for airlines and commercial 
vendors to widely adopt TASAR technology. Since no new industry standards were required to 
implement TASAR, proving the technology in actual airline operations stood out as the most 
effective means of establishing its viability in a significant aviation market. Having these two 
airlines volunteer for the activity was particularly fortuitous. Virgin America exclusively operated 
the Airbus A320 family of aircraft, while Alaska Airlines exclusively operated the Boeing 737 
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family. Together, these aircraft types dominate the single-aisle commercial transport category of 
aircraft in the U.S. and much of the world. Furthermore, the two airlines also employed different 
EFB architectures. Virgin America was in the process of upgrading to the Astronautics NexusTM 
Class 3 EFB, representing a consolidated architecture, whereas Alaska Airlines had standardized 
on the iPad and would connect it as a Class 2 EFB in a distributed architecture. Working with both 
airlines would enable NASA to solve implementation issues of both aircraft types and both EFB 
architectures, thereby reducing adoption risks even further for the industry. 
In addition to working through the technical issues, NASA also had the objective of validating 
the estimated cost-saving benefits of TASAR. Chapter 5 summarized the method and findings of 
a benefits estimation analysis that was conducted using a representative model of TASAR in a 
simulation environment. It was these estimates, performed specifically for the partner airlines, that 
the airlines used to gain internal financial approval to partner with NASA to conduct the 
operational evaluations. The estimated savings for each airline was the same: about $5 million per 
year. It would be up to the airlines to determine whether the savings were sufficient to build a fleet-
wide business case, but it was up to NASA to validate the savings potential of TASAR. An 
operational evaluation would provide that opportunity. 
For the two airlines, the primary objectives of the partnerships were straightforward: evaluate 
TASAR through a limited trial, assess its utility in normal operations, and acquire sufficient 
evidence of cost savings to build a business case to equip their entire fleets. This represents the 
normal method for airlines to evaluate new technologies, though they are highly selective of the 
technologies they evaluate given the high cost and limited discretionary budget typically available. 
In the case of TASAR, both airlines also recognized its game-changing potential and long-term 
benefits achievable by expanding its functionality and integrating it with existing and emerging 
technologies. Both airlines had well-established reputations as technology-centric airlines, 
especially Alaska Airlines who pioneered Required Navigation Performance (RNP) approaches 
and was the first major domestic airline to use the iPad to replace paper manuals. Seeing the 
potential of TASAR to truly revolutionize aircraft operations, Alaska Airlines wanted to lead the 
industry here as well, not only by being first but by encouraging the rest of the industry to follow. 
To that end, they spoke publically on many occasions through industry forums and press releases 
about TASAR, about their ongoing evaluation, and about the future they saw for the technology. 
12.2. Airline Merger 
Since Alaska Airlines was ready prior to Virgin America, its operational evaluation was the first 
focus for NASA. The kickoff meeting for Alaska Airlines was held September 22, 2015, and the 
corresponding meeting for Virgin America was held June 9, 2016. Subsequently Alaska Airlines 
announced it would acquire Virgin America in a merger. Shareholders approved the merger in July 
2016, and the merger was completed in December 2016. Alaska Airlines confirmed it would only 
have resources to conduct the TASAR evaluation on one of their two fleets. Fortunately, NASA 
and Virgin America had expended only limited effort by this point on plans for implementation on 
the A320. Given the significant progress already made on the Boeing 737 implementation, it was 
mutually agreed to terminate the Virgin America SAA and A320 evaluation plans. The decision 
was also influenced by NASA ATD Project’s change in priorities toward air/ground integration. 
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12.3. Approach 
The plan for the Alaska Airlines operational evaluation would be to conduct TASAR operations 
on several aircraft in revenue service for a data collection period of approximately one year. This 
duration was deemed necessary to collect sufficient data for statistical analysis and to capture 
seasonal variations in winds and weather. The approach as executed is summarized in the 
remaining sections, including the areas of government/industry teaming, aircraft equipage, system 
testing, TAP Operator training, flight conduct, and data analysis. Further details of the approach 
are provided in references [59]–[61]. 
12.4. Building the Government/Industry Team 
Achieving the first operational TASAR flight on Alaska Airlines aircraft required an extensive, 
multi-disciplinary collaboration. Organizations and individuals contributing to this achievement 
included: 
• NASA research, legal, licensing, software release, and airworthiness review offices 
• NASA-contracted software developers, testers, and analysts 
• Industry hardware, software, and certification specialists 
• Government regulatory organizations 
• Airline departments including flight operations, avionics engineering, aircraft maintenance, 
cabin systems engineering, mobile technology, crew training, regulatory compliance 
management, and flight dispatch 
The extensive coordination required to ensure all disciplines were adequately engaged and had 
their requirements met in the proper sequence highlights the complexity of installing research 
software on a commercial aircraft. With little to no ability to modify software or hardware after 
installation, all elements of the project required careful planning and execution.  
The SAA defined the basic objectives and responsibilities of the collaboration:  
1. NASA to adapt TAP software for compatibility with Alaska Airlines’ trial aircraft 
2. Alaska Airlines to install EFB hardware, data connections, and TAP software 
3. Alaska Airlines to acquire FAA operational approval to operate TAP software 
4. Alaska Airlines to conduct evaluation flights in revenue service for up to one year 
5. NASA to analyze data for operational benefits from using TAP  
6. NASA to update TAP software based on interim findings  
To achieve these objectives, NASA and Alaska Airlines assembled the multi-organizational 
team shown in Figure 32. With leadership jointly provided by NASA and Alaska Airlines TASAR 
project leads, the team pooled together a diverse set of expertise. NASA researchers and 
contractors contributed expertise in the TAP software code and its capabilities, adapting it to new 
aircraft environments, software testing, and data analysis to confirm proper operation and realized 
benefits. Alaska Airlines Avionics Engineering contributed expertise in hardware integration, 
software loading, and avionics regulatory compliance management.  
NASA supporting organizations contributed expertise in systems engineering, legal agreements, 
software release processes, and Agency-required reviews and approvals (e.g., Institutional Review 
Board, Airworthiness and Safety Review Board). Alaska Airlines internal organizations 
contributed expertise in flight dispatch, mobile information technology (IT), flight operations 
regulatory compliance management, aircraft performance, fuel efficiency, and crew training.  
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Alaska Airlines arranged for three leading 
aircraft system suppliers to contribute to the 
project. UTAS (later Collins Aerospace), Gogo, 
and ACSS each contributed expertise in their 
hardware platforms, software integration and 
testing, software quality assurance and 
packaging, IT integration and security, and 
aircraft and technology certification. Each of 
these industry partners played a crucial role in 
the success of the project, working 
cooperatively with each other and the 
NASA/Alaska Airlines teams through frequent 
meetings and periodic integration testing in 
laboratories and onboard the aircraft.  
12.5. Equipping the TASAR Fleet 
While 10 aircraft were initially proposed to maximize the collection of benefits data, Alaska 
Airlines leadership approved three aircraft to conduct the evaluation. All three aircraft would be 
Boeing 737-900ER, the aircraft type typically used on transcontinental flights where the largest 
TASAR benefits were expected, and all three would be new deliveries from Boeing.i  
To achieve full TASAR capability, the three aircraft underwent the following system 
modifications, shown in Figure 33: 
• Installation of one UTAS AID2 and two UTAS TIMs with connectivity to two iPads 
• Connectivity of UTAS AID2 to Gogo Airborne Control Processing Unit (ACPU2) 
• Upgrade of ACSS TCAS 3000SP to ADS-B In with auxiliary DTIF output, and subsequent 
connectivity to the UTAS AID2 
• Installation of TAP software on the AID2, ACPU2, TIMs, and iPadsii 
To reduce project risk, a system architecture was designed wherein two instances of TAP were 
installed on each aircraft, one for the Captain (or left seat) and one for the First Officer (or right 
seat), though either system could be operated from either seat. The Captain’s TAP Engine would 
run on the Gogo ACPU2, and the First Officer’s TAP Engine would run on the UTAS AID2. This 
approach reduced the risk that one or the other processor would be insufficient for running TAP, 
though both proved to be sufficient. Based on recommendations from FT-2, generally only one 
TAP would be operated on a given flight.  
12.6. Adapting TAP for the Alaska Airlines B737-900ER 
Adapting TAP to a particular aircraft requires several things to be addressed: (1) mapping TAP’s 
inputs to the appropriate data sources of the onboard avionics and internet sites, (2) installing 
aircraft performance data from which TAP can model the aircraft behavior for accurate trajectory 
                                                 
i The Alaska Airlines TASAR fleet for the operational evaluation were aircraft N267AK, N270AK, and N272AK, 
delivered in January, March, and April of 2017, respectively. 
ii iPads are portable equipment and not considered installed hardware on the aircraft. Installation of the TAP Display 
app on the iPads was managed by Alaska Airlines Flight Operations, whereas the remaining TAP component 
installations on installed hardware were managed by UTAS, Gogo, and Alaska Airlines Avionics Engineering. 
Figure 32. Multi-organizational team for the 
TASAR operational evaluation. From ref. [60]. 
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prediction, and (3) verifying or adapting the hosting hardware to support the TAP software 
application (e.g., operating system, processor speed, memory footprint, partitioning). Since none 
of these adaptations are standard for all aircraft, each installation of TAP in a new aircraft 
environment requires some level of adaptation to that environment and/or by that environment. 
For the Alaska Airlines deployment, UTAS, Gogo, and the NASA team worked together to adapt 
TAP and the hosting hardware for mutual compatibility, enabling TAP to compile, run, support 
inter-process communications, and be protected on the hardware. In addition, the NASA team 
devised a new “TAP Services” architecture to facilitate installation and remote execution of TAP 
software components on otherwise inaccessible devices onboard the airliner. 
12.6.1. Avionics Data Mapping 
TAP’s primary sources of input data are onboard avionics, from which TAP derives the current 
state of the aircraft (e.g., position, heading, altitude, speed, weight). The AID2 was wired to 
ARINC 429 output busses of appropriate avionics systems, allowing it to provide the avionics data 
to TAP via an ARINC 834 server in STAP format. TAP uses these data to monitor the aircraft’s 
autoflight system settings, to model the aircraft’s state, and to predict future 4D positions and fuel 
states along the FMS active route and TAP-generated candidate reroutes. Alaska Airlines’ B737-
900ER aircraft hosted a GE Aviation FMS that provided multiple ARINC 429 output busses 
containing much of the data TAP required. 
TAP contains an avionics data map that identifies which data elements are available on which 
port and from which “equipment code” (i.e., avionics device). The mapping can differ from one 
aircraft implementation to the next, but within a given aircraft-type fleet at an airline, the mapping 
is typically the same for all the aircraft of that fleet. This was the case for Alaska Airlines’ three 
Figure 33. System architecture for the Alaska Airlines operational evaluation. From ref. [60]. 
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B737-900ER aircraft assigned to the trial, and so the same TAP software configuration was 
installed on all three aircraft, greatly simplifying configuration management for Alaska Airlines 
Avionics Engineering. At the time of TAP software deployment for this project, TAP was capable 
of reading data only in ARINC 429 format, but subsequently the capability of reading ARINC 717 
data formats was added, increasing the availability of data for future adaptations via the aircraft’s 
digital flight data acquisition unit. 
A challenge identified during an on-aircraft test at Alaska Airlines’ maintenance facility at 
KSEA was that the wiring design did not include connecting the AID2 to the Air Data Computer 
(ADC) as intended. The ADC was expected to provide certain key data parameters to TAP, 
including altitude, Mach, calibrated airspeed, true airspeed, altitude rate, and static air temperature. 
Four of the parameters were fortunately available on existing FMS output busses to which the 
AID2 was wired. TAP’s data mapping was therefore modified to acquire these parameters from 
the FMS rather than the ADC. Unfortunately, Mach and true airspeed were not available as 
dedicated parameters on an available FMS or alternate bus. However, the NASA team established 
the feasibility of computing these parameters dynamically using equations for compressible, 
isentropic flow. To avoid the expenses of modified wiring and certification, the computations were 
implemented in TAP and verified on subsequent tests.  
12.6.2. Aircraft Performance Modeling 
The TAP TG algorithm [44] predicts future 4D positions and fuel states along the FMS active 
route and TAP-generated candidate reroutes. The versatile TAP TG has been demonstrated to 
support various aircraft types (e., turbojet, turboprop) using aircraft performance models (APM) 
at various levels of detail and in various formats. For the Alaska Airlines implementation, the 
expectation was for TAP to use the APM dataset provided by the Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) of the aircraft, in this case Boeing, using the SCAP industry standard format. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to proceed on this path for two reasons. First, the SCAP standard 
is used by OEMs primarily for takeoff and landing data, and en route cruise performance modeling 
has not kept up with this standard in the industry. Second, the APM data usage agreement between 
NASA and Boeing was not completed in time for the project, though it was eventually executed. 
An alternative APM approach was therefore pursued and implemented using the Eurocontrol 
BADA 4 aircraft performance modeling specification and dataset. BADA 4 enables aircraft 
behavior to be modeled with increased levels of precision over the entire flight envelope. A NASA 
agreement with Eurocontrol, with concurrence received from the OEM, authorized NASA to 
implement the BADA 4 specification in TAP and deploy it with the Boeing 737-900ER BADA 4 
dataset to Alaska Airlines for the TASAR operational evaluation. This deployment was the first 
approved use of BADA 4 in an airborne application. 
One element lacking from the BADA 4 APM was a specification of economy (ECON) cruise 
speeds (i.e., the FMS speed schedule when the pilot has selected the ECON setting for FMS speed 
management). Airborne applications like TAP are dependent on accurate speed modeling for the 
particular aircraft. To compensate for the missing ECON speed data, an Alaska Airlines B737-
900ER flight simulator was used to derive a speed table that included dependencies on appropriate 
flight parameters. TAP TG was modified to read the speed table. This limitation of BADA 4 was 
communicated back to the Eurocontrol BADA team to help improve the model going forward. 
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12.6.3. Service Architecture 
To facilitate installation and execution in a commercial airline environment, NASA implemented 
some significant enhancements to the TAP software architecture [59]. For instance, one major 
challenge of airline environments is the relative inaccessibility of installed hardware, which affects 
installing the software, launching it, and retrieving data. Therefore, installation packages and tools 
were implemented to allow aircraft maintenance crews to install the TAP application suite with a 
minimum of effort. The installation packages are customized for each aircraft, including the binary 
executables, configuration files, aircraft performance data, network addresses, and target host 
locations.  
A TAP Service daemon was installed on each computing platform hosting one or more TAP 
components. The TAP Services launch the various remote TAP components when triggered to do 
so by the pilot launching the TAP Display application on the iPad. At the conclusion of the flight, 
the TAP Service is responsible for compressing and offloading output data from all TAP 
components to a central repository (one for each TAP) for offline retrieval and evaluation. UTAS, 
Gogo, and NASA developed scripts and file naming structures that automated the entire data 
retrieval process after each flight and allowed any dispersed data files to be reunited later. 
A TAP Utility iPad application was developed for use in validating the completed installation 
across the multiple hardware hosts. The TAP Utility communicates with the TAP Service daemons 
to validate the installation. If there is a problem, the TAP Utility provides troubleshooting 
information to the user as to which components have failed to install. 
12.6.4. Host Hardware Testing 
TAP software components were distributed across multiple specialized hardware devices on the 
Alaska Airlines aircraft: AID2, ACPU2, and TIM (in addition to the commonly available iPad). 
Of these three devices, only the TIM could be acquired by NASA for bench testing. Testing of 
TAP on the AID2 and ACPU2 could only be performed by UTAS and Gogo in their test facilities. 
Unique hardware configurations were needed to compile and host the software on each device, 
which could only be performed by UTAS and Gogo engineers. The NASA team worked closely 
with the UTAS and Gogo teams in their bench testing of TAP and helped to assess performance 
acceptability. One test outcome was confirmation that TAP could be successfully hosted on a wide 
range of computing platforms with significantly differing performance characteristics. However it 
also reinforced the decision stemming from FT-2 that only one instance of TAP be operating in 
the cockpit at a time. Performance differences between TAP instances running on different 
hardware platforms would only exacerbate the factors identified in FT-2 that complicated crew 
coordination.  
In addition to bench testing of TAP on individual hardware devices, integrated testing was 
performed to verify TAP functionality across the internal network (particularly between the UTAS 
AID2 and Gogo ACPU2). Multiple test environments were employed, including co-located testing 
at one facility, remote testing through connected facilities, and on-aircraft testing once the 
hardware was installed. This final test environment used the actual flight hardware and aircraft 
network, but the limiting factor was the small amount of testing time available since the aircraft 
could not be pulled out of service. Tests were performed at KSEA on overnight stops. 
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12.7. Authorizing the TASAR Installation 
The entire implementation of TASAR on the three Alaska Airlines aircraft was fully FAA-
approved through normal, established authorization processes. The hardware installations and 
upgrades were approved through three STCs and a Technical Standard Order (TSO). The TAP 
software installations used rigorous industry processes at UTAS and Gogo for software packaging, 
verification, and tracking. TAP operational use was approved and documented in Alaska Airlines 
OpSpec A061, “Use of Electronic Flight Bag.” These various installations, certifications, and 
operational approvals were extensive, intricate, and time-consuming processes and were dominant 
factors in the ever-expanding schedule of achieving readiness for conducting the operational 
evaluation. However they were largely driven by Alaska Airlines, the FAA, and the participating 
industry collaborators (UTAS, Gogo, and ACSS), and being standard industry practices tangential 
to TASAR, they are not described further in this report. Some additional information is provided 
in reference [60].  
The key outcome of the application of these processes was that Alaska Airlines was fully 
authorized by the FAA to conduct TASAR operations on revenue service flights with passengers 
in the aircraft, as if it were a commercially deployed system. Figure 34 shows the first commercial 
airline aircraft to be TASAR equipped. 
12.8. Verifying the Installed TASAR System  
The long lead time required for TAP software packaging by UTAS and Gogo made it imperative 
to verify the Alaska Airlines TASAR system as early as possible to detect and resolve any faults 
with minimum delay to the project. Prior to aircraft delivery, preliminary component integration 
tests were performed by UTAS and Gogo at their facilities, verifying that TAP ran correctly on 
their hardware and that the secure network link established between the AID2 and ACPU2 
supported all required TAP-related messaging. However, verifying the installed system required 
access to the flight hardware and installed network, which only became available in phases as the 
various certification processes ensued following the first aircraft delivery in January 2017. To this 
end and to reduce project risk, the NASA team devised a multi-stage test plan that ran in parallel 
with the phased aircraft implementation of TASAR equipage and certification. Through a series 
of on-aircraft ground and airborne tests performed in concert with evolving certification/approval 
Figure 34. First of three Alaska Airlines aircraft to be equipped for TASAR. Photo by author. 
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phases, the tests would, in turn, verify the required data inputs, ensure proper software performance 
on the flight hardware and networks, and methodically build toward overall operational readiness. 
The plan consisted of four incremental “stages,” numbered Stages 0 through 3, with Stages 0 and 
1 being developmental, Stage 2 being both developmental and operational, and Stage 3 being 
operational.  
12.8.1. Stage 0 
The Objective of Stage 0 was to verify that every TAP input parameter (e.g., present position 
latitude) mapped correctly to the appropriate avionics data source, that each data parameter was 
indeed received (with expected characteristics like data rate), and that TAP properly decoded each 
one. Given that the software team developed the mapping and decoding scheme based on 
documentation, the risk to be averted was any difference between the documentation and the 
installed hardware. The initial installation of the AID2 for certification testing in the newly 
delivered aircraft presented the earliest opportunity to conduct this test.  
During Stage 0 testing, Alaska Airlines and NASA technical staff ran TAP on a laptop computer 
connected to a UTAS TIM onboard the aircraft. A laptop was used to host TAP because Stage 0 
preceded operational approval to install TAP on the AID2 and ACPU2. Instead of processing the 
avionics data, TAP recorded STAP messages from the AID2 to a binary file. During data 
collection, a separate process monitored this binary file to confirm that all required Stage 0 data 
had been successfully received and decoded. 
Stage 0 was executed in three parts: Stage 0 Hangar, Stage 0 Taxi, and Stage 0 Airborne. During 
Stage 0 Hangar, Alaska Airlines personnel used a ground-test apparatus to apply controlled signals 
to aircraft sensors to make certain avionics generate non-zero data as if the aircraft was airborne, 
a process that worked for generating most of the avionics data. However, the FMS required the 
aircraft to be moving above 40 knots before complete active route waypoint information was 
generated. Alaska Airlines pilots conducted a high-speed taxi on Seattle–Tacoma International 
Airport (KSEA) runway 34C, during which the route waypoint data were collected. The Stage 0 
Taxi operation was made possible through coordination with FAA controllers in KSEA Tower. 
Additional parameters such as guidance mode were only available in flight, and so a single Stage 
0 Airborne data collection was included on a non-revenue repositioning flight. Once the ADS-B 
system was installed, another Stage 0 Hangar data collection was used to collect and verify ADS-
B data.  
Findings of Stage 0 analyses are presented in reference [60]. They indicated that the majority of 
expected parameters were properly received, and that data rates were acceptable. The exception 
was the absence of the six critical air data parameters due to the ADC not being wired to the AID2. 
As described earlier, the issue was addressed by using alternative sources for some of the 
parameters and computing the others in TAP. 
12.8.2. Stage 1 
The objective of Stage 1 was to verify that TAP performed properly in flight prior to Alaska 
Airlines pilots actually using the software. Conducted as a “shadow” test, a TAP mode was 
developed where it would run automatically without a pilot’s user interface (i.e., the TAP Display). 
Stage 1 was critical to achieving operational readiness and had several key accomplishments. Stage 
1 testing confirmed Stage 0 findings with in-flight data that TAP correctly processed the data it 
received from avionics and internet sources. It confirmed that TAP computed reasonable and stable 
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route modifications suitable for operational use. It also confirmed that TAP produced accurate 
estimates of time/fuel savings. Stage 1 testing also assessed TAP’s processing performance when 
running in the actual flight hardware environment.  
Stage 1 data were collected on revenue service flights of the three TAP-equipped aircraft. Alaska 
Airlines pilots on these aircraft were asked to launch the TAP Utility application installed on their 
iPads to initiate the data collection. Deploying TAP Utility to all Alaska Airlines pilots, rather than 
just a select few, enabled data collection for a wide range of destination airports and flight 
conditions. TAP Utility required minimal data entry by the pilots and launched TAP (without the 
TAP Display) using a “fire and forget” procedure such that TAP operated without pilot interaction 
or observation for the duration of the flight, just recording data for later analysis. Pilots were asked, 
but not required, to launch the utility either at the gate or during flight. All data were recorded on 
UTAS and Gogo hardware and transferred off manually, later automatically via internet 
downloads, after multiple flights were completed.  
The certification and deployment schedule necessitated that Stage 1 be subdivided into Stage 1a 
and 1b, the difference being AID2-ACPU2 connectivity in flight and therefore TAP’s access to in-
flight internet. TAP requires internet connectivity to receive wind data, needed to calculate 
candidate route modifications. In Stage 1a, internet connectivity was not yet available. If pilots 
launched TAP Utility on the ground, then TAP received internet data (including winds) via a 
terrestrial modem and proceeded to work properly during the flight. If pilots launched it in the air, 
then TAP did not receive internet data and no route modifications were generated during the flight. 
However, a separate EDS process running concurrently at NASA recorded internet data that was 
incorporated in post-flight runs using TAP’s “playback” capability to generate the required data 
for analysis. During the second part of Stage 1, referred to as Stage 1b, internet connectivity was 
available throughout the flight to TAP, thereby allowing direct post-flight analysis of the data.  
Stage 1 flights began September 26, 2017. Findings of Stage 1 analyses are presented in 
reference [60]. They confirmed that TAP received and correctly processed the necessary avionics 
and internet data, performed acceptably well on the flight hardware, produced stable and 
reasonable route modification solutions, and predicted time and fuel burn with approximately the 
same accuracy as the FMS and airline flight planning system. Certain air data parameters from the 
FMS, substituting for the (unwired) ADC, were found to be noisier than previously experienced 
in flight testing and triggered undesired behaviors in TAP. TAP software changes were made and 
positively confirmed using the TAP playback capability that replayed the recorded avionics data 
into the updated software. This capability to verify fixes offline proved invaluable in that it enabled 
NASA to deliver a single TAP software package update to UTAS and Gogo for each Stage with 
high confidence that the update resolves all identified issues in the previous Stage. Given the 
software deployment time (measured in months), this process was an absolute necessity for 
schedule integrity.  
12.8.3. Stage 2  
Stage 2 represented both the final developmental stage and first operational stage of the 
evaluation. It was the first opportunity to test the end-to-end TASAR system, including the final 
hardware (iPads and TIMs) and software (TAP Display and TAP Display Adaptor), that could not 
be included in the Stage 1 “shadow” testing. As a developmental activity, Stage 2 would identify 
and correct any remaining identified TASAR system faults. In both its developmental and 
operational roles, Stage 2 flights required TAP Operators and was therefore conducted with a 
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limited group of tech pilots from Alaska Airlines Flight Operations. To the extent the complete 
TASAR system was working properly, the Alaska Airlines tech pilots would use TAP as an 
operational advisory tool to optimize their flights, and the resulting data would contribute to the 
analysis of TASAR benefits.  
The use of TAP Operators in Stage 2 (and Stage 3) required augmentation in order to accelerate 
the collection of data while minimizing cost. The accelerated data collection was necessary to 
accommodate an unexpected reduction in the NASA project budget in 2018 and 2019 that would 
curtail the duration of the operational evaluation, originally planned for one year. Consequently, 
Alaska Airlines Flight Operations augmented their pool of four tech pilots as TAP Operators with 
four student interns (three for Stage 2 and one for 
Stage 3). In addition, two NASA researchers were 
included in the pool of TAP Operators. The interns 
(flight-trained, aspiring airline pilots) and NASA 
researchers operated TAP from the jump seat 
(Figure 35) and coordinated with the regular flight 
crews on route modification advisories from TAP. 
The Alaska Airlines tech pilots operated TAP 
either from the front seats when performing as a 
flight crew member or from the jump seat when 
not. When the Alaska Airlines tech pilots operated 
TAP as a flight crew member, these were actual 
TASAR flights where TAP was used as designed 
and intended as a hands-on flight crew decision 
aid. 
Stage 2 spanned two months between July and September 2018. It included 70 attempted TAP 
flights, 59 of which included successful TAP operations. However, technical issues associated 
with the aircraft network (on which TAP relies) affected TAP operations on three quarters of the 
Stage 2 flights, resulting in either TAP not receiving required external data or protectively shutting 
down as a result of network instability. The issues were not observable in Stage 1 due to the 
absence of the TAP Display and the inability to confirm on which flights the TAP Utility was used 
to launch Stage 1 attempts. The discovery of these latent issues validated the developmental role 
of Stage 2 in the overall system verification plan. 
As the issues were observed and diagnosed, immediate procedural mitigations were 
implemented to limit the impact on continued Stage 2 data collection. Network testing at UTAS 
and Gogo facilities ensued to identify potential causes with only limited success. While insufficient 
time was available to implement TAP structural changes to increase resiliency to network 
instabilities (due to the lead time required to deploy TAP on the AID2 and ACPU2), it was possible 
to add protections into the TAP Display software to inhibit some known triggers of TAP shutting 
down. This update, deployed as an iPad app directly to Alaska Airlines (needing no lead time), 
and paired with the procedural mitigations, provided sufficient improvement to complete the 
operational evaluation in Stage 3.  
12.8.4. Stage 3 
Stage 3 was the final operational stage of the evaluation. It was originally intended that Stage 3 
would expand the evaluation to a larger pilot population and use an updated version of TAP to 
Figure 35. NASA researcher operating TAP from 
the jump seat. Photo by K. Burke. 
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address any significant issues identified in Stage 2. The plan called for training a large number of 
Alaska Airlines line pilots using training materials developed by NASA, including NASA’s TAP 
CBT integrated into the airline’s Learning Management System. However, given the shortened 
window to complete the evaluation due to NASA’s budget reduction and the expense of training 
large numbers of pilots for a limited trial on only three aircraft, it was decided to conduct Stage 3 
flights with the same TAP Operator approach used in Stage 2.  
Stage 3 was conducted in a three-month period between January and April 2019, adding an 
additional 49 flights for a total of 119 flight attempts between Stage 2 and Stage 3. Of these, 90 
flights were deemed valid for a quantitative benefits analysis (see Section 12.11, p119). Of the 90 
flights, 22 were performed with Alaska Airlines pilots operating TAP from the front seat as flight 
crew members, in other words, true TASAR flights. 
12.9. Training TAP Operators 
To reach TASAR operational readiness, it was equally important to train pilots for the operation 
as it was to equip the aircraft. To a pilot, TASAR is simply another procedure to learn, one that 
involves the use of technology, cross-checking with other information sources, and decision 
making to achieve an objective. Proper training helps ensure this process achieves its full potential. 
Because two primary purposes of the operational evaluation were to assess TAP’s utility in flight 
operations and to quantify the achieved benefits in cost savings, the desired approach was to 
engage a large number of Alaska Airlines’ line pilots in the evaluation, give them high-quality 
training on TAP, and encourage its use on every flight. However as stated earlier, a significantly 
reduced project timeline led to a different approach, specifically the idea of using TAP Operators 
who may or may not be the pilots flying the aircraft. While this increased the rate of data collection, 
it also partially removed a key element of the evaluation which was the immersion of TAP in the 
decision-making of the flight crew. On many flights, TAP would not be within the field of view 
of the flight crew, nor would the flight crew be trained on its capabilities and proper use. Instead, 
TAP on these flights would be at the jump seat station behind the flight crew, being operated by a 
person who is not a member of the crew, not an airline pilot (in most cases), and possibly far junior 
to the flight crew. As a result, the ability to assess utility would be impacted, and the benefits (cost 
savings) achieved would likely be a conservative estimate of what would be achievable with TAP 
used by the flight crew as intended. This only increased the importance of giving effective training 
to these TAP Operators to minimize these effects. 
To train the Alaska Airlines tech pilots and interns in the role of TAP Operator, NASA 
researchers developed a training curriculum conducted onsite at the Alaska Airlines Flight 
Operations Training Center. Read-ahead materials included the TAP Operating Procedures 
Handbook and TAP Flight Manual Bulletin. Briefings included background on TASAR, an 
overview of the operational evaluation plan, a description of TAP functionality, a live interactive 
TAP demonstration using the “playback” capability, and a detailed review of TAP Operator 
checklists. These laminated checklists covered all aspects of TASAR procedures including pre-
flight preparations, TAP startup, in-flight TAP settings, reroute evaluations and ATC requests, 
pre-descent and post-flight actions, and troubleshooting. The classroom training concluded with 
each TAP Operator completing the TAP CBT on tablet computers.  
TAP Operator training for the interns continued in the Alaska Airlines 737-900ER flight 
simulator (Figure 36). Since TAP was not electronically integrated into the flight simulator, a flight 
plan was entered into the simulator to approximate the route in a TAP playback file generated from 
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a Stage 1 flight. As the flight progressed in the 
flight simulator and TAP playback, a walk-through 
of the checklist and procedures was performed in 
order to familiarize the interns with using TAP and 
offering recommendations to the flight crew.  
Finally, the Alaska Airlines tech pilots took each 
intern on one or more actual flights on one of the 
TASAR-equipped aircraft. These flights allowed 
the interns to develop and practice procedures for 
interacting with the flight crew on TAP-
recommended route modifications. The interns 
were at a disadvantage, not being airline pilots or 
familiar with the cockpit and normal procedures. 
These flights were intended to reduce those 
obstacles to some degree. 
12.10. Conducting TAP Flights 
TAP flights (Stage 2 and Stage 3 flights on which TAP Operators were using TAP to identify 
route optimizations and where appropriate were making TAP-inspired route modification requests 
to ATC) were conducted on Alaska Airlines’ regularly scheduled revenue flights of the three 
TASAR-equipped aircraft. Flights were typically conducted in pairs consisting of an outbound and 
return flight on the same day. All pairs originated from either Seattle (KSEA) or Portland 
International Airport (KPDX).  
Generally, the aircraft flight schedules were not changed to accommodate the TASAR 
operational evaluation. In most cases, Alaska Airlines Flight Operations scheduled TAP flights by 
identifying suitable destinations in the upcoming schedule and coordinating a TAP Operator to be 
available for those flights. On some occasions, Flight Operations coordinated with flight 
scheduling to schedule a TASAR-equipped 
aircraft for a particular route. A zone pairing 
approach was used in flight selection to achieve 
variety while emphasizing the mid-continental 
and transcontinental flights where possible. 
Figure 37 shows the zone assignments and the 
TAP flights (depicted as straight lines) used for 
the benefits analysis. Where flight swaps needed 
to happen for operational reasons, an attempt was 
made to swap the flight for another airport located 
within the same zone, thereby preserving the 
balanced flight selection.  
For the flights with interns or NASA researchers serving as TAP Operators, an Alaska Airlines 
tech pilot contacted the scheduled flight crew the day before the flight to coordinate the jump seat 
occupant and to inform the crew about the TASAR technology being evaluated. A briefing sheet 
was also sent that provided background on the trial and the duties of the TAP Operator. The 
procedure was effective in securing cooperation from the flight crews and facilitating the TAP 
Operator performing their function. The interns were Alaska Airlines-badged employees which 
Figure 36. TAP Operator training in the Alaska 
Airlines flight simulator. Photo by author. 
Figure 37. TAP flights used in the benefits analysis. 
From ref. [61]. 
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allowed significant flexibility in jump seating. The NASA researchers required advanced 
coordination and FAA approval to access the cockpit. 
TAP Operators brought onboard two iPads, one for running TAP and the other reserved as a 
backup but otherwise used for administering surveys and taking notes. Upon boarding, the TAP 
Operator would connect the iPad to either UTAS TIM through Bluetooth pairing or with a custom 
Lightning-to-USB data cable. Checklists were followed to launch TAP to complete the TAP 
Startup Checklist, either on the ground or after takeoff and above 10,000 ft. The Startup Checklist 
was the opening screen through which the TAP Operator confirmed TAP’s configuration and 
entered parameters for the flight. An important element was confirming the “data feeds,” or TAP’s 
connection to external data through the airborne internet connection. At a minimum, wind data 
were required for TAP to operate.  
During the flight, the TAP Operator monitored and updated various settings on the TAP Display. 
Some of these settings requiring manual intervention in Stage 2 were automated for Stage 3 (e.g., 
the cruise altitude and speed settings). Other settings remained under manual control (e.g., the limit 
waypoint specifying the farthest waypoint for a route modification to rejoin the FMS active route). 
As the flight progressed, the TAP Operator monitored the Auto Mode solutions and engaged the 
flight crew where possible in assessing candidate route modifications for a potential ATC request. 
A “capture sheet” form implemented on the backup iPad was used to record each of these 
assessments by the flight crew. It allowed the TAP Operator to record notes such as crew feedback 
on the proposed route modification, what aircraft systems were consulted in the assessment, the 
crew’s rationale for making or not making the ATC request, and any information on ATC’s 
response. Details of the route modification itself did not need to be recorded here, because TAP 
itself was recording all such details from the avionics data.  
About 30 minutes prior to descent, the TAP Operator offered a survey to the crew on their general 
impressions of TAP. While some crews elected to complete the survey, most did not. Near the end 
of the flight, TAP automatically shut itself down when reaching about 35 nmi to the destination. 
The automatic shutdown was used to ensure adequate recording of “as flown” state data and to 
ensure the data files were properly configured for automatic off-loading after landing. The TAP 
Operators completed the flight by entering into a “TAP Logbook” key details and notes about the 
flight. Once a week, the TAP Operators were asked to complete a “TAP Operator Weekly Report” 
in an attempt to capture their cumulative experience with TAP, though this method of knowledge 
collection turned out to be less than successful. 
The UTAS and Gogo systems were configured to automatically offload the TAP data files after 
connecting to a terrestrial modem when parked at the gate. However, given the large size of the 
TAP data files (i.e., TAP was configured for maximum data logging) and the limited bandwidth 
being shared for multiple purposes, it was common for offloading to take several days to complete. 
Special file-naming conventions were devised and scripts written to reunite TAP data files for a 
particular flight well after the fact. Such were some of the complicated logistics of conducting a 
technology evaluation in an airline operational environment. 
12.11. Analyzing the Achieved TASAR Benefits 
In order to quantitatively estimate TAP benefits achieved in the operational evaluation, data were 
recorded by TAP during operational flights and analyzed post-flight. The method is summarized 
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below. Further details are provided in references [61] and [62]. In the subsequent section, 
limitations of the operational evaluation and analysis method are summarized. 
12.11.1. Analysis Method 
TAP benefits were calculated as the cost difference between TAP-flight operating costs and 
baseline-flight operating costs, each of which was computed relative to their respective predicted 
operating costs. During TAP flights (Stages 2 and 3), TAP-computed route-modification 
advisories were displayed to pilots and used to make “TAP-inspired” route-modification requests 
to ATC. Data recorded by TAP included aircraft systems data (e.g., aircraft states and route 
modifications) and pilot interactions with TAP. Data on pilot interactions with TAP were used to 
determine whether or not a route modification observed in the aircraft systems data was due to 
TAP (i.e., TAP-inspired). During the period that Stage 2 and 3 flights were conducted, Stage 1 
flights also continued to be flown and were used as baseline flights. Stage 1 flights had TAP 
running onboard but was not used by pilots or TAP Operators. During these baseline flights, TAP 
recorded “as flown” aircraft data and computed route-modification advisories, but the advisories 
were not displayed, requested to ATC, or flown. The TAP data collection on these “non-TAP 
flights” served as baseline flights in the benefits analysis. Every TAP flight was paired with a 
corresponding baseline flight of similar length that occurred as close in date as possible to the TAP 
flight to reduce seasonal variations. 
To estimate the TAP benefit in terms of cost savings, fuel and time savings were converted to 
cost savings in U.S. dollars ($). Typically, airlines use an hourly direct-operating-cost (DOC) 
parameter, which includes fuel cost, to convert time savings to cost savings. However, since TAP-
inspired altitude changes traded off between fuel and time, the analysis separated the time-related 
and fuel-related components of hourly DOC. Alaska Airlines’ hourly DOC ($1,710/hour excluding 
fuel) and fuel costs ($2.28/gallon) used in this analysis were estimated from third quarter 2018 
financial reports obtained from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, a part of the Department 
of Transportation and the preeminent source for aviation data [63]. 
Eq. (3) below shows the computation of achieved TAP benefits. The first term to the right of the 
equal sign is the difference between flown (i.e., actual) cost (𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏) and unimpeded predicted 
cost (𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝) on TAP flights. The unimpeded predicted cost is the cost that would have been 
incurred had the aircraft remained on the planned route. The second term in Eq. (3) similarly shows 
this cost difference corresponding to non-TAP baseline flights. Flown costs are incorporated into 
the equation because unpredictable events may occur after TAP-inspired requests that alter the 
TAP-predicted savings. These events may include pilot and ATC actions, as well as changing 
atmospheric conditions. Similarly, baseline flights are susceptible to these events that affect actual 
costs relative to planned costs. Accounting for these events using this method attempts to remove 
the influence of these events on the TAP benefits estimate. 
 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹 = ∑ (𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 − ∑ (𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝)𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠   (3) 
 
Flown fuel and time are measured relative to fuel and time predictions generated just prior to the 
TAP request to reduce the impact of route and atmospheric differences prior to the point in the 
flight where TAP is used. Either the pre-departure flight plan or TAP could be used to compute 
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the predicted cost (𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝), and there are advantages and disadvantages to using either 
prediction. Flight plans predict step climbs, but aircraft may be off their pre-departure flight plan 
at the time a TAP advisory is approved. TAP does not predict step climbs, but TAP predictions 
reflect updated route and wind information received post-departure. Both methods were used in 
the analysis. 
Figure 38 shows the segments of TAP flights (upper diagram) and baseline flights (lower 
diagram) for which cost savings are calculated. For TAP flights, these segments are bounded by a 
TAP Start Point (TSP) and a TAP Finish Point (TFP), defined by the locations of the first approved 
TAP request and the last rejoin to the flight plan. For baseline flights, the segments are defined by 
a Baseline Finish Point (BFP) at the top-of-descent and a Baseline Start Point (BSP) positioned to 
produce an approximately equivalent predicted cost (𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝) as the corresponding TAP flight.  
TAP flights and baseline flights had to meet certain selection criteria to be included in the 
analysis. These criteria ensured among other things that the flight’s origin, destination, and 
majority of its route were in the CONUS (due to trial limitations on the waypoint database and 
wind data) and that TAP was sufficiently available (due to technical issues on some flights).  
12.11.2. Operational Evaluation and Method Limitations 
The conduct of the Alaska Airlines operational evaluation created conditions that may not be 
representative of TAP use in regular operations in the future. The characteristics of the benefit 
analysis method also had some unavoidable limitations that may affect its applicability. These and 
other limitations are describe in Table 15. These factors need to be taken into account when 
Figure 38. Calculating cost savings on TAP flights and baseline flights. From ref. [62]. 
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determining how the quantitative benefit estimates from the evaluation may relate to benefits 
achieved in a future deployed system. Reference [61] lists a number of related factors that may 
indicate that the achieved benefits measured in the operational evaluation are conservative. 
Table 15. Operational evaluation limitations and effects on achieved benefits. From ref. [62]. 
 
Limitation Description Effect 
TAP Operator A goal of the operational evaluation was to have 
TAP be used by the Alaska pilots flying the 
aircraft. However, TAP Operators were restricted 
to a limited group for cost reasons. The TAP 
Operators consisted of four Alaska pilot interns, 
two NASA researchers, and four Alaska tech 
pilots. The pilot interns and NASA researchers, 
seated in the jump seat, offered TAP-inspired 
route modifications to the flight crew. Alaska 
tech pilots operated TAP from either the jump 
seat or front seats, depending on the flight. 
The benefits calculated may not 
be representative of benefits in 
regular operational use by Alaska 
pilots since only about one-
quarter of the valid flights had 
TAP operated from the front seat 
as intended. Alaska pilots may 
use TAP differently when they are 
responsible for its use as 
compared to taking input from 
TAP Operators located in the 
jump seat. 
TAP intermittent 
availability 
TAP was designed to generate advisories when 
the aircraft is above 10,000 ft. However, 
connectivity was not always available between 
hardware devices hosting TAP components. For 
this reason TAP advisories may not have been 
generated for some or all of the flight.  
This temporary condition unique 
to the TAP evaluation aircraft is 
expected to reduce the number of 
requests per flight and benefits. 
The validation criteria was 
developed and applied as a 
partial mitigation to this limitation. 
Quantity of data 
collected 
TAP benefits were expected to be of similar 
magnitude to normal flight-by-flight variability of 
fuel burned and flight time. For this reason 
evaluating the benefits of TAP across a larger 
sample of Alaska revenue flights would have 
increased confidence in the quantitative benefit 
results. Also, flights departing Seattle in the 
afternoon or returning to Seattle in the morning 
were generally not sampled. The data collection 
period for the operational evaluation was 
curtailed for programmatic reasons. 
The reduced quantity of data 
resulted in larger margins of 
error. Results may also not be 
representative of routes not flown 
by Alaska during the evaluation 
period.  
Seasonal data 
collection 
Data was collected during two time periods: (1) 
July to September and (2) January to April. 
There was no TAP-inspired requests during the 
remaining months.  
This prevented the study of TAP 
benefits across certain times of 
the year and certain weather 
patterns. 
Measurement 
granularity 
effects 
TAP benefits were expected to be about the 
same order of magnitude as TAP and flight plan 
data precision. For example, flight plan 
predictions to route waypoints were available to 
the nearest one minute and 100 lbs. of fuel. 
These measurement effects 
represented uncertainty when 
calculating benefits for any 
particular flight though they were 
expected to average out when 
calculating benefits across a 
relatively large number of flights. 
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Limitation Description Effect 
Identifying 
executed TAP 
advisories 
(TSP/TFP 
positive 
identification) 
TAP was not integrated with the aircraft FMS. 
This required Alaska pilots to separately enter 
any approved TAP-inspired requests into the 
FMS for execution. Without an electronic record 
of the route modification entry, it could not be 
known with 100% certainty whether or not a 
route or altitude change executed in the FMS 
was TAP-inspired. Pilot interactions with the 
TAP Display (advisory selection, touching “ATC 
approved”), the TAP Operator logbook, and 
analyst judgment were used to ascertain 
whether specific route and altitude changes 
were TAP-inspired. 
The process for identifying TAP-
inspired route modifications had 
potential for error, resulting in 
possible misidentification of route 
changes as TAP-inspired or not. 
Evaluating non-
TAP maneuvers 
TAP was used during the operational evaluation 
to decide whether it was still beneficial to climb 
according to the step climb listed in the flight 
plan. TAP could similarly be used to evaluate 
ATC-offered directs. The benefits of not 
executing a potentially detrimental maneuver 
was not incorporated into the benefit 
methodology. In addition to modifying the 
method, additional data collection would likely be 
required to identify these cases.  
Not including these cases has the 
effect of making the benefit 
estimation more conservative. 
Baseline flight 
selection 
It is not possible to fly the same flight twice, once 
with TAP and once without TAP, to definitively 
quantify TAP’s benefit. Baseline flights were 
used as an approximation for what would have 
happened without TAP. However, baseline 
flights were different from TAP flights in that they 
likely experienced different weather, ATC 
actions, and unplanned pilot maneuvers. For this 
reason, a single baseline flight may be less 
representative than using a larger sample of 
baseline flights. Limited TAP data collection 
prevented the application of a larger set of 
baseline flights. 
Benefits for individual flights may 
have substantial error, though 
benefits averaged over many 
flights should partially mitigate 
this error. 
 
12.12. Results  
The operational evaluation of TASAR met its objectives of quantifying benefits and assessing 
the operational utility of TAP. They were accomplished by equipping three Alaska Airlines aircraft 
with TAP and conducting evaluation flights in multiple months of revenue service operations. The 
following sections summarize these results. Additional details are presented in references [61] and 
[62]. 
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12.12.1. Measured Benefits 
Between July 24, 2018 and April 30, 2019 a total of 119 Alaska Airlines revenue flights were 
reviewed for analysis, including 70 flights between July 24 and September 20, 2018 and an 
additional 49 flights between January 23 and April 30, 2019. Ninety of those flights were 
determined to be valid TAP flights according to the criteria defined in reference [62]. Of those 90 
valid flights, 59 (66 percent) were determined to have had at least one approved TAP-inspired 
request during the flight. 
Recall from Eq. (1), the TAP benefit equation, that either flight plan predictions or TAP 
predictions could be used to calculate the 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝 term. Both sets of results are presented for 
the sake of completeness and to illustrate that a wide range of benefit estimates are possible using 
a small sample size.  
Table 16 summarizes benefits aggregated for all 90 valid TAP flights in the operational 
evaluation. The first row shows the summation of the flown cost minus the predicted cost across 
all valid TAP flights. On average, flown cost was higher than predicted cost since both the flight 
plan predictions (middle column) and TAP predictions (rightmost column) are unimpeded 
predictions, and unplanned deviations were common on most flights (e.g., ATC vectors, 
maneuvering for weather). The second row similarly shows this summation for baseline flights. 
The cost change is shown in the third row, which is calculated as the first row minus the second 
row. Since there was a reduction in cost attributed to TAP, the cost change is multiplied by –1 to 
provide the benefit attributed to TAP in row 4. Row 4 is divided by the number of valid flights 
(90) to obtain the average cost saving per flight calculated using flight plan predictions 
($97.00/flight) and TAP predictions ($96.93/flight). The standard deviation of the benefit is also 
shown to indicate the spread of flight-by-flight benefits. The Margin of Error (MoE), defined as 
half the width of the confidence intervals corresponding to 80 and 95 percent confidence levels 
Table 16. Aggregate TASAR benefit results corresponding to 90 valid flights. From ref. [62]. 
 
Item Flight Plan 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝  TAP 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝  
∑ (𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠   $570.88 $2,056.25 
∑ (𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝)𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠   $9,300.56 $10,780.19 
Total cost change due to TAP ($) –$8,729.68 –$8,723.93 
Total TAP benefit ($) $8,729.68 $8,723.93 
Benefit per valid flight ($/flight) $97.00/flight 
std dev=$274.28 
MoE=$37.05, CL 80% 
MoE=$56.67, CL 95% 
$96.93/flight 
std dev=$269.30 
MoE=$36.38, CL 80% 
MoE=$55.64, CL 95% 
Benefit per valid flight (min/flight) 0.84 min/flight 
std dev=3.84 min 
MoE=0.52 min, CL 80% 
MoE=0.79 min, CL 95% 
0.58 min/flight 
std dev=4.56 min 
MoE=0.62 min, CL 80% 
MoE=0.94 min, CL 95% 
Benefit per valid flight (gal/flight) 32.1 gal./flight 
std dev=89.6 gal 
MoE=12.10 gal, CL 80% 
MoE=18.51 gal, CL 95% 
35.2 gal/flight 
std dev=81.4 gal 
MoE=11.00 gal, CL 80% 
MoE=16.82 gal, CL 95% 
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(CL), is shown below the standard deviation. The time and fuel benefit estimation are then shown 
in the final two rows. 
The approximately $270 standard deviation indicates a relatively large spread of cost savings 
around the $97/flight average. Cost savings due to TAP were estimated to range from about –$500 
to about $1,200 as shown in Figure 39. Any flight could be impacted by events unrelated to TAP 
that increase or decrease cost savings. Flights with negative cost savings had (1) a non-TAP event 
that negatively impacted the TAP flight, (2) a non-TAP event that positively impacted the baseline 
flight, or (3) a combination of negative and positive events that impacted both the TAP and 
baseline flights, respectively. Similarly, it would be difficult to distinguish the cost savings from 
noise for flights with savings between about –$500 to about $500 with the exception of $0 cost 
savings that correspond to flights that did not experience a TAP-inspired request (i.e., savings set 
to zero). Flights further to the right on the plot experienced clear benefits though the exact value 
of that benefit is unknown due to uncertainties caused by the baseline flight selection. The figure 
also shows that there is no significant difference in the benefit distribution when using the flight 
plan for predicted costs (𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝) as compared to using TAP for predicted costs. 
Table 17 summarizes benefits by flown flight length (wheels-off to wheels-on) for reference 
even though the sample size is generally too small to definitively estimate benefits. The trend 
across flown flight lengths was as expected, with the largest benefit per flight corresponding to 
flights exceeding 4 hours ($185.49/flight) and the lowest benefit corresponding to flights less than 
2 hours (-$25.59/flight). Benefits corresponding to flights from 2 to 4 hours came in between 
($78.99/flight). The majority of benefits were concentrated to a few flights with estimated benefits 
exceeding $400/flight. On flights from 2 to 4 hours, 85 percent of the benefits were attributed to 4 
of the 51 flights. Similarly, on flights exceeding 4 hours, 70 percent of the benefits were attributed 
to 5 of the 27 flights. 
TAP was intended to be used by the aircrew from the front seat. However, TAP was used by an 
Alaska Airlines tech pilot from the front seat during only 22 of the 90 valid flights. An additional 
12 flights had either an Alaska Airlines tech pilot or NASA researcher in the jump seat advising a 
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Figure 39. Distribution of estimated cost savings for the 90 valid flights. From ref. [62]. 
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flight crew with no TAP experience in the front seats. Similarly, the remaining 56 flights had non-
airline pilot interns operating TAP from the jump seat. 
Table 18 summarizes benefits by type of TAP Operator and position in the cockpit. The highest 
achieved benefits occurred when Alaska Airlines tech pilots operated TAP from the front seat 
Table 17. Aggregate TASAR benefit results by flight length. From ref. [62]. 
 
Item Flown Flight Length 
0 to 2 hours 2 to 4 hours 4+ hours 
Total valid flights 
With approved request 
Without approved request 
12 
5 (42%) 
7 (58%) 
51 
31 (61%) 
20 (39%) 
27 
23 (85%) 
4 (15%) 
∑ (𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠   $236.71 $743.47 –$409.30 
∑ (𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝)𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟   –$70.35 $4,772.06 $4,598.85 
Total cost change due to TAP ($) $307.07 –$4,028.59 –$5,008.15 
Total benefit ($) –$307.07 $4,028.59 $5,008.15 
Benefit per valid flight ($/flight) –$25.59/flight 
(std dev=$59.83) 
$78.99/flight 
(std dev=$275.34) 
$185.49/flight 
(std dev=$307.41) 
Benefit per valid flight (min/flight) 0.10 min/flight 
(std dev=0.35 min) 
0.43 min/flight 
(std dev=3.46 min) 
1.94 min/flight 
(std dev=5.06 min) 
Benefit per valid flight (gal/flight) -12.44 gal/flight 
(std dev=29.57 gal) 
29.29 gal/flight 
(std dev=93.78 gal) 
57.07 gal/flight 
(std dev=92.76 gal) 
 
Table 18. Aggregate TASAR benefit results by TAP Operator. From ref. [62]. 
 
Item TAP Operator 
Alaska Tech Pilot 
from Front Seat 
Tech Pilot or 
NASA from Jump 
Seat 
Non-Airline Pilot 
Intern from Jump 
Seat 
Total valid flights 
With approved request 
Without approved request 
22 
13 
9 
12 
8 
4 
56 
38 
18 
Flown flight length 
0 to 2 hours 
2 to 4 hours 
4+ hours 
 
3 
17 
2 
 
4 
2 
6 
 
5 
32 
19 
Mean flown flight length 3.05 hours 3.47 hours 3.61 hours 
∑ (𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝)𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠   -$1,369.39 -$165.36 $2,105.62 
∑ (𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏 − 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝)𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟   $3,136.03 $1,554.87 $4,609.66 
Total cost change due to TAP ($) -$4,505.42 -$1,720.22 -$2,504.04 
Total benefit ($) $4,505.42 $1,720.22 $2,504.04 
Benefit per valid flight ($/flight) $204.79/flight 
(std dev=$419.16) 
$143.35/flight 
(std dev=$221.06) 
$44.71/flight 
(std dev=$192.29) 
Benefit per valid flight (min/flight) 2.34 min/flight 
(std dev=5.23 min) 
1.47 min/flight 
(std dev=2.72 min) 
0.11 min/flight 
(std dev=3.23 min) 
Benefit per valid flight (gal/flight) 60.56 gal/flight 
(std dev=132.9 gal) 
44.45 gal/flight 
(std dev=83.65 gal) 
18.21 gal/flight 
(std dev=65.51 gal) 
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($204.79/flight). These achieved benefits were higher than when TAP was operated from the jump 
seat by an Alaska Airlines tech pilot or NASA ($143.35/flight) or by a non-airline pilot intern 
($44.71/flight). As stated earlier, when operated from the jump seat, TAP was not within the field 
of view of the flight crew, nor was the flight crew trained on its capabilities and proper use. Instead, 
the TAP Operator interacted with TAP and relayed TAP recommendations to the flight crew. 
Without the flight crew incorporating TAP into their scan and directly interacting with it, its ability 
to inform flight crew decisions was diminished, and this is reflected in the lower achieved benefits 
with TAP operated from the jump seat.  
Considering the three types of TAP Operators (i.e., Alaska Airlines tech pilot, NASA researcher, 
or non-airline pilot intern), an Alaska Airlines tech pilot serving as TAP Operator in the jump seat 
was more likely to have their recommendations accepted by the flight crew based on their status 
as an Alaska Airlines pilot. Similarly, flight crews were more likely to be receptive to senior NASA 
researchers with deep experience in the technology. The interns were at the greatest disadvantage 
due not only to their location in the jump seat but also to their junior status as neither airline pilots 
nor NASA technology experts. Their challenge was to convince seasoned airline pilots to request 
changes to the aircraft’s route on the basis of recommendations from technology with which the 
flight crew had no training and could not readily interact. The resulting effect is indicated in the 
much lower achieved benefits by the intern TAP Operators. 
In contrast, the condition where TAP’s greatest influence could be applied was with Alaska 
Airlines tech pilots, well trained in TAP and motivated to use the technology, serving as both a 
flight crew member and TAP Operator in the front seat. This condition allowed TAP to be fully 
integrated into flight crew scans and decision making as intended, and the effect is reflected in the 
greater achieved benefits. The benefit of about $200/flight when TAP was operated from the front 
seat indicates that the overall estimated benefit of $97/flight may underestimate future benefits if 
TAP is exclusively used by trained pilots from the front seat, as it was designed and intended to 
be used. It is expected that benefits may increase further as flight crews build experience and 
familiarity with the technology, thereby increasing its use. 
12.12.2. Comparison to Model Estimate 
Prior to the Alaska Airlines operational evaluation, a fast-time simulation analysis was 
performed to estimate the benefits of using TAP on Alaska Airlines aircraft (Section 5.3.2, p22). 
That study examined the potential for benefits by use case and aircraft type. The use cases were 
(1) make a lateral change after an ATC-initiated reroute has ended, (2) make a lateral change to 
optimize in the presence of convective weather, and (3) change to a more wind optimal trajectory. 
The study was conducted using data from the summer of 2012 when there were fewer high impact 
convective weather events than typical. For this reason, use cases (1) and (2) did not occur 
frequently and did not have a significant impact on the predicted benefits. In excess of 90 percent 
of the benefits were attributed to use case (3) which was switching to a more wind optimal 
trajectory.  
The model-based analysis yielded an average estimated savings of 25 gallons/flight and 2.8 
minutes/flight which, when applied to Alaska Airlines’ DOC and fuel costs, correspond to a fast-
time simulation estimated cost savings of $136.05/flight. The results in Table 16 (p124) show an 
achieved savings of 32.1 gallons/flight and 0.84 minutes/flight during the operational evaluation 
representing a lower estimated cost savings of $97.00/flight. However, there is still the caveat of 
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large uncertainty in these estimates due to the large variation of benefits across the modest sample 
size of the operational evaluation. 
The use cases exercised during the Alaska Airlines operational evaluation were different than 
the dominant wind optimal use case exercised during the fast-time simulation study. During the 
operational evaluation the dominant beneficial use cases seemed to be (1) climb to a more fuel-
efficient altitude and (2) make a lateral change in the presence of convective weather. It is possible 
that additional benefits were available if TAP had generated, and pilots had selected, more 
advisories to follow a more wind optimal trajectory, but this behavior was not frequently observed.  
Among several possible reasons for the difference in achieved and predicted benefits, a 
significant factor was likely the TAP Operator. Of the 90 flights, 56 were conducted by non-airline 
pilot interns. As discussed earlier, their junior position relative to the flight crew may have reduced 
the likelihood of executing lateral path changes that occurred frequently in the fast-time simulation 
model, favoring instead altitude changes which a flight crew unfamiliar with TAP might more 
easily accept as a recommendation. There were an estimated 12 lateral or combo TAP-inspired 
route modifications during the 56 flights conducted with a non-airline pilot intern TAP Operator. 
By comparison, there were 16 lateral or combo TAP-inspired route modifications during the 
remaining 34 flights representing a higher rate of non-altitude TAP-inspired route modifications 
when either an Alaska Airlines tech pilot or NASA researcher operated TAP. 
The output from the fast-time simulation model was also used to estimate an annual TAP benefit 
of approximately $5.15M/year across 109 aircraft equipped with TAP. This simulation-based 
estimate can be updated to $5.53M/year using the more recent operating costs for Alaska Airlines. 
A corresponding estimate was made using the operational evaluation results, yielding an estimated 
annual cost savings due to TAP of $14.97M/year [62]. The estimate has a high degree of 
uncertainty due to the small sample size of valid TAP flights collected during the operational 
evaluation.  
Exploring the differences, Alaska Airlines has a larger fleet in 2019 (approximately 180 aircraft) 
than when the simulation-based estimate was conducted in 2015 due to a merger between Alaska 
Airlines and Virgin America. The merger is one reason why the $14.97M/year benefit estimate is 
higher than the simulation-based estimate of $5.53M/year, which was based on a smaller fleet of 
109 aircraft. Another reason is that the updated estimate included benefits for all routes more than 
2 hours planned duration while not all Alaska Airlines routes were simulated in 2015. It should be 
noted that the updated estimate of $14.97M/year is based on a combination of Alaska Airlines tech 
pilot and non-pilot intern TAP Operator results. Approximately double the annual benefits could 
be obtained if it is assumed that the Alaska Airlines tech pilot $200/flight cost savings shown in 
Table 18 (p126) can be sustained if TAP is deployed for use by all pilots. Alternatively, if pilots 
do not consistently use TAP then the annual benefits will be lower. 
12.12.3. Operational Utility Assessment 
In addition to estimating the cost savings, the operational evaluation provided Alaska Airlines 
the opportunity to assess the operational utility of TAP to pilots and to the airline. Alaska Airlines 
tech pilots operated TAP on 32 of the 90 valid flights. This experience provided exposure to a 
variety of flight situations in which TAP’s operational utility was observed. As a result, they 
identified at least three distinctly useful scenarios of TAP utility and benefit. They refer to these 
scenarios as (1) Home Run, (2) Cumulative Small Gains, and (3) Plan Validation.  
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Home Run Scenarios 
“Home Run” scenarios reflect those opportunities where a significant improvement to the 
aircraft’s route is possible relative to the flight plan route or a modified weather routing issued by 
ATC. An example from the operational evaluation is shown in Figure 40.  
Flight planning systems generally do an excellent job of creating efficient routes, taking into 
account forecast weather available at the time. However, forecast inaccuracies and conservative 
planning can result in occasions where the forecast conditions differ significantly from the actual 
conditions experienced in flight. Similarly, ATC may issue conservative “playbook” routing 
around weather when significant en route weather is forecast, but actual conditions may be less 
severe or may dissipate early without timely routing relief offered to the operators. Alaska Airlines 
observed TAP offering significant benefits in such scenarios through monitoring the latest weather 
and wind information and continually refreshing the search for more efficient route opportunities.  
Cumulative Small Gains Scenarios 
 “Cumulative Small Gains” scenarios generate savings on a much smaller scale per individual 
instance but may aggregate into significant 
cumulative savings for the airline through 
multiple requests on a given flight and 
across many flights. An example of this 
scenario is shown in Figure 41. They 
leverage the availability of a flight crew to 
“fine tune” the route during periods of low 
workload (often the majority of the en 
route segment). The flight crew minimizes 
impacts to ATC workload by monitoring 
the voice frequency to avoid congested 
periods and making at most one request per 
sector. TAP remains vigilant for benefit 
opportunities no matter how large or small. 
Figure 40. "Home Run" TASAR benefit case. From ref. [61]. Photo by author. 
Figure 41. "Cumulative Small Gains" TASAR benefit case. 
From ref. [61]. Photo by author. 
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Since TAP has no minimum threshold for savings when presenting route modification options to 
pilots, the flight crew will have the opportunity to act upon even minor route modification 
advisories at their discretion. Such opportunities can emerge, for example, when TAP receives a 
wind update (an hourly occurrence during this operational evaluation). The updated winds, which 
can be several hours more recent than winds used by the flight planning system, will occasionally 
favor an earlier or delayed climb to a higher altitude or a non-direct route between flight plan 
waypoints as shown in Figure 41. 
Plan Validation Scenarios 
“Plan Validation” scenarios became apparent during the operational evaluation as pilots used 
TAP to consider and then reject a prospective change from the flight plan. The benefit, in this case, 
is not the generation of savings through identifying and executing an improvement to the current 
route. Rather, the benefit is in preempting an adverse consequence (i.e., increase in direct operating 
cost) that would have resulted from an uninformed route modification decision by the flight crew. 
It is common for flight crews to make 
occasional requests to ATC to achieve a 
seemingly more optimal route using rules 
of thumb and optimization information 
available from onboard sources. The “up 
and straight” philosophy can lead pilots to 
seek routing short cuts and climbs to the 
optimum altitude indicated by the FMS at 
the earliest opportunity, despite the 
recommendations of the flight plan. 
However, such decisions can sometimes be 
detrimental to optimization. An example of 
Plan Validation is shown in Figure 42, 
where a short cut is shown by TAP to be not 
beneficial.  
Situation Awareness 
An additional area of TAP operational utility is the SA provided by the integration of various 
data sources and route probing functionality. Though not a primary benefit mechanism wherein 
TAP scans for route optimization opportunities and displays these to the flight crew, it assisted 
pilots in proactive decision-making, sometimes resulting in operational efficiency benefits. For 
instance, in the scenario depicted in Figure 42, the “traffic aware” aspect of TAP provided the TAP 
Operator and flight crew with advance notice of conflicting traffic and the subsequent ATC 
instruction to descend 2000 feet for traffic. According to TAP, retaining this new cruise altitude 
for the duration of the flight would have cost over 400 lbs of fuel. TAP assisted in identifying the 
soonest opportunity to request a climb back to the original altitude. 
Culture Change 
The full potential for achieving TASAR benefits will be driven by three factors: opportunity, 
approvability, and action. The opportunities for route improvement must exist, the route 
modification must be approvable (and actually approved) by ATC, and action must be taken by 
the flight crew to request the route modification. As an optimization tool, TAP is designed to 
address the first and second factors directly: it monitors the flight vigilantly for beneficial route 
Figure 42. "Plan Validation" TASAR benefit case.  
From ref. [61]. 
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modification opportunities, and it increases approvability by accounting for ATC constraints such 
as nearby traffic in its advisories. TAP indirectly addresses the third factor, action, by incorporating 
human-centered principles in the user interface design to maximize system usability. But action 
will also be driven over time by accumulated experience using TAP and a culture change wherein 
flight crews engage more frequently and proactively in route optimization throughout the flight 
and further integrate technology such as TAP into that role. Alaska Airlines expects that TAP will 
accelerate this culture change toward proactive optimization engagement, resulting in increased 
operational benefits as the culture change unfolds. 
12.13. Outcomes of the Operational Evaluation 
The completed operational evaluation of TASAR in partnership with Alaska Airlines has 
produced six key outcomes. Many relate to the original objectives NASA and Alaska Airlines each 
brought to the activity, while the others speak to the technology’s maturity and its future.  
 
 
By conducting an operational evaluation of TASAR with an airline, NASA sought to eliminate 
risks and barriers for the technology’s transfer to industry for commercialization. This achievement 
substantially reduces risk for the commercial sector by providing a reference case of a successful 
deployment. Such evidence increases confidence and may provide the basis for initiating 
commercial investment. It also eliminates the barrier of adopting technology that has only been 
tested in research laboratories or flight-test aircraft. Through this activity, deployment of TAP to 
one of the commercial sector’s key target environments (an airliner) has been successfully 
accomplished. 
 
 
With the technology deployment achieved, NASA sought to validate the projected cost savings 
in flight optimization using actual airline flight data. For the TASAR flights conducted by the 
Alaska Airlines tech pilots, which most closely matched the mature-state operations represented 
by the modeling and intended for the technology, the average cost savings exceeded the model 
estimate. Given the limited number of flights and the wide variance in estimated benefits achieved, 
there remains uncertainty in how benefits would accrue for an airline in the long term. However, 
this dataset provides as much certainty as could be achieved in a limited trial activity with a 
reasonable level of investment. For Alaska Airlines, the evidence it produced was sufficient to 
declare the predicted savings to be genuine.  
 
 
Outcome #1 
Implementation of TAP on a commercial airliner and approval for revenue service 
operations have been successfully achieved, providing concrete evidence to industry of 
the feasibility of such a commercial deployment. 
Outcome #2 
The estimated cost savings achieved in the TASAR operational evaluation confirmed the 
expectations set by the model-based estimates produced beforehand. 
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In addition to needing to see quantitative evidence of benefits, Alaska Airlines sought to evaluate 
the operational utility of TAP. With even just a limited number of hands-on evaluation flights, 
Alaska Airlines discerned several practical categories of TAP operational utility, each of which 
supports and builds upon the prized optimization culture of their airline. Furthermore, their 
experience using TAP triggered ideas for new functionality, new data sources and optimization 
objectives, and additional aircraft systems to be integrated with TAP. This perspective validates 
TAP’s design goal of serving as an inspiration and platform for growth in airborne trajectory 
management. 
 
 
Alaska Airlines invested in the TASAR partnership with NASA having seen in 2013 the strong 
potential for both economic and operational benefits of the technology. Their expectation was to 
pursue fleet-wide deployment if these benefits could be verified through the operational trial. With 
the benefits now confirmed, Alaska Airlines is following through by taking the next step of 
working with the commercial sector to deploy and verify a commercial version of the technology. 
This lays the groundwork for fleet-wide deployment, which they have indicated will be to both 
their Boeing and Airbus fleets.  
 
 
Several major U.S. airlines followed the Alaska Airlines operational evaluation of TASAR while 
it was underway. The sustained interest was evident from the repeated requests for briefings and 
demonstrations made to NASA and calls placed to Alaska Airlines. As the operational evaluation 
concluded, Alaska Airlines communicated the success of the trial at several industry venues, 
including the 2019 Global Connected Aircraft Summit in San Diego and in a joint briefing with 
NASA at the 2019 EFB Users Forum in Chicago. Their declaration of success cemented a growing 
interest by at least a half-dozen airlines to begin investigating TASAR, with some taking steps to 
conduct their own commercial trials.  
 
 
 
Outcome #3 
TAP’s prototype functionality demonstrated diverse operational utility to flight crews in 
a commercial airline cockpit, while also inspiring the airline to generate many new ideas 
for functional growth. 
Outcome #4 
Alaska Airlines has initiated a commercial development trial of TASAR with the expected 
outcome of deploying TAP to all aircraft in the airline’s fleet. 
Outcome #5 
Following Alaska Airlines’ lead, additional airlines are evaluating TASAR for their 
fleets. 
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The operational evaluation of TAP on Alaska Airlines aircraft in revenue service was equivalent 
to a “system prototype demonstration in an operational environment,” thereby meeting the criteria 
for TRL 7 [64]. In further substantiation, the prototype software (TAP) had “all key functionality 
available for demonstration and test.” TAP was “well integrated with operational 
hardware/software systems demonstrating operational feasibility.” The trial met the TRL 7 exit 
criteria by producing “documented test performance demonstrating agreement with analytical 
predictions.” Although it is uncommon for a NASA aeronautics technology to reach such high 
TRL while still in NASA’s portfolio, the outcomes listed here validate the productivity of the 
investment toward the likely achievement of successful technology transfer and commercial 
implementation. 
Outcome #6 
NASA completes its work on TASAR, having achieved Technology Readiness Level 7. 
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13. Technology Transfer and Beyond 
As stated in Chapter 4, the TASAR project was initiated with the principal objective of 
positioning NASA’s state-of-the-art airborne trajectory management technology for transfer to 
industry such that it would “stick.” At a minimum, such successful technology transfer requires 
commercialization of the technology, which in turn requires suppliers and a market. To be 
sustainable, it needs either a growing market or the ability to grow the technology. Both attributes 
are possible with TASAR. The following sections discuss the emerging commercial market and 
the derivative products achievable from TASAR, some of which are already under consideration 
by industry, that could build upon TAP’s capabilities in the near term and foster an evolution of 
airborne trajectory management toward operational autonomy in the long term. 
13.1. Commercial Market 
TASAR technology transfer was pursued with the goal of making TASAR ubiquitously available 
to potentially all aircraft operators in the U.S. market. As no single industry supplier serves all 
operators, exclusive licensing was not considered for this technology. Limited exclusive licensing 
with market carve-outs was also determined not to be a good fit, given that operator classes are 
still too large for one supplier, and other market parameters like geographic region are unworkable 
because operator aircraft crisscross the country. Instead, licenses were offered on a non-exclusive 
basis to allow multiple suppliers to potentially commercialize the technology. In addition to more 
broadly reaching the aircraft operator community, having multiple suppliers is good for growing 
a TASAR industry in that it incentivizes companies to each distinguish their TASAR offering by 
innovating beyond the NASA-developed baseline, a key project goal.  
Industry’s commercial interest in TASAR started within two years of project initiation and 
broadened considerably by the end of the project. The interest did not emerge in a single sector of 
the industry, but rather from a broad base that cut across multiple industries within the aviation 
supplier community. Though unexpected, it also made sense given TASAR’s intersecting position 
between multiple systems and functions regarding aircraft operations. Table 7 (p39) lists the 
industries that made specific inquiries to NASA on TASAR licensing. The diversity is self-evident 
and highlights the breadth of commercial interest in TASAR. Commercialization by multiple 
crosscutting industries increases market coverage by providing aircraft operators with access to 
TASAR through a variety of alternative mechanisms thereby averting the need to necessarily 
divest from any of their existing suppliers in order to get TASAR onboard. 
The potential customer market of aircraft operators is also diverse. The initial market targeted in 
NASA’s TASAR research was the U.S. airline community, which led to the operational evaluation 
being conducted in an airline environment. The evaluation caught the attention of many dominant 
air carriers and has resulted in multiple airline inquiries to NASA and to potential commercial 
suppliers. Multiple airlines talking to multiple suppliers is a healthy indicator of an emerging initial 
TASAR market. Ironically, airlines are not necessarily the best initial market for a new technology. 
Their historically thin profit margins have typically not permitted them to be the vanguard of 
technological advances, though plenty of exceptions certainly have occurred. One strong 
advantage the airlines have is that their fleets often consist of many aircraft of the same type, 
making it more economical to deploy a certified system across the fleets. However, as more aircraft 
types are equipped, deployment to other parts of the operator market will become easier. Business 
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and high-end General Aviation represent opportunities for significant market growth, as they may 
have additional resources and the propensity to gravitate toward adopting new technology. Other 
potential beneficiaries of TASAR in its current form would include regional and fractional airlines 
and the U.S. military. The latter two operators in particular may achieve benefits from TASAR in 
that they generally are not based at capacity-constrained airports where flow restrictions may 
impede the approval of route modifications. 
To assist potential suppliers in estimating TASAR benefits for potential customers, and to assist 
operators in assessing various fleet deployment strategies and economics, NASA produced several 
“tech transfer products” for use by the emerging TASAR community. The first product, shown in 
Table 19, is a conservative estimate of annual TAP benefits for the top 10 U.S. airlines (based on 
annual domestic CONUS operations), using cost savings experienced by Alaska Airlines in the 
operational evaluation as a function of flight length (Table 17, p126) [62]. The number of aircraft 
that were considered candidates to be equipped with TAP were estimated and are shown in the 
middle column. Generally, modern mainline jets were considered candidates. Regional jets and 
older aircraft were assumed to not be candidates for TAP for the purpose of this calculation. Also, 
the fleet size should be considered approximate since new aircraft regularly enter airline fleets, 
and older aircraft are retired. Benefits for aircraft types that have recently been introduced by an 
airline were not quantified due to insufficient historical cost and flight frequency data. Some of 
the limitations of this estimation method are the city pairs used by Alaska Airlines potentially not 
providing the same benefits to other city pairs of similar flight length, and the generalization of 
benefits by only three flight-length categories. The method also did not account for any 
competitive effect if all aircraft were simultaneously using the technology and potentially 
competing for ATC approval. (Modeling was not conducted in this project to assess whether or to 
what degree this would affect benefits. However by the time this level of equipage could 
realistically be achieved, the FAA Data Comm program will likely be providing full en route 
services which may significantly change the landscape in airspace usage and request procedures 
using data link.) Given these limitations, the method provides a first cut estimation of annual 
benefits for airlines based on fleet size and flight lengths. The estimates may be conservative for 
the same reasons highlighted in reference [62] for the Alaska Airlines operational evaluation. 
Airline Estimated Aircraft that are 
Candidates to be Equipped with TAP 
Estimated Annual Cost 
Savings due to TAP 
Alaska Airlines 180 $14.97M 
Allegiant Air  37 $1.41M 
American Airlines  831 $52.29M 
Delta Airlines  466 $23.61M 
Frontier Airlines  62 $4.38M 
JetBlue Airways  63 $6.69M 
Southwest Airlines  754 $36.47M 
Spirit Airlines  61 $4.86M 
Sun Country  30 $1.41M 
United Airlines  562 $23.26M 
 
Table 19. Estimated annual TASAR cost savings for the top 10 U.S. airlines. From [62]. 
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The second “tech transfer product” is a TAP Benefits Estimation Calculator, a spreadsheet that 
duplicates the computations used to produce the cost-saving estimates in Table 19. The tool allows 
an analyst to refine the estimates for the top 10 airlines, or to produce estimates for an unlisted 
operator, by adjusting various input parameters. For instance, the default values for fuel cost, direct 
operating cost (excluding fuel), and number of aircraft in a given fleet can be modified. The 
spreadsheet also contains an adjustable fuel-burn-rate scaling factor relative to the Boeing 737-
900ER (the aircraft used in the operational evaluation). The analyst may also modify the number 
of annual flights for each aircraft type, adjust the assumed time and fuel savings provided by TAP, 
and even adjust the percentage of flights where TAP is used and at least one request is approved. 
The tool outputs the estimated annual time, fuel, and cost savings per aircraft and for that aircraft-
type fleet. The same limitations apply but are partially mitigated by the adjustability of some key 
parameters. 
The third “tech transfer product” is a description of the methodology for using the actual TAP 
software in a standalone model environment to refine the estimation of TAP benefits. The achieved 
benefits data that were used to generate the annualized benefits results in Table 19 are restricted 
to the routes actually flown during the operational evaluation and may not accurately represent the 
fuel and time benefits achievable between other city pairs and regions of the U.S. To partially 
mitigate this limitation, the TAP optimization algorithm can be exercised in a stand-alone 
condition to obtain TAP benefit opportunity estimates between different city pairs, effectively 
acting as an alternative data source for TAP benefit estimations versus the operational evaluation. 
This methodology produces idealized opportunity benefits data rather than achieved benefits data 
as reported for the Alaska Airlines operational evaluation, thus not accounting for factors 
addressed by the baseline flights (e.g., ATC and pilot actions independent of TAP). The 
methodology is detailed in Appendix G of reference [62] and has been exercised on several of 
Alaska Airlines’ city pairs not flown during the operational evaluation. TAP software licensees 
have the capability to exercise this methodology to generate their own customized benefit 
estimates for potential TASAR customers. 
13.2. Derivative Opportunities 
To generate the creative environment for airborne trajectory management to flourish and grow 
in the industry, the TASAR technology transfer strategy intended to foster competition such that 
TASAR capabilities are continually enhanced and expanded. The purpose of TAP, in fact, was to 
be a platform for innovation where commercial companies are expanding connectivity, 
diversifying input data, and enhancing functionality with the goal of eventually enabling new 
applications. The following sections list some of the ideas that have been discussed or explored. 
The descriptions distinguish between the initial TAP prototype developed by NASA and tested in 
this project and the possible derivatives of TAP that industry could build from this foundation. The 
incorporation of safety-related data or functionality into TAP derivatives would warrant revisiting 
the technology’s intended function and performing the appropriate hazards analysis.  
13.2.1. Expanding Connectivity 
The TAP prototype was designed to connect to specific onboard avionics devices and off-board 
internet sites, thereby providing a good representation of the aircraft’s state and operating 
environment. It led to a demonstration of how this limited, yet unprecedented, connectivity can be 
used to feed flight optimization algorithms and produce measurable operational benefits. However, 
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the connectivity was all one way: data flowing into TAP. The next frontier for TAP derivatives is 
to establish two-way connectivity to systems onboard and off the aircraft.  
Dispatch Connectivity: Airlines currently use the Aircraft Communications Addressing and 
Reporting System (ACARS) for coordination between flight crews and dispatchers. Air/ground 
coordination could be significantly improved by enabling the two-way exchange of candidate route 
modifications, as well as the constraints and objectives that go into their determination. TAP’s 
internet connectivity provides a more efficient and data-rich channel for flight crews and 
dispatchers to confer on significant changes to the aircraft’s route. Reference [65] is a candidate 
concept of operations for Multi-Agent Air/Ground Integrated Coordination (MAAGIC) between 
flight-deck and dispatch technologies for route optimization. MAAGIC leverages connectivity 
between these technologies to enable cross-checking of candidate routes against the potentially 
different constraints known to the air and ground systems and to support rapid coordination 
between flight crews and dispatchers on post-departure flight optimization opportunities. 
FMS Connectivity: Once a route modification has been identified, a pilot using the TAP 
prototype enters it by hand into the FMS. The process can be cumbersome and prone to error, 
particularly if multiple off-route waypoints are involved. FMS manufacturers are developing new 
certified mechanisms to enable EFB applications to send data securely to the FMS, including 
routes. This capability is perfectly suited to incorporating an export function into a TAP derivative 
whereby route modifications could be auto-loaded into the FMS with minimal effort and maximum 
accuracy. In addition to easing workload and reducing manual data entry errors, auto-load would 
also facilitate the procedure of cross-checking TAP time/fuel estimates with the FMS and verifying 
routes using onboard weather radar. 
ATC Connectivity: Once TAP’s solutions and estimates are verified, a pilot using the TAP 
prototype system makes a voice request for the route modification to ATC. The design of the TAP 
prototype was heavily influenced by the constraints of a voice-request environment. Route 
modifications were limited to two off-route waypoints, which in turn were limited to those listed 
in a published waypoint database. These design restrictions greatly facilitated voice requests but 
may have compromised the benefits achievable [66]. Data Comm is an emerging NextGen 
capability. Pilots and air traffic controllers equipped for this capability can quickly send and 
respond to electronic messages instead of talking on the radio without the risks of missed or 
misunderstood spoken information. As the full en route services become available, TAP 
derivatives can be well prepared to take maximum advantage of this digital request capability. 
Reference [67] describes this capability in greater detail. 
13.2.2. Diversifying Input Data 
The data ingested into the TAP prototype provided key information on the aircraft’s state, 
planned route, and operating environment. While each had relevance to route optimization or 
route-change acceptability, they were selected primarily based on data availability and were 
intended to represent a starting set of the much broader suite of data relevant to route optimization. 
The following are examples of additional data that could be incorporated. 
4D Winds: A strong attribute of the TAP prototype was its use of 3D gridded winds updated 
regularly throughout the flight. Knowledge of current off-route and off-altitude winds enabled 
TAP to explore and offer route optimization opportunities in the 3D airspace. However, the winds 
were not treated as time varying, allowing for the possibility for some error in the downrange 
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portions of the modeled trajectory in situations where wind field changes are expected during the 
flight. A straightforward yet beneficial enhancement would be to incorporate 4D winds while also 
expanding the wind field beyond the CONUS geographic limits established for the operational 
evaluation. 
Onboard Weather Radar: Pilots rely on onboard weather radar when making decisions about 
acceptable routing in regions of convective activity. While the TAP prototype used only weather 
polygons derived from a ground-based weather data service for the Alaska Airlines operational 
evaluation, research was initiated in FT-3 on requirements for the incorporation of onboard 
weather radar data in TAP’s algorithms and display. The research will need to be completed to 
determine requirements for a viable design, but the value to the pilot of integrating the airborne 
weather data was evident on several flights in the operational evaluation.  
Turbulence: Ride quality is frequently cited among airlines as a dominant factor in route 
selection and modification. As new technologies emerge for sharing turbulence data among 
operators and prediction models are steadily improved, an opportunity exists to incorporate this 
information into TAP derivatives and expand the optimization criteria to include ride quality. 
Identified regions of severe or extreme turbulence can be easily incorporated as avoidance 
polygons requiring essentially no change to TAP functionality. More interesting is the possibility 
of using TAP to optimize routes in the presence of light to moderate turbulence, which might 
require a trade-off with cost optimization based on fuel and flight time. This new functionality, 
described below, would probably require 3D or 4D contour maps of turbulence prediction, such as 
the Graphical Turbulence Guidance (GTG) developed by the National Center for Atmospheric 
Research.  
Volcanic Ash / Icing: These represent examples of various other atmospheric hazards that are 
potentially relevant to route optimization. Provided that measurements or prediction data are 
available and avoidance polygons can be generated, incorporation of these hazards into TAP’s 
processing would be straightforward.   
Ionizing Radiation: TAP is also ripe for incorporating innovative and unexpected data sources. 
An example is ionizing radiation dosimetry. There is a growing concern for the health and safety 
of commercial aircrew and passengers due to their exposure to ionizing radiation, particularly at 
high latitudes. The Nowcasting of Atmospheric Ionizing Radiation for Aviation Safety (NAIRAS) 
model [68] is an analytical tool that provides a global, real-time, atmospheric ionizing radiation 
dosimetry package for archiving and assessing radiation exposure levels at commercial airline 
altitudes that have potentially harmful health outcomes. Incorporating data from the NAIRAS 
model into a TAP derivative could support airline operational decisions for altering flight paths 
and altitudes for the mitigation and reduction of radiation exposure levels during solar radiation 
events. 
FMS Parameters: With the emerging capabilities described earlier to connect EFB applications 
to the FMS comes the opportunity not only to push routes to the FMS but to retrieve FMS data as 
well. The TAP prototype included a Startup Checklist screen where the pilot would hand enter a 
number of parameters that were not available on an FMS data bus at the time of the Alaska Airlines 
operational evaluation. While acceptable for a limited trial, it could be problematic in regular line 
operations. A TAP derivative having direct access to FMS internal parameters could increase pilot 
usage of TAP. It could also be leveraged to enhance the accuracy of its trajectory predictions. 
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Traffic Intent: TAP uses traffic data from ADS-B In to filter out candidate route modifications 
that might create a traffic conflict and therefore be unacceptable to ATC. The 2020 ADS-B Out 
mandate requires the broadcast of aircraft state data but not intent, which means TAP may be 
missing important information about a traffic aircraft’s future trajectory, such as upcoming turn 
points or a vertical profile change. Inherited from AOP, the underlying algorithms in TAP were 
designed to use multiple levels of intent data. These data could be extracted from SWIM and 
supplied to a TAP derivative to enhance the fidelity of traffic trajectory modeling thereby reducing 
both false and missed alerts. 
Airspace Structure: A key element of TASAR is to increase ATC approvability of route 
modification requests, thereby increasing operational benefits. FT-2 included observations at ATC 
facilities of the TASAR flight-test aircraft (see Section 11.2.4, p87). A key finding was that 
incorporation of a sector map into TAP and associated logic to minimize airspace structure factors 
(e.g., sector clipping, handoff impacts) may increase request approval rates under conditions of 
high controller workload. The challenges of identifying these conditions and the limited 
availability of relevant data sources (e.g., up-to-date sector maps, LOAs) did not warrant 
implementing these functions in the TAP prototype during this project. It was clear, however, that 
controllers were enthusiastic about this possibility. 
Political Boundaries / Overflight Fees: Depending on a flight’s geographic location, overflight 
fees may be charged when crossing certain political boundaries. The cost savings from minimizing 
flight time and fuel burn may be offset by these charges. TAP could factor this data into account 
in its cost function during route optimization and find the overall lowest cost route.  
13.2.3. Enhancing Functionality 
The TAP prototype put forth a powerful and unprecedented collection of functionality that was 
sufficient to distinguish it from other route optimization tools and thereby establish its initial 
marketability. Its real power, however, is the opportunity it provides to expand the functionality in 
new directions, even while maintaining its intended function as a route-optimization advisory tool 
in the cockpit. Several possibilities are described that were either envisioned early in the project 
but not built due to limited resources or emerged later with insufficient time or priority to be 
implemented.  
Post-tactical optimization: The TAP prototype’s route optimization function was derived from 
AOP’s strategic intent-based conflict resolution function. This function required the aircraft’s 
auto-flight system to be coupled to FMS navigation on a fully defined route to the destination. This 
allowed the TAP prototype to predict time and fuel to the destination on the current route and 
compare it to the same metrics for various candidate route modifications, returning the one that 
generated the greatest savings (and was conflict free). In this way, the TAP prototype was a 
“relative route” optimizer, not an “absolute route” optimizer. During the operational evaluation, 
Alaska Airlines recognized a need for an absolute optimization function that would be usable after 
significant tactical maneuvering for weather deviated the aircraft far from its FMS route. “Post-
tactical optimization” would find the most cost-effective, conflict-free route from present position 
to the destination or other specified waypoint, thereby creating a new strategic plan. TAP’s AOP 
heritage may be useful in that it included a prototype function called “Strategic Reroute” that 
performed this service [13].  
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Ride Quality Optimization: The TAP prototype was developed with three optimization objective 
options: time, fuel, and trip cost. All three objectives related to the direct operating cost of the 
flight. Multiple objectives were included to show the flexibility of TAP’s optimization capability, 
including allowing the pilot to switch between objectives during the flight. However, the fitness 
function of the TAP prototype’s genetic algorithm could easily be modified to include other 
optimization objectives not related to operating cost, either as a separate objective option or in 
weighted combination with any of the three original metrics. A prime example would be ride 
quality. By integrating candidate routes through a 3D “heat map” of predicted turbulence contours, 
such as GTG, a TAP derivative could compute the cumulative exposure of the aircraft to turbulence 
and seek the route modification (lateral and/or vertical changes) that minimizes the total exposure. 
It would be similar to how TAP integrates routes through the 3D wind field to find the minimum 
fuel-burn option. As described earlier, localized areas of greater turbulence could be polygonised 
and avoided completely.  
4D Constraint Adherence: Scheduled aircraft operations are often concerned with on-time arrival 
statistics. The particular desire is to avoid frequently arriving late (usually defined as 15 minutes 
or greater), but early arrivals can also be problematic due to gate availability. The TAP prototype’s 
optimization algorithm was not designed to ensure solutions conformed to an arrival time window, 
primarily because there was no ready data source for such time constraints, but also because it was 
not needed to demonstrate TAP’s operational value. Provided the time constraints are available, it 
would be straightforward to modify TAP’s fitness function to require solution compliance to the 
constraints. A softer constraint of “get as close as you can” could also be implemented, provided 
the trade-off with other objectives (e.g., minimizing trip cost) could be defined. 
4D Solutions: An improvement upon the 4D constraint adherence functionality would be the 
implementation of an additional solution advisory type: speed solutions. The TAP prototype 
produces lateral, vertical, and combo solutions that best meet the objectives of minimizing flight 
time, fuel burn, or trip cost. The airspeed is treated as an input, not an output. However, for 
situations in which the most economical solution would be to slow down, new functionality could 
enable a TAP derivative to provide that solution, either as an actual speed (or Mach) target, or 
more flexibly as a new Cost Index (which governs the speed profile). In fact, TAP could produce 
the best combination of lateral path, altitude, and speed (Cost Index) to meet an arrival time target 
with minimum operating cost. As before, the key will be to provide a meaningful data source for 
the arrival time constraints. 
New Solution Patterns: The solution patterns used by TAP’s genetic algorithm define the range 
of allowable geometry for the route modifications. The TAP prototype contained lateral patterns 
for one and two off-route waypoints, as did the combo patterns with an added altitude change. 
Other patterns could be developed that might provide additional operational utility. For example, 
all of the initial patterns defined the first maneuver as being executed essentially right away, thus 
a delayed first maneuver (e.g., future turn-out point or climb/descent point) was not possible. This 
could easily be added to the existing patterns. Another pattern that was implemented in AOP but 
not inherited by the TAP prototype was a “lateral offset” pattern that mimicked a side-step 
maneuver. A particularly useful pattern to implement would be a vertical pattern with multiple 
climb/descent points, including a delayed first maneuver. Improving upon the current design for 
TAP vertical solutions, which assumes an immediate climb/descent is maintained until the top-of-
descent prior to arrival, the proposed pattern would assist the pilot in step-climb planning using 
updated winds and local constraints (e.g., weather, traffic, turbulence).  
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Handoff Monitoring: Furthering the discussion above on airspace structure, a key finding from 
FT-2 was the importance to air traffic controllers on the timing of route modification requests 
relative to handoff between sectors. With the incorporation of sector boundary data and some basic 
timing assumptions, a TAP derivative could infer the handoff status of the aircraft between sectors 
and advise the flight crew on the best time to make the ATC request to minimize the workload of 
request deferment or possible denial due to the transitioning of aircraft control between sectors. 
Though it is uncertain whether this function would accrue measureable cost savings, it would 
certainly facilitate pilot/controller procedures which would likely improve the perceived utility of 
TASAR by both parties. 
Machine Learning: ATC approval of TASAR requests is dependent on some factors that are 
deterministic and have available data, such as proximate traffic conflicts and SUAs, but also many 
other factors that are non-deterministic or involve information not readily available to airspace 
users. For instance, air traffic controllers are bound to many intricate requirements spelled out in 
inter-facility LOAs that affect what they can or cannot approve. Other factors such as sector 
capacity metrics, weather impacts, and local restrictions around arrival/departure flows of major 
airports, further complicate the ability to predict whether any given route modification request is 
approvable or whether slight modifications might help. This may be a good application for 
machine learning algorithms that accumulate a knowledge base and mine the data for 
characteristics that may increase ATC approval probability. This approach may improve upon 
other techniques that bias toward historically approved routes in that it would allow both ATC and 
aircraft operators to evolve toward greater airspace access, using as much operational flexibility 
as the current conditions permit. 
13.3. TASAR Roadmap 
In Chapter 2, the discussion on TASAR’s motivation detailed how it was conceived as a catalyst 
for achieving a future vision of operational autonomy for airspace users. By pursuing a strategy of 
technology insertion, TASAR would place key elements of the future technology into service 
today in a non-safety-critical role to enable its maturation and verification in an operational 
environment. Simultaneously, TASAR would initiate a culture change by acclimating the 
commercial aviation community to the idea of cockpit-based proactive trajectory management. By 
introducing the technology and evolving the culture, TASAR could potentially generate 
momentum toward the future vision.  
Since planting these seeds in no way guarantees the final outcome, a high-level roadmap [7] was 
devised to chart a potential path from TASAR to the autonomy vision of full “Airborne Trajectory 
Management” (ABTM). The roadmap was devised such that each interim step could also be a 
viable and beneficial ending point, should the future vision be unobtainable. The roadmap’s 
endpoint uses the general term “ABTM” instead of “AFR” as described in Chapter 2 in order to 
decouple the envisioned capability from NASA’s proposed concept of implementation. While this 
roadmap was developed primarily with today’s IFR operators in mind, the applications from 
TASAR to ABTM are applicable to new types of operations as well, for example Urban Air 
Mobility (UAM) as described in reference [69]. In UAM, trajectory management automation 
onboard the aircraft would serve both safety-critical functions for traffic separation and non-safety-
critical flight optimization functions for conserving energy use while efficiently adjusting to 
dynamic constraints along the flight and at the destination. 
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Shown in Figure 43, the five-step roadmap begins with 1: Basic TASAR as described in this 
report. The subsequent steps include 2: Digital TASAR, adopting the use of Data Comm for route 
modification requests and approvals; 3: 4D TASAR, adding the speed dimension, time constraints, 
and integration with time-based arrival flow management processes under development by the 
FAA; 4: Strategic ABTM, adding user authority to define and modify downstream, strategic 
portions of the trajectory; and 5: Full ABTM that ultimately incorporates the functions and 
1: Basic TASAR 2: Digital TASAR 
3: 4D TASAR 4: Strategic ABTM 
5: Full ABTM 
Figure 43. Roadmap from TASAR to full airborne trajectory management. From ref. [7]. 
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responsibilities of self-separation in the current airspace sector, enabling full operational 
autonomy.  
The roadmap represents a sustainable progression in which each additional integration step 
provides new benefits. It takes advantage of existing NextGen programs and industry standards 
development, while minimizing the number of hardware upgrades required of airspace users to 
take advantage of these advanced capabilities to achieve dynamically optimized business 
trajectories. Just like TASAR, each subsequent step in the roadmap provides operational benefits 
to first adopters so that investment decisions do not depend upon other segments of the user 
community becoming equipped before benefits can be realized. The issues of equipment 
certification and operational approval of new procedures are addressed in a way that minimizes 
their impact on the transition. This is accomplished by deferring a change in the assignment of 
separation responsibility until a large body of operational data (acquired during all previous steps) 
is available to support the safety case for this change in the last roadmap step. This design 
philosophy also delays paradigm shifts in the control of air traffic that could create barriers to 
transition. It is only after extensive experience has been gained through operations in the earlier 
steps that rules and procedures would be changed to fully exploit new capabilities. Ultimately, 
each roadmap step is supportable on its own merits, enabling the choice by each operator on how 
far to proceed on the roadmap. 
To progress forward on this roadmap, the industry can follow the model of TASAR by 
implementing the new capabilities in an optional capacity at first, such that it does not replace an 
operationally required function until the capability is matured. For instance, Digital TASAR could 
be implemented using the same TAP solution complexity as was developed for voice requests, 
thereby making TASAR requests by Data Comm optional until it becomes standard practice. 
Similarly, 4D TASAR could be implemented initially for minor arrival time adjustments within 
the pilot’s current authority until true 4D operations (e.g., required times of arrival, interval 
management) are fully rolled out. In fact, TASAR advancements embodied in this roadmap may 
actually accelerate user community adoption of these NextGen capabilities. 
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14. Conclusion 
The commercial aircraft cockpit is among the most under-utilized workspaces in en route 
airspace operations. With little access to information on the traffic environment or weather beyond 
the range of their onboard radar, flight crews have had few if any tools to reliably improve upon 
the flight plan created hours earlier, even as evolving airspace conditions create new opportunities. 
As a result, flight crews in high-altitude airspace have largely fallen into the passive role of flight 
plan followers. By introducing TASAR, NASA is attempting to cultivate a transformational 
change: transforming flight crews from flight plan followers into proactive trajectory managers.  
TASAR is at the nexus of data connectivity, onboard computing, and flight-crew decision-
making, and it embodies the idea that when all three are brought to bear, the flight no longer needs 
to be a static execution as encapsulated in the pre-departure flight plan. Leveraging unprecedented 
connectivity to up-to-date operational data, TASAR gives flight crews the computational tools 
they need to dynamically re-optimize their trajectory throughout much of the flight. In the long 
term, this cultural transformation is envisioned to lead to significantly greater aircraft autonomy 
in airspace operations. The emergent capability to self-manage trajectories will enable future 
operators to safely operate amidst growing demand in the National Airspace System while 
providing unparalleled operational flexibility and flight efficiency. 
The TASAR project was established to develop and test prototype cockpit technology for in-
flight route optimization, with the intent of transferring the technology to industry as a first step 
toward these transformational goals. The project was formulated around a five-point strategy:  
1. Fill a current need: The TASAR project would help establish a business case for the emerging 
“connected EFB” by developing a compelling software application for this revolutionary 
new platform. The software application would introduce a state-of-the-art airborne 
trajectory management function and a proactive role for pilots using it.  
2. Demonstrate a clear business case: The TASAR project would focus the technology on 
achieving direct-operating-cost savings. The project would estimate the cost-savings benefit 
and make these preliminary estimates available to industry early in the project to promote 
interest and engagement. 
3. Reduce risk of technology transfer: The TASAR project would conduct preliminary analyses 
of safety, human factors, and FAA authorization requirements. The project would conduct 
flight trials to validate the technology’s viability and robustness in real aircraft operating in 
the airspace system. 
4. Bridge the valley: The TASAR project would seek partner airlines to conduct operational 
evaluations of the technology in revenue service. Operational data from the evaluations 
would be used to validate the preliminary benefit estimates and provide justification for 
industry to carry it forward. 
5. Promote industry investment in basic and derivative products: The TASAR project would 
encourage companies to follow or participate in NASA’s activities, increasing awareness of 
TASAR as a foundation for technology innovation while creating an initial cadre of TASAR 
industry experts. 
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Each of these strategy points was achieved. The connected EFB and TASAR application were a 
well-suited match of platform and function, and the timing was fortuitous with ubiquitous airborne 
connectivity just beginning to emerge as an industry revolution. TASAR’s flight optimization 
function provided the direct link to operational benefits that the airlines needed to build a business 
case for the connected EFB. NASA’s preliminary, model-based benefit estimates secured initial 
airline interest which in turn helped to direct industry’s attention toward TASAR. The project’s 
preliminary analyses of safety, certification, and operational approval, vetted with FAA policy 
authors, established confidence in the industry that the TASAR application could be implemented 
under current regulations with minimal risk.  
NASA’s TASAR prototype software, TAP, offered state-of-the-art technology with unique 
capabilities and attributes. Its innovative functionality, industry appeal, and growth potential all 
contributed to its award as 2016 NASA Software of the Year and recognition as a recipient of the 
international 2019 R&D 100 Award. The attention paid to human factors throughout the project 
produced a useful and usable tool that consistently received high marks from evaluation pilots. 
TAP was matured through multiple high fidelity simulations and flight trials that also cemented 
airline interest in conducting an operational evaluation on airline aircraft in partnership with 
NASA.  
The Alaska Airlines operational evaluation, a significant undertaking, was completed 
successfully. Three aircraft conducted over 100 TASAR flights in revenue service, and Alaska 
Airlines technical pilots identified multiple distinct applications of the technology that would 
clearly benefit airline operations. Quantitative estimates of achieved cost savings validated the 
preliminary model-based benefit estimates. Three aviation system suppliers from industry 
participated in the operational evaluation largely at their own expense and thus had front row 
seating for its implementation and assessment by a potential customer. 
Evidence suggests that the technology insertion strategy of TASAR has taken root. At project 
completion, each of the top six U.S. airlines had expressed interest in acquiring TASAR for their 
fleets. Six commercial industry vendors had received preliminary evaluation licenses for TASAR, 
and multiple commercial license applications were submitted to NASA. These companies and 
others have already begun exploring derivative products around integrating TASAR with their 
own technology innovations and new data sources. All of this indicates the emergence of a healthy 
and sustainable market for TASAR and bodes well for the roadmap beyond TASAR.  
The arc of the TASAR project began with an ambitious vision of aircraft operational autonomy 
and ended with the prototype technology on track toward commercialization by industry and 
adoption by the aircraft operator community as a catalyst application of airborne trajectory 
management. Key to this project’s accomplishments was NASA’s early, insightful investment in 
research and development of advanced technology for aircraft autonomy. This foundation enabled 
TASAR to rapidly progress from TRL 1 to 7, highly unusual in NASA Aeronautics but positioning 
TASAR well for a successful handoff to industry. If widespread adoption ensues, the cultural 
transformation inspired by TASAR could become a catalyst to eventually achieving the vision of 
aircraft operational autonomy.  
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15. Abbreviations 
2D two-dimensional 
3D three-dimensional 
4D four-dimensional  
ABTM Airborne Trajectory Management 
AC Advisory Circular  
ACARS Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System 
ACPU2 Gogo Airborne Control Processing Unit 
ACSS Aviation Communication & Surveillance Systems 
ADC Air Data Computer 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast  
AFR Autonomous Flight Rules 
AFS FAA Flight Standards  
AIAA American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics  
AID Aircraft Interface Device (also AID2) 
AIR FAA Aircraft Certification  
AOP Autonomous Operations Planner 
AOSP Airspace Operations and Safety Program  
API Application Programming Interface  
APM Aircraft Performance Model 
ARTCC Air Route Traffic Control Center 
ATC Air Traffic Control  
ATD Airspace Technology Demonstrations Project 
AWC Aviation Weather Center  
AWRP Airborne Weather Radar Processor 
BADA 4 Eurocontrol Base of Aircraft Data Version 4 
BFP Baseline Finish Point 
BSP Baseline Start Point 
CAS Calibrated Airspeed 
CBT Computer Based Trainer 
CD Conflict Detection 
CDTI Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
CIFP Coded Instrument Flight Procedures 
CL Confidence Level 
CONUS Conterminous United States  
CRM Crew Resource Management 
CS Civil Servant 
CTD Concepts and Technology Development Project 
DAL Design Assurance Level  
Data Comm Data Communications  
Depr. Depreciation 
DER Designated Engineering Representative  
DOC Direct Operating Cost 
DTIF Display Traffic Information File 
Abbreviations 
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EDS External Data Server 
EFB Electronic Flight Bag  
EMI Electro-Magnetic Interference  
ERAM En Route Automation Modernization 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FACET Future ATM Concept Evaluation Tool  
FEC Failure Effects Classification  
FMS Flight Management System  
FOB Flight Operations Bulletin 
ft feet 
FT Flight Trials  
FT-1 Flight Trial 1  
FT-2 Flight Trial 2  
FT-3 Flight Trial 3 
Gal. Gallons 
GAMA General Aviation Manufacturers Association 
GDS Ground Data Server 
GRIB2 Gridded Binary Edition 2 
GS Ground Speed 
GTG Graphical Turbulence Guidance 
HIRF High Intensity Radio Frequency  
HITL Human-in-the-Loop  
HITL-1 Human-in-the-Loop Simulation 1  
HITL-2 Human-in-the-Loop Simulation 2  
HMI Human Machine Interface 
IFC In-Flight Connectivity  
IFR Instrument Flight Rules  
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions  
IT Information Technology 
KBHM Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport, Alabama 
KMGM Montgomery Regional Airport, Alabama 
KPDX Portland International Airport, Oregon 
KPHF Newport News / Williamsburg International Airport, Virginia 
KSEA Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Washington 
KTPA Tampa International Airport, Florida 
LOA Letters of Agreement 
lbs pounds 
M Mean 
Maint. Maintenance 
MFD Multi-Function Display 
MoE Margin of Error 
Mspec Management Specification  
NAS National Airspace System  
NATCA National Air Traffic Controllers Association  
NBAA National Business Aviation Association  
NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System  
Abbreviations 
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NIA National Institute of Aerospace 
nmi nautical miles 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  
NRA NASA Research Announcement 
NRS Navigation Reference System 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
OPL Operator Performance Lab (University of Iowa) 
OpSpec Operational Specification  
OSA Operational Safety Assessment  
PBGA Pattern-Based Genetic Algorithm 
PED Portable Electronic Device  
PF Pilot Flying 
PFD Primary Flight Display 
PM Pilot Monitoring 
POI Principal Operations Inspector  
RAP NOAA “Rapid Refresh” product 
RNP Required Navigation Performance 
R&D Research and Development 
SA Situation Awareness 
SAA Space Act Agreement 
SART Situation Awareness Rating Technique 
SBS FAA Surveillance & Broadcast Services  
SCAP Standardized Computerized Airplane Performance 
SD Standard Deviation 
SIGMET Significant Meteorological Information 
SIP NASA Aeronautics Strategic Implementation Plan 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SOP Standard Operating Procedures 
STAP Simple Text Avionics Protocol 
STC Supplemental Type Certificate  
std dev Standard deviation 
SUA Special Use Airspace  
SUS System Usability Scale 
SWIM System Wide Information Management  
TAP Traffic Aware Planner 
TFP TAP Finish Point 
TSP TAP Start Point 
TASAR Traffic Aware Strategic Aircrew Requests 
TC Type Certificate 
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System 
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
TDA TAP Display Adaptor 
TFP TAP Finish Point 
TG Trajectory Generator 
TRL Technology Readiness Level  
TSO Technical Standard Order 
Abbreviations 
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TSP TAP Start Point 
UAM Urban Air Mobility 
USB Universal Serial Bus 
UTAS United Technologies Corporation Aerospace Systems 
VFR Visual Flight Rules  
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
VOR Very-high-frequency Omnidirectional Range 
WSI Weather Services International (later, The Weather Company) 
ZJX Jacksonville Air Route Traffic Control Center 
ZTL Atlanta Air Route Traffic Control Center 
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